Coordinates: 36°28′47.00″N 140°33′13.24″E / 36.47972°N 140.5536778°E / 36.47972; 140.5536778

There have been two Tokaimura nuclear accidents.

1. On 11 March 1997, in a Dōnen plant.
2. On 30 September 1999, in a JCO plant.

[edit] In 1997

The first Tokaimura nuclear accident was the nuclear disaster which occurred on 11 March 1997, in a nuclear reprocessing plant of the Dōnen (Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation). Another name is the Dōnen accident (動燃事故 (Dōnen jiko?)).

On the night of 11 March 1997, a small explosion occurred in a nuclear reprocessing plant of the Dōnen. In this accident, approximately 40 workers were exposed to radiation.

[edit] In 1999

The second and more serious Tokaimura nuclear accident (Japanese: Tōkai-mura JCO-rinkai-jiko) indicates the nuclear disaster which occurred on 30 September 1999,[1][2][3] resulted in two deaths.[4] It was the worst civilian nuclear radiation accident in pre-Fukushima Japan.

The criticality accident occurred in a uranium reprocessing facility operated by JCO (formerly Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co.), a subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. in the village of Tōkai, Naka District, Ibaraki Prefecture.[5]

The accident occurred as three workers were preparing a small batch of fuel for the Jōyō experimental fast breeder reactor, using uranium enriched to 18.8% with the fissile radionuclide (radioisotope) known as U‑235 (with the remainder being the less-fissile U‑238). It was JCO's first batch of fuel for that reactor in three years, and no proper qualification and training requirements appear to have been established to prepare those workers for the job. At around 10:35 a.m., a precipitation tank reached critical mass when its fill level, containing about 16 kilograms of uranium, reached about 40 liters (about 35 pounds and 11 US gallons respectively).[5]

[edit] Details

Criticality was reached upon the technicians adding a seventh bucket of an aqueous uranium solution known as uranyl nitrate to the tank. The nuclear fission chain reaction became self-sustaining and began to emit intense gamma and neutron radiation. The technicians, one of whom had his body draped over the tank, observed a blue flash (of, possibly, Cherenkov radiation) and gamma-radiation alarms sounded.[4][6] The two technicians closest to the tank immediately experienced pain, nausea, difficulty breathing, and other symptoms. The technician closest to the tank lost consciousness in the decontamination room a few minutes later and began to vomit.[7] There was no explosion, but fission products (fission fragments of U‑235 with atomic masses typically around 95 and 137, such as yttrium‑94 and barium‑140) were progressively released inside the building.

Being a wet process with an intended liquid result, the water promoted the chain reaction by serving as a neutron moderator, whereby neutrons emitted from fissioned nuclei are slowed so they are more readily absorbed by neighboring nuclei, inducing them to fission in turn.

The criticality continued intermittently for about 20 hours. As the solution boiled vigorously, steam bubbles attenuated the liquid water's action as a neutron moderator (see Void coefficient ) and the solution lost criticality. However, the reaction resumed as the solution cooled and the voids disappeared. The following morning, workers permanently stopped the reaction by draining water from a cooling jacket surrounding the precipitation tank since that water was serving as a neutron reflector. A boric acid solution (boron being a good neutron absorber) was then added to the tank to ensure that the contents remained subcritical. These operations exposed 27 workers to radioactivity.[5]

The direct cause of the criticality accident was workers putting uranyl nitrate solution containing about 16 kg of uranium, which exceeded the critical mass for the precipitation tank. The tank was not designed to hold this type of solution and was not configured to prevent criticality.

[edit] Evacuation

Five hours after the start of the criticality, evacuation commenced of some 161 people from 39 households within a 350 meter radius from the conversion building. Residents were allowed home two days later after sandbags and other shielding ensured no hazard from residual gamma radiation. Twelve hours after the start of the incident residents within 10 km were asked to stay indoors as a precautionary measure, and this restriction was lifted the following afternoon.[5]

[edit] Aftermath

Dozens of emergency workers and nearby residents were hospitalized and hundreds of thousands of others were forced to remain indoors for 24 hours.[8] At least 667 workers, emergency responders, and nearby residents were exposed to excess radiation as a result of the accident.[4]

A dose of 50 millisieverts (mSv) is the maximum allowable annual dose for Japanese nuclear workers.[5] For context, 8000 mSv (800 rem) is normally a fatal dose and more than 10,000 mSv is almost invariably fatal. Normal background radiation amounts to an annual exposure of about 3 mSv.[4] There were 56 plant workers whose exposures ranged up to 23 mSv and a further 21 workers received elevated doses when draining the precipitation tank. Seven workers immediately outside the plant received doses estimated at 6–15 mSv (combined neutron and gamma effects).[9] The three operators' doses were far above permissible limits at 3,000, 10,000, and 17,000 mSv; the two receiving the higher doses died several months later.[4] The most severely exposed worker had his body draped over the tank when it went critical. He suffered serious burns to most of his body, experienced severe damage to his internal organs, and had a near-zero white blood cell count.[4]

The cause of the accident was said to be "human error and serious breaches of safety principles", according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.[5]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

[edit] External links

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (福島第一原子力発電所事故, Fukushima Dai-ichi ( pronunciation) genshiryoku hatsudensho jiko?) was a series of equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns, and releases of radioactive materials at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, following the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011.[5][6] It is the largest nuclear disaster since the Chernobyl disaster of 1986.[7]

The plant comprises six separate boiling water reactors originally designed by General Electric (GE), and maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). At the time of the quake, Reactor 4 had been de-fueled while 5 and 6 were in cold shutdown for planned maintenance.[8] Immediately after the earthquake, the remaining reactors 1-3 shut down automatically, and emergency generators came online to control electronics and coolant systems. However the tsunami following the earthquake quickly flooded the low-lying rooms in which the emergency generators were housed. The flooded generators failed, cutting power to the critical pumps that must continuously circulate coolant water through a nuclear reactor to keep it from melting down. As the pumps stopped, the reactors overheated due to the high radioactive decay heat that normally continues for hours or days after a nuclear reactor shuts down.

At this point, only prompt flooding of the reactors with seawater could have cooled the reactors quickly enough to prevent meltdown. Salt water flooding was delayed because it would ruin the costly reactors permanently. Flooding with seawater was finally commenced only after the government ordered that seawater be used, and at this point it was already too late to prevent meltdown.[9]

As the water boiled away and levels in the fuel rods pools dropped, they began to overheat severely, and to melt down. In the hours and days that followed, Reactors 1, 2 and 3 experienced full meltdown.[10][11]

In the intense heat and pressure of the melting reactors, a reaction between the nuclear fuel metal cladding and the remaining water surrounding them produced explosive hydrogen gas. As workers struggled to cool and shut down the reactors, several hydrogen-air chemical explosions occurred.[12][13]

Concerns about the repeated small explosions, the atmospheric venting of radioactive gasses, and the possibility of larger explosions led to a 20 km (12 mi)-radius evacuation around the plant. During the early days of the accident workers were temporarily evacuated at various times for radiation safety reasons. At the same time, sea water that had been exposed to the melting rods was returned to the sea heated and radioactive in large volumes for several months until recirculating units could be put in place to repeatedly cool and re-use a limited quantity of water for cooling. The earthquake damage and flooding in the wake of the tsunami hindered external assistance. Electrical power was slowly restored for some of the reactors, allowing for automated cooling.[14]

Japanese officials initially assessed the accident as Level 4 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) despite the views of other international agencies that it should be higher. The level was later raised to 5 and eventually to 7, the maximum scale value.[15][16] The Japanese government and TEPCO have been criticized in the foreign press for poor communication with the public and improvised cleanup efforts.[17][18][19] On 20 March, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano announced that the plant would be decommissioned once the crisis was over.

The Japanese government estimates the total amount of radioactivity released into the atmosphere was approximately one-tenth as much as was released during the Chernobyl disaster.[20] Significant amounts of radioactive material have also been released into ground and ocean waters. Measurements taken by the Japanese government 30–50 km from the plant showed caesium-137 levels high enough to cause concern,[21] leading the government to ban the sale of food grown in the area. Tokyo officials temporarily recommended that tap water should not be used to prepare food for infants.[22][23] In May 2012, TEPCO reported that at least 900 PBq had been released "into the atmosphere in March last year [2011] alone" although it has been said staff may have been told to lie, and give false readings to try and cover up true levels of radiation.[24][25]

A few of the plant's workers were severely injured or killed by the disaster conditions resulting from the earthquake. There were no immediate deaths due to direct radiation exposures, but at least six workers have exceeded lifetime legal limits for radiation and more than 300 have received significant radiation doses. Predicted future cancer deaths due to accumulated radiation exposures in the population living near Fukushima have ranged from none[26] to 100[27] to a non-peer-reviewed "guesstimate"[28] of 1,000.[20] On 16 December 2011, Japanese authorities declared the plant to be stable, although it would take decades to decontaminate the surrounding areas and to decommission the plant altogether.[29] On July 5, 2012, the parliament appointed The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) submitted its inquiry report to the Japanese parliament,[30] while the government appointed Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company submitted its final report to the Japanese government on July 23, 2012.[31]Tepco admitted for the first time on October 12, 2012 that it had failed to take stronger measures to prevent disasters for fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants.[32][33][34][35]

[edit] Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant

The Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant consists of six light water, boiling water reactors (BWR) designed by General Electric driving electrical generators with a combined power of 4.7 gigawatts, making Fukushima I one of the 25 largest nuclear power stations in the world. Fukushima I was the first GE designed nuclear plant to be constructed and run entirely by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).

Unit 1 is a 439 MWe type (BWR3) reactor constructed in July 1967. It commenced commercial electrical production on 26 March 1971.[36] It was designed for a peak ground acceleration of 0.18 g (1.74 m/s2) and a response spectrum based on the 1952 Kern County earthquake.[37] Units 2 and 3 are both 784 MWe type BWR-4 reactors, Unit 2 commenced operating in July 1974 and Unit 3 in March 1976. The earthquake design basis for all units ranged from 0.42 g (4.12 m/s2) to 0.46 g (4.52 m/s2).[38][39] All units were inspected after the 1978 Miyagi earthquake when the ground acceleration was 0.125 g (1.22 m/s2) for 30 seconds, but no damage to the critical parts of the reactor was discovered.[37]

Units 1–5 have a Mark 1 type (light bulb torus) containment structure, Unit 6 has Mark 2 type (over/under) containment structure.[37] From September 2010, Unit 3 has been partially fuelled by mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel.[40]

At the time of the accident, the units and central storage facility contained the following numbers of fuel assemblies:[41]

Location	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit 5	Unit 6	Central Storage
Reactor Fuel Assemblies	400	548	548	0	548	764	0
Spent Fuel Assemblies	292	587	514	1331	946	876	6375
Fuel	UOx	UOx	UO2/MOX	UOx	UOx	UOx	UO2/MOX
New Fuel Assemblies[42]	100	28	52	204	48	64	N/A

[edit] Cooling requirements

See also: Decay heat – Power reactors in shutdown and Nuclear reactor safety systems

Power reactors work by splitting atoms, typically uranium, in a chain reaction. The reactor continues to generate heat after the chain reaction is stopped because of the radioactive decay of unstable isotopes, fission products, created by this process. This decay of unstable isotopes, and the decay heat that results, cannot be stopped.[43][44] Immediately after shutdown, this decay heat amounts to approximately 6% of full thermal heat production of the reactor.[43] The decay heat in the reactor core decreases over several days before reaching cold shutdown levels.[45] Nuclear fuel rods that have reached cold shutdown temperatures typically require another several years of water cooling in a spent fuel pool before decay heat production reduces to the point that they can be safely transferred to dry storage casks.[46]

To safely remove this decay heat, reactor operators must continue to circulate cooling water over fuel rods in the reactor core and spent fuel pond.[43][47] In the reactor core, circulation is accomplished by use of high pressure systems that pump water through the reactor pressure vessel and into heat exchangers. These systems transfer heat to a secondary heat exchanger via the essential service water system, taking away the heat which is pumped out to the sea or site cooling towers.[48]

To circulate cooling water when the reactor is shut down and not producing electricity, cooling pumps can be powered by other units on-site, by other units off-site through the grid, or by diesel generators.[47][49] In addition, boiling water reactors have steam-turbine driven emergency core cooling systems that can be directly operated by steam still being produced after a reactor shutdown, which can inject water directly into the reactor.[50] Steam turbines results in less dependence on emergency generators, but steam turbines only operate so long as the reactor is producing steam. Some electrical power, provided by batteries, is needed to operate the valves and monitoring systems.

If the water in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool had been heated to boiling temperature, the decay heat has the capacity to boil off about 70 tonnes of water per day (12 gallons per minute), which puts the requirement for cooling water in context.[51] On 16 April 2011, TEPCO declared that Reactors 1–4's cooling systems were beyond repair and would have to be replaced.[52]

The reason that cooling is so essential for a nuclear reactor, is that many of the internal components and fuel assembly cladding is made from zircaloy. At normal operating temperatures (of approximately 300 degrees Celsius), zircaloy is inert. However, when heated to above 500 degrees celsius in the presence of steam,[53] zircaloy undergoes an exothermic reaction where the zircaloy oxidises, and produces free hydrogen gas. The reaction between the zirconium cladding and the fuel can also lower the melting point of the fuel and thus speed up a core melt.[54]

The reactor's emergency diesel generators and DC batteries, crucial components in powering the reactors' cooling systems in the event of a power loss, were located in the basements of the reactor turbine buildings. The reactor design plans provided by General Electric specified placing the generators and batteries in that location, but mid-level engineers working on the construction of the plant were concerned that this made the back-up power systems vulnerable to flooding. TEPCO elected to strictly follow General Electric's design in the construction of the reactors.[55]

[edit] Safety history

[edit] 1967: Changing the layout of the emergency-cooling system, without reporting it

On 27 February 2012, NISA ordered TEPCO to report by 12 March 2012 about the reasoning to change the layout for the piping for an emergency cooling system from the plans originally registered in 1966 before the reactor was taken in operation.

After the plant was hit by the tsunami, the isolation condenser should have taken over the function of the ordinary cooling pumps, by condensing the steam from the pressure vessel into water to be used for cooling the reactor. But the condenser did not function properly, and TEPCO could not confirm whether a valve was opened.

In the original papers submitted – in July 1966 – for government approval of the plans to set up the reactor, the piping systems for two units in the isolation condenser were separated from each other. But in the application for the construction plan of the reactor – submitted in October 1967 – the piping layout was changed by TEPCO, and the two piping systems were connected outside the reactor. The changes were not reported in violation of all legal regulations.[56]

[edit] 1976: Falsification of safety records by TEPCO

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex was central to a falsified-records scandal that led to the departure of a number of senior executives of TEPCO. It also led to disclosures of previously unreported problems at the plant,[57] although testimony by Dale Bridenbaugh, a lead GE designer, purports that General Electric was warned of major design flaws in 1976, resulting in the resignations of several designers who protested GE's negligence.[58][59][60]

In 2002, TEPCO admitted it had falsified safety records at the No. 1 reactor at Fukushima Daiichi. As a result of the scandal and a fuel leak at Fukushima Daini, the company had to shut down all of its 17 nuclear reactors to take responsibility.[61] A power board distributing electricity to a reactor's temperature control valves was not examined for 11 years. Inspections did not cover devices related to cooling systems, such as water pump motors and diesel generators.[62]

[edit] 1991: Back-up generator of reactor nr. 1 flooded

On 30 October 1991, one of two backup generators of reactor nr. 1 did fail, after it was flooded in the basement of the reactor buildings. Seawater used for the cooling of the reactor was leaking into the turbine-building from a corroded pipe at a rate of 20 cubic meters per hour. This was told by former TEPCO employees to the Japan Broadcasting Corporation news-service in December 2011. An engineer told, that he informed his superiors about this accident, and that he mentioned the possibility that a tsunami could inflict damage to the generators in the turbine-buildings near the sea. After this, TEPCO did not move the generators to higher grounds, but instead, TEPCO installed doors to prevent water leaking into the generator rooms. The Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission commented that it would revise the safety guidelines for designing nuclear plants and would enforce the installation of additional power sources. On 29 December 2011, TEPCO admitted all these facts: its report mentioned, that the emergency power system room was flooded through a door and some holes for cables, but the power supply to the reactor was not cut off by the flooding, and the reactor was stopped for one day. One of the two power sources was completely submerged, but its drive mechanism had remained unaffected.[63][64][65]

[edit] 2006: The Japanese government opposes a court-order

In March 2006, the Japanese government opposed a court order to close a nuclear plant in the west part of the country over doubts about its ability to withstand an earthquake. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency believed it was "safe" and that "all safety analyses were appropriately conducted".[66]

[edit] 2007: Tsunami-study ignored

In 2007, TEPCO did set up a department to supervise all its nuclear facilities, and until June 2011 its chairman was Masao Yoshida, the chief of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant. An in-house study in 2008 pointed out that there was an immediate need to improve the protection of the power station from flooding by seawater. This study mentioned the possibility of tsunami-waves up to 10.2 meters. Officials of the department at the company's headquarters insisted that such a risk was unrealistic and did not take the prediction seriously.[67]

[edit] 2008: Seismic-concerns

In addition to concerns from within Japan, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also expressed concern about the ability of Japan's nuclear plants to withstand seismic activity. At a meeting of the G8's Nuclear Safety and Security Group, held in Tokyo in 2008, an IAEA expert warned that a strong earthquake with a magnitude above 7.0 could pose a "serious problem" for Japan's nuclear power stations.[68]

[edit] 2011: Results of governmental investigations

On request of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, on 2 October 2011, the Japanese Government released a report of TEPCO to NISA. These papers proved that TEPCO was well aware of the possibility that the plant could be hit by a tsunami with waves far higher than the 5.7 meters which the plant was designed to withstand. Simulations done in 2008, based on the destruction caused by the 1896-earthquake in this area, made it clear that waves between 8.4 and 10.2 meters could overflow the plant. Three years later the report was sent to NISA, where it arrived on the 7 March 2011, just 4 days before the plant was hit by the tsunami. Further studies by scientists and an examination of the plant's tsunami resistance measures were not planned by TEPCO before April 2011, and no further actions were planned to deal with this subject before October 2012. TEPCO official Junichi Matsumoto said that the company did not feel the need to take prompt action on the estimates, which were still tentative calculations in the research stage. An official of NISA said that these results should have been made public by TEPCO, and that the firm should have taken measures right away.[69][70]

This all was in sharp contrast with the events at the Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant where the dike around the plant was raised to 6.1 meters after evaluations showed the possibility of tsunami-waves higher than previously expected. Although the dike was not completely finished at 11 March 2011, the plant was able to ride out the tsunami, even though the external power-sources in Tokai were lost also. With two (of three) functioning sea-water-pumps and the emergency diesel-generator the reactor could be kept safely in cold shutdown.[71]

On 26 November, a TEPCO spokesman mentioned that TEPCO would have been better prepared to cope with the tsunami in March 2011, if it had taken the 2008-study more seriously. TEPCO was also willing to use the estimates of renewed study done by a national civil engineering society for its facility management.[67]

Nuclear Safety Commission Chairman Haruki Madarame told a parliamentary inquiry in February 2012 that "Japan's atomic safety rules are inferior to global standards and left the country unprepared for the Fukushima nuclear disaster last March". There were flaws in, and lax enforcement of, the safety rules governing Japanese nuclear power companies, and this included insufficient protection against tsunamis.[72]

[edit] After the tsunami

The 9.0 MW Tōhoku earthquake occurred at 14:46 JST on Friday, 11 March 2011 with epicenter near the island of Honshu.[73] It resulted in maximum ground accelerations of 0.56, 0.52, 0.56 g (5.50, 5.07 and 5.48 m/s2) at Units 2, 3 and 5 respectively, above their designed tolerances of 0.45, 0.45 and 0.46 g (4.38, 4.41 and 4.52 m/s2), but values within the design tolerances at Units 1, 4 and 6.[39] The Fukushima I facility had not initially been designed for a tsunami of the size that struck the plant,[74][75] nor had the reactors been modified when later concerns were raised in Japan and by the IAEA.[76] When the earthquake occurred, the reactors on Units 1, 2, and 3 were operating, but those on Units 4, 5, and 6 had already been shut down for periodic inspection.[38][77] Units 1, 2 and 3 underwent an automatic shutdown (called SCRAM) when the earthquake struck.[78][79]

When the reactors shut down, the plant stopped generating electricity, stopping the normal source of power for the plant.[80] TEPCO reported that one of the two connections to off-site power for Reactors 1–3 also failed[80] so 13 on-site emergency diesel generators began powering the plant's cooling and control systems.[81] There are two emergency diesel generators for each of the Units 1–5 and three for Unit 6.[82]

The earthquake was followed by a 13–15 m (43–49 ft) maximum height tsunami arriving approximately 50 minutes later which topped the plant's 5.7 m (19 ft) seawall,[83][84][85] flooding the basement of the Turbine Buildings and disabling the emergency diesel generators[86][87] located there[82] at approximately 15:41.[80][88] At this point, TEPCO notified authorities, as required by law, of a "First level emergency".[78] The Fukushima II plant, which was also struck by the tsunami, incorporated design changes which improved its resistance to flooding and it sustained less damage. Generators and related electrical distribution equipment were located in the watertight reactor building, so that power from the grid was being used by midnight.[89] Seawater pumps for cooling were given protection from flooding, and although 3 of 4 failed in the tsunami, they were able to be restored to operation.[90]

In the late 1990s, three additional backup generators for reactors Nos. 2 and 4 were placed in new buildings located higher on the hillside, to comply with new regulatory requirements. All six reactors were given access to these generators, but the switching stations that sent power from these backup generators to the reactors' cooling systems for Units 1 through 5 were still in the poorly protected turbine buildings. All three of the generators added in the late 1990s were operational after the tsunami. If the switching stations had been moved to inside the reactor buildings or to other flood-proof locations, power would have been provided by these generators to the reactors' cooling systems.[91]

After the diesel generators located in the turbine buildings failed, emergency power for control systems was supplied by batteries that were designed to last about eight hours.[92] Further batteries and mobile generators were dispatched to the site, delayed by poor road conditions with the first not arriving until 21:00 JST 11 March,[81][93] almost six hours after the tsunami struck.

Attempts to connect portable generating equipment to power water pumps were eventually discontinued after numerous attempts, as the connection point in the Turbine Hall basement was flooded and because of difficulties finding suitable cables.[86] TEPCO switched its efforts to installing new lines from the grid to the cooling systems.[94] One plant generator at Unit 6 was restored to operation on 17 March, and external power returned to Units 5 and 6, on 20 March, allowing cooling equipment to be restarted.[95]

[edit] Unit 1 Reactor

[edit] Details of the core

F. Tanabe has estimated that the core contained the following materials:[96]

[edit] Cooling problems and first radioactivity release

On 11 March at 14:46 JST, Unit 1 scrammed (shut off power-producing nuclear fission chain reactions) successfully in response to the earthquake[80] though evacuated workers reported violent shaking and burst pipes within the reactor building.[97] At 15:37, all generated electrical power was lost following the tsunami leaving only emergency batteries, able to run some of the monitoring and control systems. It was later learned that Unit 1's batteries were damaged and unavailable following the tsunami. At 15:42, TEPCO declared a "Nuclear Emergency Situation" for Units 1 and 2 because "reactor water coolant injection could not be confirmed for the emergency core cooling systems."[80] The alert was temporarily cleared when water level monitoring was restored for Unit 1 but it was reinstated at 17:07 JST.[80] Potentially radioactive steam was released from the primary circuit into the secondary containment area to reduce mounting pressure.[98]

After the loss of site power and reactor shutdown, Unit 1 was initially cooled using the isolation condenser system. About 10 minutes after the earthquake, TEPCO operators removed both of Unit 1's isolation condensers from service, and instead chose to activate the HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) systems to cool the reactor and the core spray system was activated at 15:07 to cool the suppression pool. The core spray system was disabled with AC power loss at 15:37 (The tsunami) and the HPCI system failed following DC (i.e., battery back up) power loss.[citation needed]

Operators were unable to restart the isolation condensers for an extended period of time after the tsunami (greater than 30 minutes). After that, the isolation condensers were operated intermittently, for unknown reasons. The isolation condensers were designed to successfully cool Unit 1 for at least 8 hours, and it is unknown how effective they were. After that, refill would have been required to the isolation condenser tanks which are under atmospheric pressure (low pumping head requirements). By design, isolation condensers would have removed the heat from the reactor transferring it out of the primary containment and into the atmosphere, but with limited and non-existent operation, core and containment cooling was not successful.

For whatever reason, the isolation condensor apparently did not work. On 27 February 2012 NISA ordered TEPCO to reveal – before 12 March 2012 – why the layout of the isolation condensor was changed. In the papers of the original application (dated from July 1966) for reactor 1 the tubes were separated from each other. But in the blueprints submitted in October 1967, the two tubes were connected with each other outside the reactor vessel. TEPCO apparently changed the design without notifying NISA, in violation of legal procedure.[56]

By midnight, water levels in the reactor were falling and TEPCO gave warnings of the possibility of radioactive releases.[99] In the early hours of 12 March, TEPCO reported that radiation levels were rising in the turbine building for Unit 1[100] and that it was considering venting some of the mounting pressure into the atmosphere, which could result in the release of some radioactivity.[101] Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano stated later in the morning the amount of potential radiation would be small and that the prevailing winds were blowing out to sea.[102] At 02:00 JST, the pressure inside the reactor containment was reported to be 600 kPa (6 bar or 87 psi), 200 kPa higher than under normal conditions.[87] At 05:30 JST, the pressure inside Reactor 1 was reported to be 2.1 times normal levels, 820 kPa.[103] Isolation cooling ceased to operate between midnight and 11:00 JST 12 March, at which point TEPCO started relieving pressure and injecting water.[104] One employee working inside Unit 1 at this time received a radiation dose of 106 mSv and was later sent to a hospital to have his condition assessed.[105]

Rising heat within the containment area led to increasing pressure. Electricity was needed for both the cooling water pumps and ventilation fans used to drive gases through heat exchangers within the containment.[106] Releasing gases from the reactor is necessary if pressure becomes too high and has the benefit of cooling the reactor as water boils off, but this also means cooling water is being lost, and must be replaced if the water level is not to fall too low.[86] If there is no damage to the fuel elements, water and water vapor from inside the reactor should be only slightly radioactive.

In a press release on 12 March at 07:00 JST, TEPCO stated, "Measurement of radioactive material (iodine-131, etc.) by monitoring car indicates increasing value compared to normal level. One of the monitoring posts is also indicating higher than normal level."[107] Dose rates recorded on the main gate rose from 69 nGy/h (for gamma radiation, equivalent to 69 nSv/h) at 04:00 JST, 12 March, to 866 nGy/h 40 minutes later, before hitting a peak of 0.3855 mSv/h at 10:30 JST.[107][108][109][110] At 13:30 JST, workers detected radioactive caesium-137 and iodine-131 near Reactor 1,[3] which indicated some of the core's fuel had been damaged.[111] Cooling water levels had fallen so much that parts of the nuclear fuel rods were exposed and partial melting might have occurred.[112][113] Radiation levels at the site boundary exceeded the regulatory limits.[114]

On 14 March, radiation levels had continued to increase on the premises, measuring at 02:20 an intensity of 0.751 mSv/h on one location and at 02:40 an intensity of 0.650 mSv/h at another location on the premises.[115] On 16 March, the maximum readings peaked at 10.850 mSv/h.[116]

[edit] Hydrogen explosion

At 07:00 JST on 12 March, Prime Minister Naoto Kan asked Daiichi director Masao Yoshida why his workers were not opening the valves to release rising steam pressure within the reactor. Yoshida answered that they could not open the electrical valves because of the power failure and the radiation was too high to send workers to manually open the valves. Nevertheless, with the pressure and temperatures continuing to rise, at 09:15, TEPCO sent workers to begin manually opening the valves. The high radiation slowed the work and the valves were not opened until 14:30.[117]

At 15:36 JST on 12 March, there was an explosion in the reactor building at Unit 1. The side walls of the upper level were blown away, leaving in place only the vertical steel framed gridworks. The roof collapsed, covering the floor and some machinery on the south side. The walls were relatively intact compared to later explosions at Units 3 and 4.[118][119] Video of the explosion shows that it was primarily directed sideways.[120]

The roof of the building was designed to provide ordinary weather protection for the areas inside, not to withstand the high pressure of an explosion. In the Fukushima I reactors the primary containment consists of "drywell" and "wetwell" concrete structures below the top level, immediately surrounding the reactor pressure vessel. The secondary containment includes the top floor with water-filled pools for storing fresh or irradiated fuel and for storage of irradiated tools and structures.[103][121]

Experts soon agreed that the cause was a hydrogen explosion.[123][124] Almost certainly the hydrogen was formed inside the reactor vessel because of falling water levels exposing zircaloy structures/fuel assembly cladding, which then reacted with steam and produced hydrogen,[125] with the hydrogen subsequently vented into the containment building. when the hydrogen reached ignition concentration in the air of the secondary containment building, an ignition source such as a spark triggered a hydrogen-oxygen explosion, blowing out the walls of this building from the inside.

Officials indicated that reactor primary containment (the reactor pressure vessel) had remained intact and that there had been no large leaks of radioactive material,[103] although an increase in radiation levels was confirmed following the explosion.[126][127] The report[128] of the fact-finding commission states that "There is a possibility that the bottom of the RPV [reactor pressure vessel] was damaged and some of the fuel might have dropped and accumulated on the D/W [dry well] floor (lower pedestal)." The Fukushima prefectural government reported radiation dose rates at the plant reaching 1.015 mSv/h.[129] The IAEA stated on 13 March that four workers had been injured by the explosion at the Unit 1 reactor, and that three injuries were reported in other incidents at the site. They also reported one worker was exposed to higher-than-normal radiation levels but the level fell below their guidance for emergency situations.[130]

[edit] Seawater used for cooling

At 20:05 JST on 12 March, the Japanese government ordered seawater to be injected into Unit 1 in a new effort to cool the reactor core.[131] The treatment had been held as a last resort since it ruins the reactor.[132] TEPCO started seawater cooling at 20:20, adding boric acid as a neutron absorber to prevent a criticality accident.[133][134] The water would take five to ten hours to fill the reactor core, after which the reactor would cool down in around ten days. The injection of seawater into the reactor pressure vessel was done by fire department trucks.[135][136][137] At 01:10 JST on 14 March, injection of seawater was halted for two hours because all available water in the plant pools had run out (similarly, feed to Unit 3 was halted).[135] NISA news reports stated 70% of the fuel rods had been damaged when uncovered.[138]

On 12 March, a new electrical distribution panel was installed in an office adjacent to Unit 1 to supply power via Unit 2 when it was reconnected to the transmission grid two days later.[136] On 21 March, injection of seawater continued, as did repairs to the control instrumentation.[3] On 23 March, it became possible to inject water into the reactor using the feed water system rather than the fire trucks, raising the flow rate from 2 to 18 m3/h (later reduced to 11m3/h,[139][140] and even further to reduce the build up of contaminated water); on 24 March, electricity was restored to the central operating room.[141]

As of 24 March, the spent fuel pool was "thought to be fully or partially exposed", according to CNN.[142] Pressure in the reactor had increased owing to the seawater injection, resulting in steam being vented, later alleviated by reducing the water flow. Temperature increases were also reportedly temporary. TEPCO condensed some of the steam to water in the spent fuel pool.

It was estimated[143] that as much as 26 tonnes of sea salt may have accumulated in reactor Unit 1 and twice that amount in Units 2 and 3. As salt clogs cooling pipes and erodes zirconium oxide layer of the fuel rods, switching to the use of freshwater for cooling was a high priority.

The use of seawater has the potential to make uranium chemistry more complex; in pure water the hydrogen peroxide formed by the radiolysis of water can react with uranium dioxide to form a solid peroxide mineral known as studtite. According to Navrotsky et al. this mineral has been found in the fuel storage pond at the plutonium production site at Hanford. Navrotsky et al. report that when alkali metal ions are present, uranium can form nanoparticles (U60 clusters) which may be more mobile than the solid studtite.[144] A review of the research done at the University of Notre Dame on the subject of nanoscale actinyl clusters was published in 2010.[145]

[edit] Reactor stabilization

By 24 March, electrical power (initially from temporary sources, but off-site power used from 3 April) was being restored to parts of the unit, with the Main Control Room lighting being restored.[146]

On 25 March, fresh water became available again to be added to the reactor instead of salt water,[147] while work continued to repair the unit's cooling systems.[148] A volume of 1890 m3 (500,000 USgal) of fresh water was brought to the plant by a barge provided by the US Navy.[149] On 29 March, the fire trucks which had been used to inject water into the reactor were replaced by electrical pumps.[141]

On 28 March, pumping began to remove water contaminated with radioactive 137Cs and 131I from basement areas, storing it in the condenser system.[141] By 29 March, pumping was halted because condensate reservoirs were almost full and plans were being considered to transfer water to the suppression pool surge tanks.[150]

On 7 April, TEPCO began injecting nitrogen into the containment vessel, which was expected to reduce the likelihood of further hydrogen explosions.[151] The injection has been ongoing since then and has been repeated on the other units at Fukushima.[152] On 7 April, before a large aftershock, temperatures in the reactor core unexpectedly "surged in temperature to 260 °C"; the cause was unknown, but the temperature dropped to 246 °C by 8 April.[153] On 27 April, TEPCO revised its estimate of damaged fuel in Unit 1 from 55% to 70%.[154]

On 17 April, remote control robot was used to enter the Reactor Building and performed a series of inspections, which confirmed on 29 April that there was no significant water leakage coming from the containment vessel.[146]

On 23 and 26 April, concerns that Unit 1 fuel rods may be exposed to air caused TEPCO to consider filling the "containment vessel with water to cool the reactor" despite concerns for building integrity.[155][156] Efforts were slowed by Unit 1 radiation measurements "as high as 1,120 mSv/hr".[157] On 13 May, TEPCO announced it would proceed with a plan to fill the containment vessel despite the possibility of holes caused by melting fuel elements in the pressure vessel.[157][158] TEPCO had expected to increase the amount of water pumped to Unit 1 to compensate for any leakage from the holes[159] but decided on 15 May to abandon the plan after finding the Unit 1 basement was already half flooded.[160]

On 5 May, ventilation systems were installed in the Reactor Building, to clean the highly radioactive air encapsulated in it.[146]

On 12 May, the water level gauge for the reactor was calibrated, and it was subsequently identified that the water level was lower than previously thought (as the water level went off the lower side of the gauge).[146]

On 13 May, preparatory work started on the installation of the Reactor Building covers. Construction work started on 28 June.[161]

On 20 May, staff entered the Reactor Building, confirming reactor water level and radioactivity.[161]

Since 2 July, the reactor has been cooled using fresh water from the on-site water treatment plant.[161]

On 21 August, TEPCO reported that all of the temperature sensors of Unit 1 were recording temperatures less than 100 degrees Celsius on Friday 19 August. Once other goals are met, Unit 1 will have achieved cold shutdown state.[162]

On 28 October, TEPCO reported the completion of cover construction at reactor building of Unit 1 of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station.[163]

On 19 January 2012, the interior of the primary containment vessel of reactor 2 was inspected, by TEPCO for the first time after the accident, with an industrial endoscope. With this device photos were taken and the temperature was measured at this spot and from the cooling-water inside, in an attempt to calibrate the existing temperature-measurements that could have an error margin of 20°C (36°F). The procedure lasted 70 minutes.[164] The photos showed parts of the walls and pipes inside the containment vessel, but they were unclear and blurred, most likely due to water vapors and the radiation inside. According to TEPCO the photos showed no serious damage. The temperature measured inside was 44.7 °C (112.5 °F) and did not differ much from the 42.6 °C (108.7 °F) measured outside the vessel.[165]

[edit] Possibility of criticality

Reports of 13 observations of neutron beams 1.5 km "southwest of the plant's No. 1 and 2 reactors" from 13 to 16 March raised the possibility that nuclear chain reactions could have occurred after the initial SCRAMing of the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi.[166] 16 March reports that fuel rods in the spent fuel pool at Unit 4 could have been exposed to air appeared to indicate that uncontrolled fission may have occurred in that fuel pool.[167] Later reports of exceptionally high iodine-134 levels appeared to confirm this theory because very high levels of iodine-134 would be indicative of criticality.[168] The same report also showed high measurements of chlorine-38,[169] which some nuclear experts used to calculate that self-propagating fission must be occurring in Unit 1.[170][171] Despite TEPCO suggesting the iodine-134 report was inaccurate, the IAEA appeared to accept the chlorine-based analysis as a valid theory suggesting criticality when it stated at a press conference that "melted fuel in the No. 1 reactor building may be causing isolated, uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions".[172] TEPCO confirmed its concern about the accuracy of the high iodine and chlorine report by formally retracting the report on 21 April,[173] which eliminated both the exceptionally high iodine-134 and chlorine-38 levels as proof of criticality. TEPCO did not appear to comment on the criticality concern when withdrawing its report,[174][175] but the IAEA has not withdrawn its comments, and some off-site experts find the currently measured iodine-134 levels higher than expected.[176][177]

[edit] Meltdown

On 12 May, TEPCO engineers confirmed that a meltdown occurred, with molten fuel having fallen to the bottom of the reactor's pressure vessel, or RPV.[178] The utility said that fuel rods of the No. 1 reactor are fully exposed, with the water level 1 meter (3.3 feet) below the base of the fuel assembly. According to a Japanese press report, there are holes in the base of the pressure vessel – these holes were meant for the control-rods. After the fuel had melted, it produced holes in the bottom of the RPV, and then escaped into the containment vessel. In November 2011 TEPCO did not know the shape or porosity of the fuel mass, which is at the bottom of the containment vessel.[179] As a result it is impossible to know exactly how far the fuel mass would have eroded the concrete floor, but TEPCO estimate that no more than 70 cm of a 7.6 meter concrete slab was eroded away by the hot fuel. The production of heat and steam in unit 1 has decreased, as suggested by both radioactive decay calculations and photographic evidence (same source from TEPCO).

TEPCO estimates the nuclear fuel was exposed to the air less than five hours after the earthquake struck. Fuel rods melted away rapidly as the temperature inside the core reached 2,800 °C within six hours. In less than 16 hours, the reactor core melted and dropped to the bottom of the pressure vessel, burning a hole through the vessel. By that time, water was pumped into the reactor in an effort to prevent the worst-case scenario – overheating fuel melting its way through the containment and discharging large amounts of radionuclides in the environment.[180] In June the Japanese government confirmed that Unit 1 reactor vessel containment was breached, and pumped cooling water continues to leak months after the disaster.[181]

On 11/10/2012, TEPCO released results of the first direct inspections (by remotely operated camera) of conditions in the interior of the Reactor 1 PCV.[182] These suggest that the initial assumptions concerning the behaviour of the fuel mass during the accident may have been incorrect. In particular, the distribution of radiation levels within the PCV, with peak levels being around the bottom head of the RPV, suggest that the majority of the fuel has in fact been retained within the RPV. Radiation levels are also notably lower around the lower parts of the "Drywell", suggesting that fuel had not reached the bottom of the containment vessel, or damaged the concrete floor slab. There is a further issue in that radiation levels within the water inside the containment are markedly higher than those in the reactor basements, suggesting that either there is limited flow from the PCV to the basement, or that substantial dilution is taking place - raising the issue of what is the flow path for the water.

[edit] Spent fuel pool of reactor 1

From 31 March, additional sea water was added to the spent fuel pool, initially by using a concrete pump. Fresh water was used from 14 May. By 29 May water was able to be injected using a temporary pump and the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) line.[146][161]

On 10 August, the spent fuel pool was switched from the water-injection system – that functioned some 5 months – to a circulatory cooling system. For the first time since the 11 March disaster, all four damaged reactors at the plant were using circulatory cooling systems with heat-exchangers.[183]

[edit] Unit 2 reactor

Unit 2 was operating at the time of the earthquake and experienced the same controlled initial shutdown as the other units.[103] As with unit 1, the reactor scrammed following the earthquake. The two diesel generators came online and initially all cooling systems were available. Initially the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was primary cooling the core and at 15:00 operators activated the residual heat removal system main pump and the containment vessel spray pump at 15:07 to cool the suppression pool; all these systems failed following both AC power and DC power loss after the tsunami as the diesel generators and other systems failed when the tsunami overran the plant. The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system was manually activated by operators at 15:39 following power loss, but by midnight the status of the reactor was unclear; some monitoring equipment was still operating on temporary power.[99] The coolant level was stable and preparations were underway to reduce pressure in the reactor containment vessel should it become necessary, though TEPCO did not state in press releases what these preparations were, and the government had been advised that this might happen.[184] The RCIC was reported by TEPCO to have shut down around 19:00 JST on 12 March, but reported to be operating again as of 09:00 JST 13 March.[185] The pressure reduction of the reactor containment vessel commenced before midnight on 12 March[186] although the IAEA reported that as of 13:15 JST 14 March, that according to information supplied to them, no venting had taken place at the plant.[3] A report in The New York Times suggested that plant officials initially concentrated efforts on a damaged fuel storage pool at Unit 2, diverting attention from problems arising at the other reactors, but that incident was not reported in official press releases.[187] The IAEA reported that on 14 March at 09:30, the RCIC was still operating and that power was being provided by a mobile generator.[3] By midday on 19 March grid power had been connected to the existing transformer at Unit 2 and work continued to connect the transformer to the new distribution panel installed in a nearby building.[188] Outside electricity became available at 15:46 JST on 20 March, but equipment still had to be repaired and reconnected.[136]

[edit] Cooling problems

On 14 March, TEPCO reported the shutdown of the RCIC system presumably due to low reactor pressure. Operators had for days taken measures to prevent the reactor pressure from dropping below the level at which the RCIC can operate to keep it running as long as possible. The system was never designed to be used for an extended period.[189]Fuel rods had been fully exposed for 140 minutes and there was a risk of a core meltdown.[190] Reactor water level indicators were reported to be showing minimum-possible values at 19:30 JST on 14 March.[191]

At 22:29 JST, workers had succeeded in refilling half the reactor with water but parts of the rods were still exposed, and technicians could not rule out the possibility that some had melted. It was hoped that holes blown in the walls of reactor building 2 by the earlier blast from Unit 3 would allow the escape of hydrogen vented from the reactor and prevent a similar explosion.[190] At 21:37 JST, the measured dose rates at the gate of the plant reached a maximum of 3.13 mSv/h, which was enough to reach the annual limit for non-nuclear workers in twenty minutes,[190] but had fallen back to 0.326 mSv/h by 22:35.[192]

It was believed that around 23:00 JST, the 4 m long fuel rods in the reactor were fully exposed for the second time.[190][193] At 00:30 JST on 15 March, NHK ran a live press conference with TEPCO stating that the water level had sunk under the rods once again and pressure in the vessel was raised. The utility said that the hydrogen explosion at Unit 3 might have caused a glitch in the cooling system of Unit 2: Four out of five water pumps being used to cool the Unit 2 reactor had failed after the explosion at Unit 3. In addition, the last pump had briefly stopped working when its fuel ran out.[194][195] To replenish the water, the contained pressure would have to be lowered first by opening a valve of the vessel. The unit's air flow gauge was accidentally turned off and, with the gauge turned off, flow of water into the reactor was blocked leading to full exposure of the rods. As of 04:11 JST on 15 March, water was being pumped into the reactor of Unit 2 again.[196]

At Thursday 23 June Tepco-workers entered the building of reactor 2, to install a provisional gauge for measuring the water level inside the reactor. The original device was damaged in March. Next Saturday 25 June Tepco reported, that it was still not possible to obtain accurate data on the water level and pressure of this reactor. The temperature near the containment vessel is very high, because of this the gauge did not function properly: the water inside the tubes of the gauge was evaporated.[197]

It was later revealed that workers were minutes from restoring power to the standby liquid control (SLC) system pumps in unit 2 as a way to inject borated water once the RCIC shut down and had spent hours laying cable from a generator truck to the unit 2 power center when the unit 1 explosion occurred. This damaged the cable preventing this method from being used. It is possible this system could have prevented a complete meltdown as it took hours after the explosion until injection using fire trucks could be started.[198]

[edit] Explosion

An explosion was heard after 06:14 JST[199] on 15 March in Unit 2, possibly damaging the pressure-suppression system, which is at the bottom part of the containment vessel.[200][201] The radiation level was reported to exceed the legal limit and the plant's operator started to evacuate all non-essential workers from the plant.[202] Only a minimum crew of 50 men, also referred to as the Fukushima 50, was left at the site.[203] Soon after, radiation equivalent dose rates had risen to 8.2 mSv/h[204] around two hours after the explosion and again down to 2.4 mSv/h, shortly after.[205] Three hours after the explosion, the rates had risen to 11.9 mSv/h.[206]

While admitting that the suppression pool at the bottom of the containment vessel had been damaged in the explosion, causing a drop of pressure there, Japanese nuclear authorities emphasized that the containment had not been breached as a result of the explosion and contained no obvious holes.[207] In a news conference on 15 March the director general of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, said that there was a "possibility of core damage" at Unit 2 of less than 5%.[208] Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) stated 33% of the fuel rods were damaged, in news reports the morning of 16 March.[138] On 30 March, NISA reiterated concerns about a possible Unit 2 breach at either the suppression pool, or the reactor vessel.[209] NHK World reported the NISA's concerns as "air may be leaking", very probably through "weakened valves, pipes and openings under the reactors where the control rods are inserted", but that "there is no indication of large cracks or holes in the reactor vessels".[209]

On 8 November workers did enter reactor-building no. 4, and inspected the place to determine the cause of the hydrogen-blast on 15 March 2011. They found the 5th floor more severely damaged compared with the 4th floor, where the spent fuel pool was located. The fuel itself was found undamaged. The workers also found a severely damaged air conditioning duct on floor 5. These findings did not support earlier assumptions that the hydrogen in the blast originated from the spent fuel pool of reactor 4, but instead proved that the explosion was caused by hydrogen from the number 3 reactor, after the valves were opened. The hydrogen reached the fifth floor of reactor building 4 through the aforementioned damaged air conditioning duct.[210][211]

[edit] Spent fuel pool

From 20 March, seawater was added to the spent fuel pool[136] via the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) line.[161] Fresh water was used from 29 March.[161]

On 31 May, the spent fuel pool was switched from the water-injection system, to a circulatory cooling system.[161]

[edit] Containment damage

Unit 2 was considered the most likely unit to have a damaged reactor containment vessel, as of 24 March.[142] On 27 March, TEPCO reported measurements of very high radiation levels, over 1000 mSv/h, in the basement of the Unit 2 turbine building, which officials reported was 10 million times higher than what would be found in the water of a normally functioning reactor. Hours into the media frenzy, the company retracted its report and stated that the figures were not credible.[212] "because the level was so high the worker taking the reading had to evacuate before confirming it with a second reading."[213] Shortly following the ensuing wave of media retractions that discredited the report worldwide, TEPCO clarified its initial retraction; the radiation from the pool surface in the basement of the Unit 2 turbine building was found to be "more than 1,000 millisieverts per hour", as originally reported, but the concentration of radioactive substances was 100,000 times higher than usual, not 10 million.[214]

[edit] Seawater used for cooling

At 20:05 JST on 14 March, the Japanese government ordered seawater to be injected into Unit 2 in a new effort to cool the reactor core. The treatment had been held as a last resort since it ruins the reactor. TEPCO started seawater cooling at 16:34.[146] From 26 March, freshwater was used to cool the core.[161]

[edit] Reactor stabilization

By 26 March 2011, electrical power (initially from temporary sources, off-site power starting 3 April) was restored to parts of the Unit, with the Main Control Room lighting being restored.[161]

On 28 March, the Nuclear Safety Commission announced its suspicion that radioactive materials had leaked from Unit 2 into water in trenches connecting Unit 2's buildings, leading TEPCO to reduce the amount of water pumped into the reactor because of fears that the water could leak into the sea.[215] The reduction in water pumping could have raised reactor temperatures.[216]

On 27 March, the IAEA reported temperatures at the bottom of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) at Unit 2 fell to 97 °C (206.6 °F) from 100 °C (212 °F) on Saturday. Operators attempted to pump water from the turbine hall basement to the condenser,[217][218] but "both condensers turned out to be full."[219] Therefore, condenser water was first attempted to be pumped to storage tanks, freeing condenser storage for water currently in the basement of Unit 2.[219] The pumps now being used can move 10 to 25 tons of water per hour.[219] On 19 April 2011, TEPCO began transferring excess, radioactive cooling water from the reactor's basement and maintenance tunnels to a waste processing facility.[220]

On 18 April, remote control robot was used to enter the Reactor Building and performed a series of inspections.[146]

On 18 May, staff entered the Reactor Building for the first time since 15 March.[161]

On 11 June, ventilation systems were installed in the Reactor Building, to clean the highly radioactive air encapsulated within the Reactor Building.[161]

On 28 June, TEPCO began injecting nitrogen into the containment vessel, which was expected to reduce the likelihood of further hydrogen explosions.[161]

Since 2 July, the Reactor has been cooled using fresh water treated by the on site water treatment plant.[161]

On 14 September at 11AM (JST) TEPCO began injecting water into the No. 2 reactor using the core spray system piping in addition to the feed water piping already being used as this method seemed to be effective in reducing the temperature in the No. 3 reactor. At that time the temperature at the bottom of the No. 2 reactor was still 114.4 degrees Celsius (237.92 °F), compared to the 84.9 °C degrees(184.82 °F) in the No.1 reactor and the 101.3 °C (214.34 °F) in the No. 3 reactor. The new method has led to some temperature decrease, but not as significant as the decrease that occurred in the No.3 reactor.[221]

After some positive effect was noticed using both the core spray system and feed water piping, TEPCO decided on 16 September to increase the amount of water pumped into the No. 2 reactor by one ton, in an attempt to further lower the temperature in the core, to a total of 7 tons per hour. The same was done for reactor No. 3, where 5 tons were added, bring the total to 12 tons per hour. TEPCO also added that the volume of cooling water into the No. 1 reactor would be increased as necessary.[222]

On 21 September 2011, Masanori Naitoh, director in charge of nuclear safety analysis at the Institute of Applied Energy, an expert commenting on the plan to contain the crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, mentioned that the interior temperatures of the damaged reactors had to be checked to confirm cold-shutdown. Naitoh said that TEPCO was only measuring temperatures outside the reactors, and that the temperatures inside should be confirmed through simulation to confirm that they had fallen below 100 degrees, and that there were no risks of nuclear reactions recurring.[223]

In the first week of February 2012, temperatures inside reactor No. 2 became unstable. On 7 February, the amount of cooling water was increased from 10.5 tons to 13.5 tons per hour. After a slight initial decrease in temperature, sensor readings again showed the temperature rising at some locations in the bottom of the reactor. On 11 February, temperatures rose once again.[224][225][226][227] On 12 February, the temperature rose to 78.3°C (172.94°F). TEPCO denied the possibility of the core going critical again, because that would produce xenon, which was still below detectable levels. To prevent any possible nuclear criticality, TEPCO planned to dump boric acid into the reactor and to increase the volume of cooling water by 3 tons per hour.[228]

Since only one of the temperature-sensors showed fluctuating readings between 70°C and 90°C, TEPCO and NISA thought this sensor was malfunctioning. The sensor works on the principle of changing resistance between the surface of two different metals as the temperature changes. TEPCO planned measurements on this sensor.[vague] Since the radiation around reactor 2 could make it impossible to place new sensors inside the reactor vessel, the situation would become very serious if the other two sensors inside the reactor were to also fail. After that, it would be impossible to monitor the reactor. Kazuhiko Kudo, a professor of nuclear engineering at the university of Kyushu, Japan commented: "Because we haven't been able to grasp how the nuclear fuel in the cores has been distributed, it's impossible to rule out localized high temperature spots. As the high radiation rules out installing new temperature sensors, if the last two sensors fail, the situation will be much more serious indeed."[229][230][231] On 26 February, TEPCO sent a report to the Japanese government about the malfunctioning temperature-sensors and has since ceased monitoring that sensor. The other two temperature-sensors and the radiation levels inside the containment vessel would be used to monitor the state of the cold shutdown. The amount of cooling water would be lowered, after NISA's approval.[232]

On 15 April 2012, one of the two remaining temperature-sensors at the bottom of the No.2 reactor gave false readings, and because the electric resistance was found greatly increased, TEPCO concluded that it was broken, leaving only 18 of 36 temperature sensors still functioning. At 11 a.m., the remaining thermometer at this place measured 46.7 degrees Celsius.[233]

On 1 June 2012 TEPCO reported that another thermometer had malfunctioned, resulting in more than half of the temperature sensors, 23 out of 41, now being out of use in reactor No. 2., thus making it more problematic to monitor the state of "cold-shutdown". According to TEPCO, the high humidity in the reactor may be a contributing factor in the failure of the sensors. TEPCO stated that it is currently decontaminating the site and training workers to install new thermometers. The plan is to install new thermometers through pipes that are connected to the reactor. TEPCO stated that it plans to decontaminate the site and install the new thermometers by late July 2012.[234]

On 15 June 2012 TEPCO reported that a robot that was sent into the No. 2 reactor building on 13 June 2012 to take video images and radiation measurements, detected a reading of 880mSv (millisieverts) per hour of radiation on the fifth floor, which one floor (4.5 meters) directly above the reactor containment vessel. TEPCO suspects that during initial accident in March 2011, that radioactive substances leaked from the No. 2 reactor moved through the building, but after analyzing the images taken by the robot it could not find the exact route the radioactive substances traveled, and images taken by the robot found no major damage on the fifth floor. During the March 2011 nuclear accident the No. 2 reactor is believed to have released the largest amount of radioactive substances. But the overall route the radioactive material traveled has yet to be determined. TEPCO needs to find and repair the damaged parts of the reactor to recover melted nuclear fuel before TEPCO can begin the process of decommissioning the reactor. However high radiation often stops workers from entering the building. This scenario means it will take a long time to find the problems in the containment vessel.[235]

On 3 October 2012 TEPCO installed a new temperature-sensor inside reactor nr.2. The thermometer showed 42.6 degrees Celsius, another nearby the RPV bottom monitoring instrument (TE-2-3-69H3) indicated 46.1 degrees. At that moment only 1 out of the existing 5 sensors was functioning properly.[236][237]

[edit] Pressure vessel damage

On 15 May, TEPCO revealed that the pressure vessel that holds nuclear fuel "is likely to be damaged and leaking water at Units 2 and 3", which means most of the thousands of tons of water pumped into the reactors had leaked.[180]

[edit] Meltdown

On 29 March, Richard Lahey, former head of safety research for boiling-water reactors at General Electric, speculated that the reactor core may have melted through the reactor containment vessel onto a concrete floor, raising concerns of a major release of radioactive material, while failing to divulge the report by Dale G. Bridenbaugh which condemned the design as "unsafe".[238] On 27 April, TEPCO revised its estimate of damaged fuel in Unit 2 from 30% to 35%.[154] TEPCO reported on 23 May that Reactor 2 suffered a meltdown about 100 hours after the earthquake.[239]

[edit] Concerns over re-criticality

On 1 November 2011 TEPCO said that xenon-133 and xenon-135 was detected in gas-samples taken from the containment vessel of reactor 2, in a concentration of 6 to 10 (or more) parts per million becquerels per cubic centimeter. Xenon-135 was also detected in gas samples collected on 2 November. These isotopes are the result of nuclear fission-reaction of uranium. Because the short half-lifes of these gases: (Xe-133: 5 days Xe-135: 9 hours), the presence could only mean that nuclear fissions were occurring at some places in the reactor. Boric-acid was poured into the reactor in an attempt to stop the fission-reactions. No significant change in temperature or pressure was found by TEPCO, so there was no sign of large-scale criticality. The reactor-cooling was continued, but TEPCO would examine the situation at reactor 1 and 3 also.[240][241][242][243] Professor Koji Okamoto of the University of Tokyo Graduate School made the comment that localized and temporary fission might still happen, and that the melted fuel could undergo fission, but the fuel was probably scattered around. Neutrons from radioactive materials could react with the uranium fuel and other substances. Self-sustaining chain reactions were unlikely, thanks to the huge amounts of boric acid that were poured into the reactor. According to Okamoto, these neutrons should be closely monitored to make sure fission did not happen, because when the fission-reactions were not controlled, it would be impossible to reach a state of "cold-shutdown". Therefore it was needed to locate all molten fuel in and outside the reactor-vessel.[241][244]

On 3 November 2011 TEPCO said that the tiny amounts of xenon-135 detected in the reactor's containment vessel atmosphere came from spontaneous nuclear fission with curium-242 and curium-244, substances that were present in the nuclear fuel. A critical fission would have caused much higher concentrations of xenon isotopes. These reactions would occur constantly, and did not lead to criticality in the melted fuel of reactor 2. All assessments would be sent to NISA for reevaluation.[245][246][247]

The detection of xenon on the afternoon of 1 November by TEPCO was reported to NISA in the night. The next day, 2 November just past 7 a.m., NISA informed the Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda's secretary about the possibility of critical reactions in reactor 2. Two hours later at 9 a.m. prime minister Edano learned the news. At a press-conference, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura revealed that Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Yukio Edano sent a strong reprimand to Hiroyuki Fukano, the chief of NISA, because NISA failed to report the incident immediately to both himself and the Prime Minister's Office, and that NISA waited almost a day after the find was done. Fujimura said, "I have been told that NISA decided not to report the incident until the following morning because the agency didn't believe it was a dangerous situation."[248]

[edit] Unit 3 Reactor

Unlike the other five reactor units, reactor 3 ran on mixed core, containing both uranium fuel and mixed uranium and plutonium oxide, or MOX fuel (with the core comprising ~6% MOX fuel[250]), during a loss of cooling accident in a subcritical reactor MOX fuel will not behave differently to UOX fuel. The key difference between plutonium-239 and uranium-235 is that plutonium emits fewer delayed neutrons than uranium when it undergoes fission.[251]

While water-insoluble forms of plutonium such as plutonium dioxide are very harmful to the lungs, this toxicity is not relevant during a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) because plutonium is very involatile and unlikely to leave the reactor in large amounts. Plutonium dioxide has a very high boiling point. The toxic effect of the plutonium to the public under these conditions is much less than that of iodine-131 and caesium. A key difference between the Fukushima accident and the Chernobyl accident was that the Chernobyl explosion shattered the fuel and flung it out of the reactor building, while at Fukushima there was no steam explosion driven by the release of fission energy. During a loss of cooling accident, the fuel is not subject to such intense mechanical stresses, so the release of radioactivity is controlled by the boiling-point of the different elements present.[252]

[edit] Cooling problems

Following the reactor SCRAM, operators activated the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) and the residual heat removal system and core spray systems were made available to cool the suppression pool; whether they were activated prior to the tsunami has not been made clear. The RHRS and CS pumps were knocked out of commission by the tsunami. With DC battery power remaining, the RCIC continued to keep the water level stable, and the operators switched to the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system when water level began to drop. On 13 March, the HPCI system failed, the reason for which is not completely clear due to instrumentation not being available. It is believed to be either due to loss of DC power due to depletion of batteries or to reactor pressure dropping below the level at which it can operate. Operators were unable to restart it as batteries were exhausted. After this the operators were unable to start the RCIC system and began injecting seawater. Although it was not clear at the time, some of the fuel in Reactor 3 apparently melted around sixty hours after the earthquake (the night of the 12th to 13th).[239]

Early on 13 March an official of the Japan Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) told at a news conference that the emergency cooling system of Unit 3 had failed, spurring an urgent search for a means to supply cooling water to the reactor vessel to prevent a meltdown of its reactor core.[253] At 05:38 there was no means of adding coolant to the reactor, owing to loss of power. Work to restore power and to vent excessive pressure continued.[254] At one point, the top three meters of the uranium/mixed oxide (MOX) fuel rods were not covered by coolant.[255]

At 07:30 JST, TEPCO prepared to release radioactive steam, indicating that "the amount of radiation to be released would be small and not of a level that would affect human health"[256] and manual venting took place at 08:41 and 09:20.[257] At 09:25 JST on 13 March, operators began injecting water containing boric acid into the primary containment vessel (PCV) via the pump of a fire truck.[258][259] When water levels continued to fall and pressure to rise, the injected water was switched to seawater at 13:12.[254] By 15:00 it was noted that despite adding water the level in the reactor did not rise and radiation had increased.[260] A rise was eventually recorded but the level stuck at 2 m below the top of reactor core. Other readings suggested that this could not be the case and the gauge was malfunctioning.[257]

Injection of seawater into the primary containment vessel (PCV) was discontinued at 01:10 on 14 March because all the water in the reserve pool had been used up. Supplies were restored by 03:20 and injection of water resumed.[259] On the morning of 15 March, Secretary Edano announced that according to TEPCO, at one location near reactor Units 3 and 4, radiation at an equivalent dose rate of 400 mSv/h was detected.[3][261][262] This might have been due to debris from the explosion in Unit 4.[263]

[edit] Explosion

At 12:33 JST on 13 March, the chief spokesman of the Japanese government, Yukio Edano said hydrogen gas was building up inside the outer building of Unit 3 just as had occurred in Unit 1, threatening the same kind of explosion.[264] At 11:15 JST on 14 March, the envisaged explosion of the building surrounding Reactor 3 of Fukushima 1 occurred, owing to the ignition of built up hydrogen gas.[265][266] The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of Japan (NISA) reported, as with Unit 1, the top section of the reactor building was blown apart, but the inner containment vessel was not breached. The explosion was larger than that in Unit 1 and felt 40 kilometers away. Pressure readings within the reactor remained steady at around 380 kPa at 11:13 and 360 kPa at 11:55 compared to nominal levels of 400 kPa and a maximum recorded of 840 kPa. Water injection continued. Dose rates of 0.05 mSv/h were recorded in the service hall and of 0.02 mSv/h at the plant entrance.[267]

Eleven people were reported injured in the blast.[268] TEPCO and NISA announced that four TEPCO employees, three subcontractor employees, and four Self-Defence-Force soldiers were injured.[269][270][271] Six military personnel from the Ground Self Defense Force's Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, led by Colonel Shinji Iwakuma, had just arrived outside the reactor to spray it with water and were exiting their vehicles when the explosion occurred. Iwakuma later said that TEPCO had not informed them that there was a danger of a hydrogen explosion in the reactor, adding, "Tokyo Electric was desperate to stabilize (the plant), so I am not angry at them. If there is a possibility of an explosion, I would be reluctant to send my men there."[272]

[edit] Possibility of criticality in the spent fuel pool

TEPCO claimed that there was a small but non-zero probability that the exposed fuel assemblies could reach criticality.[273][274] The BBC commented that criticality would never mean a nuclear explosion, but could cause a sustained release of radioactive materials.[273] Criticality is usually considered highly unlikely, owing to the low enrichment level used in light water reactors.[275][276][277] American nuclear engineer Arnold Gundersen, noting the much greater power and vertical debris ejection compared to the Unit 1 hydrogen blast, has theorized that the Unit 3 explosion involved a prompt criticality in the spent fuel pool material, triggered by the mechanical disruption of an initial, smaller hydrogen gas explosion in the building.[278]

On 11 May, TEPCO released underwater robotic video from the spent fuel pool. The video appears to show large amounts of debris contaminating the pool. Based on water samples analysed, unnamed experts and TEPCO reported that the fuel rods were left "largely undamaged",[279][280] and that it appears that the Unit 3 explosion was entirely related to hydrogen buildup within the building from venting of the reactor.

[edit] Cooling efforts

Around 10:00 JST on 16 March, NHK helicopters flying 30 km away videotaped white fumes rising from the Fukushima I facility. Officials suggested that the Reactor 3 building was the most likely source, and said that its containment systems may have been breached.[281] The control room for Reactors 3 and 4 was evacuated at 10:45 JST but staff were cleared to return and resume water injection into the reactor at 11:30 JST.[282] At 16:12 JST, Self Defence Force (SDF) Chinook helicopters were preparing to pour water on Unit 3, where white fumes rising from the building was believed to be water boiling away from the fuel rod cooling pond on the top floor of the reactor building, and on Unit 4 where the cooling pool was also short of water. The mission was cancelled when helicopter measurements reported radiation levels of 50 mSv.[283][284] At 21:06 pm JST, the government reported that major damage to Reactor 3 was unlikely but that it nonetheless remained their highest priority.[285]

Early on 17 March, TEPCO requested another attempt by the military to put water on the reactor using a helicopter[286] and four helicopter drops of seawater took place around 10:00 JST.[287] The riot police used a water cannon to spray water onto the top of the reactor building and then were replaced by members of the SDF with spray vehicles. On 18 March, a crew of firemen took over the task with six fire engines each spraying 6 tons of water in 40 minutes. 30 further hyper rescue vehicles were involved in spraying operations.[288] Spraying continued each day to 23 March because of concerns the explosion in Unit 3 may have damaged the pool (total 3,742 tonnes of water sprayed up to 22 March) with changing crews to minimise radiation exposure.[3] Lighting in the control room was restored on 22 March after a connection was made to a new grid power supply and by 24 March it was possible to add 35 tonnes of seawater to the spent fuel pool using the cooling and purification system.[140] On 21 March grey smoke was reported to be rising from the southeast corner of Unit 3 – where the spent fuel pool is located. Workers were evacuated from the area. TEPCO claimed no significant change in radiation levels and the smoke subsided later the same day.[289]

On 23 March, black smoke billowed from Unit 3, prompting another evacuation of workers from the plant, though Tokyo Electric Power Co. officials said there had been no corresponding spike in radiation at the plant. "We don't know the reason for the smoke", Hidehiko Nishiyama of the Nuclear Safety Agency said.[290]

On 24 March, three workers entered the basement of the turbine building and were exposed to radiation when they stepped into contaminated water. Two of them were not wearing high boots and received beta ray burns. They were hospitalized but their injuries were not life-threatening.[291]

From 25 March, the source of water being injected into the core was switched from seawater to freshwater.[161]

In August, TEPCO began considering changing the core injection method for the no. 3 reactor as it was requiring a much larger quantity of water to cool and the temperatures remained relatively high compared to the nos. 1 and 2 reactors which required far less water. TEPCO has hypothesized that this may be because some fuel is still present above the core support plate inside the pressure vessel of the no. 3 reactor in addition to the fuel that has fallen to the bottom of the pressure vessel. The fuel on the bottom would be easily cooled by the existing method, but as the pressure vessel is leaking, any fuel located on the support plate was likely only being cooled due to the steam generated by the cooling of the melted fuel at the bottom. TEPCO began considering utilizing the reactor's core spray system pipes as an additional path of water injection and then reduce the amount of water through the existing feedwater piping system. A team of workers were sent inside the reactor building to inspect the core spray system pipes and it was found that the piping was undamaged. Hoses were then run from the temporary injection pumps located outside the building and connected to the core spray system piping. On 1 September, TEPCO began injecting water using the new route. The new injection method has been considerably effective in lowering the temperature of the reactor to below 100 degrees celsius. As of 27 September, most of the no. 3 reactor's temperature readings are between 70–80 degrees celsius. Later, TEPCO began utilizing the same method in the no. 2 reactor; it has not had as significant effect on the no. 2 reactor as it did on the no. 3.[292]

[edit] Further developments

On 25 March 2011, officials announced the reactor vessel might be breached and leaking radioactive material. High radiation levels from contaminated water prevented work.[293] Japan Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) reiterated concerns about a Unit 3 breach on 30 March.[209] NHK World reported the NISA's concerns as "air may be leaking", very probably through "weakened valves, pipes and openings under the reactors where the control rods are inserted", but that "there is no indication of large cracks or holes in the reactor vessels".[209] As with the other reactors, water was transferred from condenser reservoirs to the suppression pool surge tanks so that condensers could be used to hold radioactive water pumped from the basement.[150]

On 17 April, remote control robots were used to enter the Reactor Building and performed a series of inspections.[161]

On 27 April, TEPCO revised its estimate of damaged fuel in Unit 3 from 25% to 30%.[154] Radiation measurements of the water in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool were reported at 140 kBq of radioactive caesium-134 per cubic centimeter, 150 kBq of caesium-137 per cubic centimeter, and 11 kBq per cubic centimeter of iodine-131 on 10 May.[280]

On 15 May, TEPCO revealed that the pressure vessel that holds nuclear fuel "is likely to be damaged and leaking water at Units 2 and 3", which means most of the thousands of tons of water pumped into the reactors had leaked.[180]

On 23 May, TEPCO reported that Reactor 3 had suffered a meltdown some sixty hours after the earthquake.[239]

On 9 June, staff entered the Reactor Building to conduct radiation surveying.[161]

On 25 June and the following day boric acid dissolved in 90 tons of water was pumped into the spent fuel pool of Reactor 3. Concrete debris from the March hydrogen explosion of the reactor building have been detected in the spent fuel pool. In June TEPCO discovered that the water in the pool was strongly alkaline: the pH had reached a value of 11.2. Leaching of calcium hydroxide (portlandite) or calcium silicate hydrate (CSH) from the concrete could have caused this. The alkaline water could accelerate the corrosion of the aluminium racks holding the spent fuel rods. If the fuel assemblies would fall, this could lead to re-criticality. In the mean time preparative works began to install a recirculation cooling system at the fuel pool, that should be operational in the first weeks of July.[294]

On 14 July, TEPCO began injecting nitrogen into the containment vessel, which was expected to reduce the likelihood of further hydrogen explosions.[161]

On 1 July, the spent fuel pool was switched from the water-injection cooling system, to a circulatory cooling system.[161]

Since 2 July, the Reactor has been cooled using fresh water treated by the on site water treatment plant.[161]

On 11 January 2012, radioactive contaminated water was found in two underground tunnels. On 12 January, TEPCO admitted that around 300 cubic meter water had accummulated in an underground tunnel near reactor No.3, with electric cables. Radioactive caesium was measured in concentrations varying from 49 to 69 becquerels per cubic centimeter. Smaller amounts of contaminated water with lower concentrations caesium was found in a tunnel near reactor no.1. How the water could accumulate at these places was under examination.[295]

In a study that began two months after an earthquake and tsunami, scientists say they've found mutant butterflies as a possible reaction to the Fukushima nuclear disaster and that it may be changing life around the area. Some of the butterflies had abnormalities in their legs, antennae, and abdomens, and dents in their eyes, according to the study published in Scientific Reports, an online journal from the team behind Nature Publishing Group.[296]

[edit] Units 4, 5 and 6

When the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster began on 11 March 2011, reactor unit 4 was shut down and all fuel rods had been transferred to the spent fuel pool on an upper floor of the reactor building. On 15 March, an explosion damaged the fourth floor rooftop area of the unit 4 reactor. Japan's nuclear safety agency NISA reported two large holes in a wall of the outer building of unit 4 after the explosion. It was reported that water in the spent fuel pool might be boiling. Radiation inside the unit 4 control room prevented workers from staying there permanently. Visual inspection of the spent fuel pool of reactor 4 on 30 April showed that there was no significant visible damage to the fuel rods in the pool. A radiochemical examination of the water from the pond confirms that little of the fuel in the pond has been damaged.[297]

Reactors 5 and 6 were also not operating when the earthquake struck although, unlike reactor 4, they were still fueled. The reactors have been closely monitored, as cooling processes were not functioning well.[citation needed]

In October 2012, the former Japanese Ambassador to both Switzerland and Senegal Mitsuhei Murata said that ground under Fukushima Unit 4 is sinking, and the structure is on the verge of complete collapse.[298][299] Akio Matsumura also believes that the plant is incredibly dangerous to the world.[300]

[edit] Central fuel storage areas

Used fuel assemblies taken from reactors are initially stored for at least 18 months in the pools adjacent to their reactors. They can then be transferred to the central fuel storage pond.[3] This contains 6375 fuel assemblies and was reported "secured" with a temperature of 55 °C. After further cooling, fuel can be transferred to dry cask storage, which has shown no signs of abnormalities.[301] On 21 March, temperatures in the fuel pond had risen slightly, to 61 °C and water was sprayed over the pool.[3] Power was restored to cooling systems on 24 March and by 28 March temperatures were reported down to 35 °C.[141]

[edit] Cascade of failures

Government agencies and Tepco were thoroughly unprepared for the "cascading nuclear disaster"[citation needed]. The tsunami that "began the nuclear disaster could and should have been anticipated and that ambiguity about the roles of public and private institutions in such a crisis was a factor in the poor response at Fukushima".[302] In March 2012, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said that the government shared the blame for the Fukushima disaster, saying that officials had been blinded by a false belief in the country's "technological infallibility", and were taken in by a "safety myth". Noda said "Everybody must share the pain of responsibility".[303]

According to Naoto Kan, Japan's former prime minister, the country was totally unprepared for the Fukushima disaster, and the crippled Fukushima plant should not have been built so close to the ocean on a tsunami-prone coast.[304] Kan has acknowledged flaws in authorities' handling of the crisis, including poor communication and coordination between nuclear regulators, utility officials and the government. He said the disaster "laid bare a host of an even bigger man-made vulnerabilities in Japan's nuclear industry and regulation, from inadequate safety guidelines to crisis management, all of which he said need to be overhauled".[304]

A national program to develop robots for use in nuclear emergencies was terminated in midstream because it "smacked too much of underlying danger". Japan, supposedly a leader in robotics, had none to send in to Fukushima when the crisis began. Similarly, Japan’s Nuclear Safety Commission said in its safety guidelines for light-water nuclear facilities that "the potential for extended loss of power need not be considered." But just such an extended loss of power contributed to the Fukushima meltdowns.[305]

Physicist and environmentalist Amory Lovins has said: Japan’s "rigid bureaucratic structures, reluctance to send bad news upwards, need to save face, weak development of policy alternatives, eagerness to preserve nuclear power’s public acceptance, and politically fragile government, along with TEPCO’s very hierarchical management culture, also contributed to the way the accident unfolded. Moreover, the information Japanese people receive about nuclear energy and its alternatives has long been tightly controlled by both TEPCO and the government".[306]

[edit] Poor communication and delays

The Japanese government has admitted it did not keep records of key meetings during the Fukushima nuclear crisis, even though such detailed notes are considered a key component of disaster management.[307] Data from SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information) were sent by email to the Fukushima prefecture government, but not shared with others. Data from five crucial days, from 12 March 2011 11:54 p.m. to 16 March 9 a.m – holding vital information for evacuation and health advisories – were in emails from NISA to Fukushima that stayed unread and were deleted afterwards. All was revealed more than a year later, on 21 March 2012. The data were not used, because the disaster countermeasure office regarded the data as "useless because the predicted amount of released radiation is unrealistic." [308]

Japan's response to the crisis at Fukushima Daiichi was flawed by "poor communication and delays in releasing data on dangerous radiation leaks at the facility", a government-appointed investigative panel has found. The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company was led by University of Tokyo Professor Yotaro Hatamura. The panel's report attaches blame to Japan's central government as well as Tokyo Electric Power Co., "depicting a scene of harried officials incapable of making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks following the disaster".[309] The 507-page interim report, which resulted from hundreds of interviews with utility workers and government officials, said poor planning also worsened the disaster response, noting that authorities had "grossly underestimated tsunami risks" that followed the magnitude 9.0 earthquake. The 40-foot-high tsunami that struck the plant was twice as tall as the highest wave predicted by officials, and the erroneous assumption that the plant's cooling system continued to work after the tsunami struck worsened the disaster. "Plant workers had no clear instructions on how to respond to such a disaster, causing miscommunication, especially when the disaster destroyed backup generators. Ultimately, the series of failures led to the worst nuclear catastrophe since Chernobyl".[309]

In February 2012, an independent investigation into the accident by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation described how Japan's response was hindered at times by a loss of trust between the major actors: Prime Minister Naoto Kan, the Tokyo headquarters of TEPCO, and the manager at the stricken plant. The report said that these conflicts "produced confused flows of sometimes contradictory information in the early days of the crisis".[310][311] According to the report, Kan delayed the cooling of the reactors by questioning the use of seawater instead of fresh water. Kan further hindered the response to the crisis by micromanaging disaster management efforts and appointing his own nominees to a small, closed, decision-making staff. The report stated that the Japanese government was also slow to accept assistance from U.S. nuclear experts.[312]

A 2012 report in The Economist said: "The reactors at Fukushima were of an old design. The risks they faced had not been well analysed. The operating company was poorly regulated and did not know what was going on. The operators made mistakes. The representatives of the safety inspectorate fled. Some of the equipment failed. The establishment repeatedly played down the risks and suppressed information about the movement of the radioactive plume, so some people were evacuated from more lightly to more heavily contaminated places".[313]

From 17 to 19 March 2011, US military aircraft, on behalf of the US Department of Energy, measured the radiation within a 45-km radius of the reactors. The data recorded 125 microsieverts per hour of radiation as far as 25 km (15.5 mi) northwest of the plant. The US provided the data, illustrated on detailed maps, to the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) on 18 March and to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) two days later. Japanese government officials did not act on the information provided by the maps.[314]

The data were not forwarded to the prime minister's office or the Nuclear Safety Commission, and subsequently not used to direct the evacuation of the people living around the plant. Because a substantial portion of radioactive materials released from the plant went northwest and fell to the ground, and some residents were "evacuated" into this direction, these people could have avoided unnecessary exposure to radiation if the data had been published directly. According to Tetsuya Yamamoto, chief nuclear safety officer of the Nuclear Safety Agency, "It was very regrettable that we didn't share and utilize the information." But an official of the Science and Technology Policy Bureau of the technology ministry, Itaru Watanabe, said it was not Japan, but more appropriate for the United States to release the data.[315]

After the Americans published their map on 23 March, Japan felt itself forced to publish, and the fallout maps – compiled from ground measurements and SPEEDI computer simulation/predictions – were released the same day. On 19 June 2012 science minister Hirofumi Hirano defended the decision not to publish, with the remark, that his "job was only to measure radiation levels on land", and that the government would study whether disclosure of the maps could have helped in the evacuation efforts.[316]

[edit] Regulation

Regulatory capture may have contributed to the cascade of failures which were revealed after the tsunami receded. Regulatory capture may have also contributed to the current situation. Critics argue that the government shares blame with regulatory agency for not heeding warnings, for not ensuring the independence of the nuclear industry's oversight while encouraging the expansion of nuclear energy domestically and internationally.[317] World media have argued that the Japanese nuclear regulatory system tends to side with and promote the nuclear industry because of amakudari (roughly translated as descent from heaven), in which senior regulators accept high paying jobs at the companies they once oversaw. To protect their potential future position in the industry, regulators seek to avoid taking positions that upset or embarrass the utilities they regulate. TEPCO's position as the largest electrical utility in Japan led it to be the most desirable position for retiring regulators, typically the "most senior officials went to work at Tepco, while those of lower ranks ended up at smaller utilities" according to the New York Times.[318]

In August 2011, several top energy officials were fired by the Japanese government; affected positions included the Vice-minister for Economy, Trade and Industry; the head of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and the head of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy.[319]

[edit] Accident rating

The severity of the nuclear accident is provisionally[320] rated 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). This scale runs from 0, indicating an abnormal situation with no safety consequences, to 7, indicating an accident causing widespread contamination with serious health and environmental effects. Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl disaster was the only level 7 accident on record, while the Three Mile Island accident was a level 5 accident. Arnold Gundersen, a former nuclear power industry executive who served as an expert witness in the investigation of the Three Mile Island accident, said that "Fukushima is the biggest industrial catastrophe in the history of mankind,"[321][322][neutrality is disputed] although current estimates of the total amount of radioactivity released from the 3 Fukushima Daiichi reactors is only 10% that from Chernobyl.[323]

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency initially rated the Unit 1 situation as below both of these previous accidents; on 13 March it announced it was classifying the event as Level 4, an "accident with local consequences".[324] On 18 March it raised its rating on Units 1, 2 and 3 to Level 5, an "accident with wider consequences". It classified the situation at Unit 4 as a Level 3 "serious incident".[325]

Several parties disputed the Japanese classifications, arguing that the situation was more severe than they were admitting at the time. On 14 March, three Russian experts stated that the nuclear accident should be classified at Level 5, perhaps even Level 6.[326] One day later, the French nuclear safety authority and the Finnish nuclear safety authority said that the Fukushima plant could be classified as a Level 6.[327][328] On 24 March, a scientific consultant for noted anti-nuclear environmental group Greenpeace, working with data from the Austrian ZAMG[329] and French IRSN, prepared an analysis in which he rated the total Fukushima accident at INES level 7.[330]

The Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported on 26 March that the accident might warrant Level 6, based on its calculations.[331]The Wall Street Journal stated that Japan's NISA would make any decision on raising the level.[332] INES Level 6, or "serious accident", had only been applied to the Kyshtym disaster (Soviet Union, 1957), while the only level 7 was Chernobyl (Soviet Union, 1986). Previous Level 5 accidents included the Windscale fire (United Kingdom, 1957), the Lucens reactor (Switzerland, 1969), Three Mile Island (United States, 1979), and the Goiânia accident (Brazil, 1987).

Assessing "seriousness" as partial or full meltdown at a civilian plant, The New York Times reported on 3 April that based on remote sensing, computer "simulations suggest that the number of serious accidents has suddenly doubled, with three of the reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi complex in some stage of meltdown." The Times counted three previous civilian meltdowns, from World Nuclear Association information: Three Mile Island, Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant (France, 1980, INES level 4), and Chernobyl.[333]

On 11 April, the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) temporarily raised the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi to Level 7 on the INES scale, by considering the whole event and not considering each reactor as an individual event (each rated between 3 and 5). This would make Fukushima the second Level 7 "major accident" in the history of the nuclear industry; having said that, radiation released as a result of the events at Fukushima was, as of 12 April, only approximately 10% of that released as a result of the accident at Chernobyl (1986), also rated as INES Level 7.[320][323] As of 21 October 2011, the largest study on Fukushima fallout concludes that Fukushima was "the largest radioactive noble gas release in history not related to nuclear bomb testing. The release is a factor of 2.5 higher than the Chernobyl 133Xe source term", although the "Xenon-133 [main noble gas] does not pose serious health risks because it is not absorbed by the body or the environment."[334][335]Arnold Gundersen said Fukushima has 20 times the potential to be released than Chernobyl. Hot spots are being found 60 to 70 kilometres away from the reactor (further away than they were found from Chernobyl), and the amount of radiation in many of them is the amount that caused areas to be declared no-man's-land for Chernobyl.[336]

In off-the-record-interviews with Japanese newspapers like the Tokyo Shimbun, former Japanese prime minister Naoto Kan revealed that there were moments he believed the disaster could have surpassed Chernobyl, many times. At first TEPCO denied that fuel-cores were melted, after all cooling functions were lost. Trade minister Banri Kaieda mentioned that TEPCO seriously considered pulling away all staff-members from the plant and leaving it abandoned. Kan could not accept this: "Withdrawing from the plant is out of the question."[337] He claimed that "If that had happened, Tokyo would be deserted by now. It was a critical moment for Japan's survival. It could have been a led to leaks of dozens of times more radiation than Chernobyl."[338] That might have "compromised the very existence of the Japanese nation".[339]

TEPCO's president at that time, Masataka Shimizu, was never clear in his answers, and TEPCO failed to obey the orders to vent one of the overheating reactors. In an interview to the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, Kan revealed that he went to the plant itself and visually inspected the plant from above in a helicopter because: "I felt I had to go there in person and speak to the people in charge or I would never have known what was going on."[citation needed] Kan said that the American government was seriously concerned about the Japanese response to the accident: "We were not told straight out, but it was obvious that they questioned whether we were really taking this seriously."[citation needed]

Kan did defend his changed attitude to a non-nuclear energy policy with the following remarks: "If there is a risk of accidents that could make half the land mass of our country uninhabitable, then we cannot afford to take that risk."[340]

[edit] Casualties

Major news source reporting at least 2 TEPCO employees confirmed dead from "disaster conditions" following the earthquake.[341] "The two workers, aged 21 and 24, sustained multiple external injuries and were believed to have died from blood loss, TEPCO said. Their bodies were decontaminated as radiation has been spewing from the plant for three weeks."[342]

45 patients were reported dead after the evacuation of a hospital in Futaba due to lack of food, water and medical care as evacuation was delayed by three days.[343]

The Associated Press reported that fourteen senior citizens died after being moved from their hospital which was in the Fukushima plant evacuation zone.[344]

On 14 April 2011, it was reported that the oldest resident of Iitate, a 102-year-old, committed suicide rather than to leave following the announcement of his village's evacuation.[345]

According to the Japanese Government, over 160,000 people in the general population were screened in March 2011 for radiation exposure and no case was found which affects health.[346] Thirty workers conducting operations at the plant had exposure levels greater than 100 mSv.[347]

In April 2011, the United States Department of Energy published projections of the radiation risks over the next year for people living in the neighborhood of the plant. Potential exposure could exceed 20 mSv/year (2 rems/year) in some areas up to 50 kilometers from the plant. That is the level at which relocation would be considered in the USA, and it is a level that could cause roughly one extra cancer case in 500 young adults. Natural radiation levels are higher in some part of the world than the projected level mentioned above, and about 4 people out of 10 can be expected to develop cancer without exposure to radiation.[348][349] Further, the radiation exposure resulting from the accident for most people living in Fukushima is so small compared to background radiation that it may be impossible to find statistically significant evidence of increases in cancer.[350]

As of September 2011, six workers at the Fukushima Daiichi site have exceeded lifetime legal limits for radiation and more than 300 have received significant radiation doses.[351]

Workers on-site now wear full-body radiation protection gear, including masks and helmets covering their entire heads, but it means they have another enemy: heat.[352] As of 19 July 2011 (2011 -07-19)[update], 33 cases of heat stroke had been recorded.[353] In these harsh working conditions, two workers in their 60s have died from heart failure.[354][355]

Two other worker deaths have been reported to date. By mid-August 2011, a man in his forties who had worked for a week on the Fukushima Daiichi site was hospitalized and died of acute leukemia not long after passing a physical test. It was not caused by occupational exposure, according to Tepco officials, as "it is medically impossible for symptoms of acute leukemia to manifest from occupational radiation exposure from a few weeks ago."[356][357][358] In October 2011, another worker died in his 50s for an undisclosed reason which, according to TEPCO, "had nothing to do with exposure to radiation."[359][360]

As of September 2012, there were no deaths or serious injuries due to direct radiation exposures. Cancer deaths due to accumulated radiation exposures cannot be ruled out, and according to one expert, might be in the order of 100 cases.[27] A May 2012 United Nations committee report stated that none of the six Fukushima workers who had died since the tsunami had died from radiation exposure.[361]

Frank N. von Hippel, a U.S. scientist, has estimated that "on the order of 1,000" people will die from cancer as a result of their exposure to radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, that is, an increase of 0.1% in the incidence of cancer, and much less than the approximately 20,000 people killed directly by the earthquake and tsunami. Because contaminated milk was "interdicted in Japan" the number of (mostly non-fatal) thyroid cancer cases will probably be less than 1% of similar cases at Chernobyl. Von Hippel added that "fear of ionizing radiation could have long-term psychological effects on a large portion of the population in the contaminated areas".[20]

According to a 2012 Yomiuri Shimbun survey, 573 deaths have been certified as "disaster-related" by 13 municipalities affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster. These municipalities are in the no-entry, emergency evacuation preparation or expanded evacuation zones around the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant. A disaster-related death certificate is issued when a death is not directly caused by a tragedy, but by "fatigue or the aggravation of a chronic disease due to the disaster".[362]

According to a June 2012 Stanford University study by John Ten Hoeve and Mark Jacobson, the radiation released could cause 130 deaths from cancer (the lower bound for the estimater being 15 and the upper bound 1100) and 180 cancer cases (the lower bound being 24 and the upper bound 1800), mostly in Japan. Radiation exposure to workers at the plant was projected to result in 2 to 12 deaths. The radiation released was an order of magnitude lower than that released from Chernobyl, and some 80% of the radioactivity from Fukushima was deposited over the Pacific Ocean; preventive actions taken by the Japanese government may have substantially reduced the health impact of the radiation release. An additional approximately 600 deaths have been reported due to non-radiological causes such as mandatory evacuations. Evacuation procedures after the accident may have potentially reduced deaths from radiation by 3 to 245 cases, the best estimate being 28; even the upper bound projection of the lives saved from the evacuation is lower than the number of deaths already caused by the evacuation itself.[363]

However, that estimate has been challenged, with some scientists arguing that accidents and pollution from coal or gas plants would have caused more lost years of life.[364]

[edit] Plight of evacuees

A survey by the Iitate, Fukushima local government obtained responses from approximately 1,743 people who have evacuated from the village, which lies within the emergency evacuation zone around the crippled Fukushima Daiichi Plant. It shows that many residents are experiencing growing frustration and instability due to the nuclear crisis and an inability to return to the lives they were living before the disaster. Sixty percent of respondents stated that their health and the health of their families had deteriorated after evacuating, while 39.9% reported feeling more irritated compared to before the disaster.[365]

Summarizing all responses to questions related to evacuees' current family status, one-third of all surveyed families live apart from their children, while 50.1% live away from other family members (including elderly parents) with whom they lived before the disaster. The survey also showed that 34.7% of the evacuees have suffered salary cuts of 50% or more since the outbreak of the nuclear disaster. A total of 36.8% reported a lack of sleep, while 17.9% reported smoking or drinking more than before they evacuated.[365]

Experts on the ground in Japan agree that Mental health challenges are the most significant issue. Stress, such as that caused by dislocation, uncertainty and concern about unseen toxicants, often manifests in physical ailments, such as heart disease. So even if radiation risks are low, people are still concerned and worried. Behavioral changes can follow, including poor dietary choices, lack of exercise and sleep deprivation, all of which can have long-term negative health consequences. People who lost their homes, villages and family members, and even just those who survived the quake, will likely continue to face mental health challenges and the physical ailments that come with stress. Much of the damage was really the psychological stress of not knowing and of being relocated, according to U.C. Berkeley's McKone.[366]

[edit] Investigations

On 7 June 2011 a government-appointed committee of 10 people convened to investigate the accident. The panel was headed by Yotaro Hatamura, professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo, and included Yukio Takasu, Michio Furukawa, the mayor of Kawamata, Fukushima, and author Kunio Yanagida, considered an expert on crisis management.[367][368]

As part of the government inquiry, the House of Representatives of Japan's special science committee directed TEPCO to submit to them its manuals and procedures for dealing with reactor accidents. TEPCO responded by submitting manuals with most of the text blotted out. In response, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ordered TEPCO to resubmit the manuals by 28 September 2011 without hiding any of the content. TEPCO replied that it would comply with the order.[369]

On 24 October NISA published a large portion of Tokyo Electric Power Company's procedural manuals for nuclear accidents. These were the manuals that the operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant earlier did send to the Lower House with most of the contents blacked out, saying that this information should be kept secret to protect its intellectual property rights, and that disclosure would offer information to possible terrorists. NISA ordered TEPCO to send the manuals without any redaction, as the law orders. 200 pages were released from the accident procedural manuals used for Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. All their contents were published, only the names of individuals were left out.

From these documents could be concluded:

• TEPCO did not make sufficient preparations to cope with critical nuclear accidents.
• After the batteries and power supply boards were inundated on 11 March, almost all electricity sources were lost
• TEPCO did not envision such a power failure or any kind of prolonged power loss.
• TEPCO thought that in a serious incident, venting pressure in the reactor containment vessels or carrying out other safety procedures would still be possible, because emergency power sources would still be available.

The agency said, the decision to publish the manuals was taken, for transparency in the search what caused the nuclear accident in Fukushima and also to establish better safety measures for the future.[370]

On 24 October 2011 the first meeting was held by a group of 6 nuclear energy specialists invited by NISA to discuss the lessons to be learned from the accidents in Fukushima. Their first remarks were:

• Japanese nuclear power plants should have multiple power sources
• plants should be able to maintain electricity during an earthquake or other emergencies
• TEPCO should examine why the equipment failed to work and should take appropriate actions to prevent such failures in the future

According to professor Tadashi Narabayashi of the Hokkaido University Graduate School, plant operators should arrange emergency power supplies with other utilities. These discussion should be completed in March 2012, to be able to implement their conclusions into the new safety-regulations by the new nuclear safety agency to be launched in April 2012.[371]

The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company was formed 7 June 2011 by the Japanese government as an independent body to investigate the Fukushima Daiichi disaster.[372] The Investigation Committee issued an interim report in December 2011, and is expected to issue its final report summer, 2012. The interim report was "a scathing assessment of the response to the Fukushima disaster", in which the investigative panel "blamed the central government and the Tokyo Electric Power Co., saying both seemed incapable of making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks after the disaster".[373]

In February 2012, an independent investigation into the accident by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation said that "In the darkest moments of last year's nuclear accident, Japanese leaders did not know the actual extent of damage at the plant and secretly considered the possibility of evacuating Tokyo, even as they tried to play down the risks in public". The government was preparing for the possibility of having to evacuate Tokyo while assuring its millions of residents that everything was under control.[310]

Officials revealed in interviews that they were grappling the possibility of a "demonic chain reaction": If Fukushima collapsed and released enough radiation, it was possible that other nearby nuclear power plants would have to be abandoned and could also collapse, thereby necessitating the evacuation of one of the world's largest cities.[339]

A 2012 report in The Economist said that the response to Fukushima has, so far, been inadequate, as many questions remain. One of the more worrying is how much damage the earthquake did to the reactors:[374]

It is claimed that they weathered the quake, but some experts, such as Masashi Goto, a retired nuclear engineer, argue that there is evidence of significant damage that speeded up the subsequent meltdown. Analysis of the spread of fallout suggests that the first releases came very soon after the tsunami hit, if not before. With quakes a more constant threat than monster tsunamis, these are the sort of lessons that Japan’s "nuclear village" needs to learn.[374]

Oregon's United States Senator Ron Wyden toured the plant and issued a statement that the situation was "worse than reported." He sent a letter to Japanese Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki urging Japan to seek international help to relocate spent fuel rods stored in unsound structures and prevent leakage of dangerous nuclear material.[375][376]

TEPCO released its final internal investigation report on 20 June 2012. In the report, TEPCO complained that top politicians, including the prime minister, interfered with recovery efforts during the initial stages of the disaster by making specific requests that were out of touch with what was actually taking place at the plant. TEPCO concluded that the direct cause of the accident was the tsunami which knocked out the reactors' cooling system. TEPCO also admitted that it was at fault in not being prepared for the situation, but said that its workers did the best they could "amid unprecedented circumstances."[377]

On July 5, 2012, the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission released an executive summary report[378] of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident. The report "blames Japanese culture for the fundamental causes of the disaster."[379][380][381][382] The panel is due to deliver its final report at the end of July.[379]

[edit] Insurance

According to Munich Re, a major reinsurer, the private insurance industry will not be significantly affected by the accidents at the Fukushima nuclear power plant.[383]Swiss Re similarly states "Coverage for nuclear facilities in Japan excludes earthquake shock, fire following earthquake and tsunami, for both physical damage and liability. Swiss Re believes that the incident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant is unlikely to result in a significant direct loss for the property & casualty insurance industry."[384]

[edit] Radioactivity releases

Radioactive material has been released from the Fukushima containment vessels as the result of deliberate venting to reduce gaseous pressure, deliberate discharge of coolant water into the sea, and accidental or uncontrolled events. Concerns about the possibility of a large scale radiation leak resulted in 20 km exclusion zone being set up around the power plant and people within the 20–30 km zone being advised to stay indoors. Later, the UK, France and some other countries told their nationals to consider leaving Tokyo, in response to fears of spreading radioactive contamination.[385] The Fukushima accident has led to trace amounts of radiation, including iodine-131, caesium-134 and caesium-137, being observed around the world (New York State, Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, California, Montreal, and Austria).[386][387][388] Large amounts of radioactive isotopes have also been released into the Pacific Ocean.

A monitoring system designed to detect nuclear explosions, operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), tracked the dispersion of radioactivity from the crippled nuclear reactor on a global scale. Radioactive isotopes originating from Fukushima were picked up by over 40 CTBTO radionuclide monitoring stations. The CTBTO makes its monitoring data and analysis results available to all its 183 Member States. Around 1,200 scientific and academic institutions in 120 countries currently make use of this offer.[389]

On 12 March, radioactive releases first reached a CTBTO monitoring station in Takasaki, Japan, around 200 km away from the troubled power plant. The dispersion of the radioactive isotopes could then be followed to eastern Russia on 14 March and to the west coast of the United States two days later. By day 15, traces of radioactivity were detectable all across the northern hemisphere. Within one month, radioactive particles were also picked up by CTBTO stations in the southern hemisphere, located for example in Australia, Fiji, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea.[390][391]

According to one expert, the release of radioactivity is about one-tenth that from the Chernobyl disaster and the contaminated area is also about one-tenth that of Chernobyl.[20] A March 2012 report by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology agreed that radioactive debris from the damaged reactors had dispersed about one-eighth to one-tenth of the distance as those in the Chernobyl disaster.[392][393] But according to a study conducted by Norwegian Institute for Air Research, the release of caesium-137 was about 40 percent of the total from Chernobyl.[394][395][396]

In March 2011, Japanese officials announced that "radioactive iodine-131 exceeding safety limits for infants had been detected at 18 water-purification plants in Tokyo and five other prefectures".[397] As of July 2011[update], the Japanese government has been unable to control the spread of radioactive material into the nation's food. Radioactive material has been detected in a range of produce, including spinach, tea leaves, milk, fish and beef, up to 200 miles from the nuclear plant. Inside the 12-mile evacuation zone around the plant, all farming has been abandoned.[398][399]

As of August 2011[update], the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant is still leaking low levels of radiation and areas surrounding it could remain uninhabitable for decades due to high radiation. It could take "more than 20 years before residents could safely return to areas with current radiation readings of 200 millisieverts per year, and a decade for areas at 100 millisieverts per year".[400]

On 24 August 2011, the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) of Japan published the results of the recalculation of the total amount of radioactive materials released into the air during the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The total amounts released between 11 March and 5 April were revised downwards to 1.3 × 1017 Bq for iodine-131 and 1.1 × 1016 Bq for caesium-137, which is about 11% of Chernobyl emissions. Earlier estimations were 1.5 × 1017 Bq and 1.2 × 1016 Bq.[401][402]

On 8 September 2011 a group of Japanese scientists working for the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the Kyoto University and other institutes, published the results of a recalculation of the total amount of radioactive material released into the ocean: between late March through April they found a total of 15,000 TBq for the combined amount of iodine-131 and caesium-137. This was more than triple the figure of 4,720 TBq estimated by the plant-owner. TEPCO made only a calculation about the releases from the plant in April and May into the sea. The new calculations were needed because a large portion of the airborne radioactive substances would enter the seawater when it came down as rain.[403]

In the first half of September 2011 the amount of radioactive substances released from the plant was about 200 million becquerels per hour, according to TEPCO, this was approximately one four-millionth of the level of the initial stages of the accident in March.[404] Traces of iodine-131 are still detected in several Japanese prefectures in the months of November[405] and December 2011.[406]

According to a report published in October 2011 by the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, between 21 March and mid-July around 2.7 × 1016 Bq of caesium-137 entered the ocean, about 82 percent having flowed into the sea before 8 April. This emission of radioactivity into the sea represents the most important individual emissions of artificial radioactivity into the sea ever observed. The Fukushima coast has one of the world's strongest currents and this transported the contaminated waters far into the Pacific Ocean, causing a high dispersion of the radioactive elements. The results of measurements of both the seawater and the coastal sediments lead to suppose that the consequences of the accident, for what concerns radioactivity, will be minor for marine life as of late 2011 (weak concentration of radioactivity in the water and limited accumulation in sediments). On the other hand, significant pollution of sea water along the coast near the nuclear plant might persist, because of the continuing arrival of radioactive material transported towards the sea by surface water running over contaminated soil. Further, some coastal areas might have less favorable dilution or sedimentation characteristics than those observed so far. Finally, the possible presence of other persistent radioactive substances, such as strontium-90 or plutonium, has not been sufficiently studied. Recent measurements show persistent contamination of some marine species (mostly fish) caught along the coast of Fukushima district. Organisms that filter water and fish at the top of the food chain are, over time, the most sensitive to caesium pollution. It is thus justified to maintain surveillance of marine life that is fished in the coastal waters off Fukushima.[407]

As of March 2012, there had been no reported cases of Fukushima residents suffering ailments related to radiation exposure. Experts cautioned that insufficient data was available so far to make conclusions on the impact on residents' health. Nevertheless, Michiaki Kai, professor of radiation protection at Oita University of Nursing and Health Sciences, stated, "If the current radiation dose estimates are correct, (cancer-related deaths) likely won't increase."[408]

On 24 May 2012, TEPCO released their estimate of radiation releases due to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster. An estimated 538,100 terabecquerels (TBq) of iodine-131, caesium-134 and caesium-137 was released. 520,000 TBq was released into the atmosphere between March 12 to March 31, 2011 and 18,100 TBq into the ocean from March 26 to September 30, 2011. A total of 511,000 TBq of iodine-131 was released into both the atmosphere and the ocean, 13,500 TBq of caesium-134 and 13,600 TBq of caesium-137.[409]

In May 2012, TEPCO reported that at least 900 PBq had been released "into the atmosphere in March last year [2011] alone".[24][25] In August 2012, researchers found that 10,000 people living near the plant at the time of the accident had been exposed to well less than 1 millisievert of radiation, far less than Chernobyl residents.[410]

In October 2012 an article in Science-magazine concluded, that at that time radiation was still leaking from the reactor-site into the ocean. Fishing in the waters around the site was still prohibited, and the levels of radioactive radiactive 134Cs and 137Cs in the fish caught were not lower compared with the levels found after the disaster. [411] On 26 October 2012 TEPCO admitted that it could not exclude radiation emissions into the ocean, although the radiation levels were stabilised. Undetected leaks into the ocean from the reactors, could not be rooled out, because their basements remain flooded with cooling water, and the 2,400-foot-long steel and concrete wall between the site’s reactors and the ocean, that should reach 100 feet underground, was still under construction, and would not be finished before mid-2014. Around August 2012 two greenling were caught close to the Fukushima shore, they contained more than 25,000 becquerels a kilogram of cesium, the highest cesium levels found in fish since the disaster and 250 times the government’s safety limit. [412][413]

[edit] Reaction in Japan and evacuation measures

A nuclear emergency was declared by the government of Japan on 11 March 2011. Later Prime Minister Naoto Kan issued instructions that people within a 20 km (12 mi) zone around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant must leave, and urged that those living between 20 km and 30 km from the site to stay indoors.[414][415] The latter groups were also urged to evacuate on 25 March.[416]

Japanese authorities have admitted that lax standards and poor oversight contributed to the nuclear disaster.[417] They have come under fire for their handling of the emergency, and have engaged in a pattern of withholding damaging information and denying facts of the accident.[417][418][419][420] Authorities apparently wanted to "limit the size of costly and disruptive evacuations in land-scarce Japan and to avoid public questioning of the politically powerful nuclear industry". There has been public anger about an "official campaign to play down the scope of the accident and the potential health risks".[419][420] The accident is the second biggest nuclear accident after the Chernobyl disaster, but more complex as all reactors are involved.[421]

Once a proponent of building more reactors, Prime Minister Naoto Kan took an increasingly anti-nuclear stance in the months following the Fukushima disaster. In May, he ordered the aging Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant be closed over earthquake and tsunami fears, and said he would freeze plans to build new reactors. In July 2011, Mr. Kan said that "Japan should reduce and eventually eliminate its dependence on nuclear energy ... saying that the Fukushima accident had demonstrated the dangers of the technology".[422]

On 22 August 2011 a spokesman of the Japanese Government mentioned the possibility, that some areas of the evacuation zone around the nuclear plant for "could stay for some decades a forbidden zone". According to the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun the Japanese government was planning to buy some properties from civilians to store radioactive waste and materials that had become radioactive after the accidents.[423][424] Chiaki Takahashi, Japan's foreign minister, criticized foreign medias reports over accidents in Fukushima Daichii as overdone and excessive. But Takahashi added that "he can understand the concerns of foreign countries over recent developments at the nuclear plant, including the radioactive contamination of seawater".[425]

Due to frustration with Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government "providing differing, confusing, and at times contradictory, information on critical health issues"[426] a citizen's group called "Safecast" has been recording detailed radiation level data in Japan.[427] The Japanese government "does not consider non-government readings to be authentic". The group uses off-the-shelf Geiger counter equipment. It is important to note that a simple Geiger counter is a contamination meter and not a dose rate meter, as the response differs so much between different radioisotopes it is not possible to use a simple GM tube for dose rate measurements when more than one radioisotope is present. A thin metal shield is needed around a GM tube to provide energy compensation to enable it to be used for dose rate measurements. For measurements of dose rates due to gamma emitters either an ionization chamber, a gamma spectrometer or an energy compensated GM tube should be used. Members of the Air Monitoring station facility at the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Berkeley, California have been doing extensive tests of environmental samples in Northern California.[428]

[edit] International reaction

The international reaction to the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster has been diverse and widespread. Many inter-governmental agencies are responding to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, often on an ad hoc basis. Responders include International Atomic Energy Agency, World Meteorological Organization and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, which has radiation detection equipment deployed around the world.[429]

Many countries have advised their nationals to leave Tokyo, citing the risk associated with the nuclear plants' ongoing accident. International experts have said that a workforce in the hundreds or even thousands would take years or decades to clean up the area.[430] Stock prices of many energy companies reliant on nuclear sources have dropped.

There has been a significant re-evaluation of existing nuclear power programs in many countries. One poll found that what had been growing acceptance of nuclear power in the United States was eroded sharply following the 2011 Japanese nuclear accidents, with 43% approving and 50% disapproving of building new plants.[431] Worldwide, a study by UBS, reported on 12 April 2011, suggests that around 30 nuclear plants may be closed as a result of Fukushima, with those located in seismic zones or close to national boundaries being the most likely to shut. Events at Fukushima "cast doubt on the idea that even an advanced economy can master nuclear safety".[432] Increased anti-nuclear sentiment has been evident in India, Italy, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States.

Much of the help and decontamination work could be done by AREVA France with boron acid, shutting down one reactor, protection suits, measurement equipment, generators, filters; by more than 1000 men with own first-hand help and information offered.[433]

Decontaminated water[434]
Week from	Tons	Plant- capacity utilisation
29 June	6380	76%
6 July	6130	73%
13 July	4510	54%
20 July	4870	58%
27 July	6190	74%
3 August	6720	80%
10 August	7420	88%

[edit] Reactor stabilization and cleanup operations

The multiple nuclear reactor units involved in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster were close to one another and this proximity triggered the parallel, chain-reaction accidents that led to hydrogen explosions blowing the roofs off reactor buildings and water draining from open-air spent fuel pools. This situation was potentially more dangerous than the loss of reactor cooling itself. Because of the proximity of the reactors, plant workers were put in the position of trying to cope simultaneously with core meltdowns at three reactors and exposed fuel pools at three units.

On 21 December 2011, the Japanese government released a roadmap for the cleanup activities, which predicted that the full cleanup will take 40 years.[435] On 10 April 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) began using remote-controlled, unmanned heavy equipment to remove debris from around nuclear reactors 1–4. TEPCO announced on 17 April that it expected to have the automated cooling systems restored in the damaged reactors in about three months and have the reactors put into cold shutdown status in six months. TEPCO planned to largely empty the basements of the turbine and reactor buildings of units 1–3 of contaminated water by the end of 2011 to allow workers access to the crucial basement areas of both the turbine and reactor buildings.[436]

When the monsoon season began in June 2011, a light fabric cover was used to protect the damaged reactor buildings from storms and heavy rainfall. On 1 August 2011, TEPCO said that very high radiation levels were found outside the building of reactor 1 and 2 from an exhaust-pipe. On 16 August, TEPCO announced the installation of devices in the spent fuel pools of reactor 2, 3 and 4, which used special membranes and electricity to desalinate the water. These pools were cooled with seawater for some time, and TEPCO feared the salt would corrode stainless steel pipes and the pool walls. Burying the reactors in sand and concrete is considered to be a last resort.

In October 2011, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said the government will spend at least 1 trillion yen ($13 billion) to clean up vast areas contaminated by radiation from the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Japan "faces the prospect of removing and disposing 29 million cubic meters of soil from a sprawling area in Fukushima, located 240 kilometers (150 miles) northeast of Tokyo, and four nearby prefectures".[437]

[edit] Energy policy implications

By March 2012, one year after the disaster, all but two of Japan's nuclear reactors had been shut down; some were damaged by the quake and tsunami. Authority to restart the others after scheduled maintenance throughout the year was given to local governments, and in all cases local opposition prevented restarting. The loss of 30% of the country's generating capacity has led to much greater reliance on liquified natural gas and coal.[438] Unusual conservation measures have also been necessary. In the immediate aftermath, nine prefectures served by TEPCO suffered power rationing.[439] The government asked major companies to reduce power consumption by 15%, and some shifted their weekends to weekdays to even out power demand.[440]

According to The Japan Times, the Fukushima nuclear disaster changed the national debate over energy policy almost overnight. "By shattering the government's long-pitched safety myth about nuclear power, the crisis dramatically raised public awareness about energy use and sparked strong anti-nuclear sentiment". A June 2011 Asahi Shimbun poll of 1,980 respondents found that 74% answered "yes" to whether Japan should gradually decommission all 54 reactors and become nuclear free.[441]

An energy white paper, approved by the Japanese Cabinet in October 2011, says "public confidence in safety of nuclear power was greatly damaged" by the Fukushima disaster, and calls for a reduction in the nation's reliance on nuclear power. It also omits a section on nuclear power expansion that was in last year's policy review.[442]

Environmental activists at a 2011 United Nations meeting in Bangkok used the Fukushima disaster as an example to promote accelerated use of renewable energy.[443]

Physicist Amory Lovins has said: "Japan is poor in fuels, but is the richest of all major industrial countries in renewable energy that can meet the entire long-term energy needs of an energy-efficient Japan, at lower cost and risk than current plans. Japanese industry can do it faster than anyone — if Japanese policymakers acknowledge and allow it".[306]Benjamin K. Sovacool has said that, with the benefit of hindsight, the Fukushima disaster was entirely avoidable in that Japan could have chosen to exploit the country's extensive renewable energy base. Japan has a total of "324 GW of achievable potential in the form of onshore and offshore wind turbines (222 GW), geothermal power plants (70  GW), additional hydroelectric capacity (26.5 GW), solar energy (4.8 GW) and agricultural residue (1.1 GW)."[444]

One result of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster could be renewed public support for the commercialization of renewable energy technologies.[445] In August 2011, the Japanese Government passed a bill to subsidize electricity from renewable energy sources. The legislation will become effective on 1 July 2012, and require utilities to buy electricity generated by renewable sources including solar power, wind power and geothermal energy at above-market rates.[446]

In September 2011, Mycle Schneider said that the Fukushima disaster can be understood as a unique chance "to get it right" on energy policy. "Germany – with its nuclear phase-out decision based on a highly successful renewable energy program – and Japan – having suffered a painful shock but possessing unique technical capacities and societal discipline – can be at the forefront of an authentic paradigm shift toward a truly sustainable, low-carbon and nuclear-free energy policy".[447]

As of September 2011[update], Japan plans to build a pilot floating wind farm, with six 2-megawatt turbines, off the Fukushima coast.[448] After the evaluation phase is complete in 2016, "Japan plans to build as many as 80 floating wind turbines off Fukushima by 2020."[448]

In 2012, Naoto Kan said the Fukushima disaster made it clear to him that "Japan needs to dramatically reduce its dependence on nuclear power, which supplied 30% of its electricity before the crisis, and has turned him into a believer of renewable energy".[304]

Sales of solar cells in Japan rose 30.7% to 1,296 megawatts in 2011, helped by a government scheme to promote renewable energy. Canadian Solar plans to build a factory in Japan and is currently in negotiations with local governments in Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures. The facility is expected to have a capacity of 150 megawatts of solar panels a year, could go online as soon as 2013.[449]

As of September 2012, most Japanese people support the zero option on nuclear power, and Prime Minister Yoshihiko and the Japanese government announced a dramatic change of direction in energy policy, promising to make the country nuclear-free by the 2030s. There will be no new construction of nuclear power plants, a 40-year lifetime limit on existing nuclear plants, and any further nuclear plant restarts will need to meet tough safety standards of the new independent regulatory authority. The new approach to meeting energy needs will also involve investing $500 billion over 20 years to commercialize the use of renewable energy sources such as wind power and solar power.[450]

[edit] Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) is the first independent investigation commission by the National Diet in the 66-year history of Japan’s constitutional government. NAICC was established on December 8, 2011 with the mission to investigate the direct and indirect causes of the Fukushima nuclear incident. NAICC submitted its report to both houses on July 5, 2012.[a][30] The 10-member commission compiled its report based on more than 1,167 interviews and 900 hours of hearings.[451][452]

It was a six-month independent investigation, the first of its kind with wide-ranging subpoena powers in Japan's constitutional history, which held public hearings with former Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Tokyo Electric Power Co's former president Masataka Shimizu, who gave conflicting accounts of the disaster response.[453] The commission chairman, Kiyoshi Kurokawa, declared with respect to the Fukushima nuclear incident: “It was a profoundly man-made disaster — that could and should have been foreseen and prevented.”[454][455] “Across the board, the commission found ignorance and arrogance unforgivable for anyone or any organization that deals with nuclear power,” the NAIIC report said.[456] The report outlines errors and willful negligence at the plant before the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 and a flawed response in the hours, days and weeks that followed. It also offers recommendations and encourages Japan's parliament to "thoroughly debate and deliberate" the suggestions.[457]

[edit] Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

The determination of the causes of the accident that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), and those of the damages generated by the accident, and thereby making policy proposals designed to prevent the expansion of the damages and the recurrence of similar accidents in the future was the purpose of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (ICANPS).[458] The 10 member,[459] government-appointed panel included scholars, journalists, lawyers and engineers,[460] was supported by public prosecutors and government experts[461] and released its final, 448-pages[462] investigation report on July 23, 2012.[31][463]

The panel interviewed 772 people,[462] including plant workers, government officials and evacuees,[464] for a total of nearly 1,479 hearing hours.[462] Its report was the fourth investigation into the crisis after the earlier release of a parliamentary study, a private report by journalists and academics as well as an investigation by TEPCO.[465] The panel said the government and TEPCO failed to prevent the disaster not because a large tsunami was unanticipated, but because they were reluctant to invest time, effort and money in protecting against a natural disaster considered unlikely.[464] "The utility and regulatory bodies were overly confident that events beyond the scope of their assumptions would not occur . . . and were not aware that measures to avoid the worst situation were actually full of holes," the government panel said in its final report.[466] The panel's report faulted an inadequate legal system for nuclear crisis management, a crisis-command disarray caused by the government and Tepco, and possible excess meddling on the part of the prime minister's office in the early stage of the crisis.[467] The panel concluded that a culture of complacency about nuclear safety and poor crisis management led to the nuclear disaster.[459]

[edit] Criminal investigations

Japanese prosecutors as a sequel to criminal complaints, including accusations that TEPCO executives and government officials committed 'acts of professional negligence’ have reportedly begun a criminal investigation into last year’s Fukushima nuclear plant accident.[468]

[edit] See also

1. ^ The startpage of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission internetsite stated on July 10, 2012 the following information which was used as the basis for the previous sentences: "NAIIC (The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission) is the first independent investigation commission by the National Diet in the 66-year history of Japan’s constitutional government. NAICC was established on December 8, 2011 with the mission to investigate the direct and indirect causes of the Fukushima nuclear incident. NAICC submitted its report to both houses on July 5, 2012."

[edit] References

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396. ^ Michael Winter (24 March 2011). "Report: Emissions from Japan plant approach Chernobyl levels". USA Today. http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/03/report-radioactive-emissions-from-japan-plant-approach-chernobyl-levels/1. 
397. ^ Hiroko Tabuchi (25 August 2011). "Japan Lifts Ban on Beef From Disaster Area". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/world/asia/26beef.html. 
398. ^ Hiroko Tabuchi (18 July 2011). "Radiation-Tainted Beef Spreads Through Japan's Markets". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/world/asia/19beef.html. 
399. ^ "Areas near Japan nuclear plant may be off limits for decades". Reuters. 27 August 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/27/us-japan-nuclear-uninhabitable-idUSTRE77Q17U20110827. 
400. ^ JAIF (5 September 2011) NSC Recalculates Total Amount of Radioactive Materials Released
401. ^ INES (the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale) Rating on the Events in Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station by the Tohoku District – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake. NISA/METI, 12 April 2011, archived from Original.
402. ^ JAIF (9 September 2011) Radioactive release into sea estimated triple
403. ^ JAIF (20 September 2011 Earthquake-report 211: A new plan set to reduce radiation emissions
404. ^ Possibility of recriticality again, Fukushima Diary
405. ^ Increasing leakage of Iodine-131, Fukushima Diary
406. ^ IRSN (26 October 2011), Synthèse actualisée des connaissances relatives à l'impact sur le milieu marin des rejets radioactifs du site nucléaire accidenté de Fukushima Dai-ichi, http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Documents/IRSN-NI-Impact_accident_Fukushima_sur_milieu_marin_26102011.pdf, retrieved 3 January 2012 
407. ^ Aoki, Mizuho, "Tohoku fears nuke crisis evacuees gone for good", Japan Times, 8 March 2012, p. 1.
408. ^ TEPCO Press Release. "The Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Air and the Ocean Caused by Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident Due to the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake (As of May 2012)". TEPCO. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1204659_1870.html. Retrieved 24 May 2012. 
409. ^ Boytchev, Hristio, "First study reports very low internal radioactivity after Fukushima disaster", Washington Post, 15 August 2012
410. ^ Ken O. Buesseler (26 October 2012). "Fishing for Answers off Fukushima". Science 338 (6106): 480-482. doi:10.1126/science.1228250. http://www.sciencemag.org/content/338/6106/480.summary?sid=a63a9534-893c-403a-a5b3-9a96f74eed93. 
411. ^ "Fish Off Japan’s Coast Said to Contain Elevated Levels of Cesium". New York Times Asia Pacific. October 25, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/asia/fish-off-fukushima-japan-show-elevated-levels-of-cesium.html?_r=0. Retrieved October 28, 2012. 
412. ^ {{nl} Nu.nl (26 oktober 2012) Tepco sluit niet uit dat centrale Fukushima nog lekt
413. ^ Richard Black (15 March 2011). "Japan quake: Radiation rises at Fukushima nuclear plant". BBC Online. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12740843. Retrieved 15 March 2011. 
414. ^ "Japan's PM urges people to clear 20-km zone around Fukushima NPP (Update-1)". RIA Novosti. http://en.rian.ru/world/20110315/163008635.html. Retrieved 15 March 2011. 
415. ^ Makinen, Julie (25 March 2011). "Japan steps up nuclear plant precautions; Kan apologizes". Los Angeles Times. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgw-japan-nuclear-plant-20110326,0,5763742.story. 
416. ^ a b "U.N. atom body wants wider nuclear safety checks". Reuters. 15 August 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/15/nuclear-iaea-safety-idUSLDE77E0F720110815. 
417. ^ Brasor, Philip, "Public wary of official optimism", Japan Times, 11 March 2012, p. 11.
418. ^ a b Norimitsu Onishi (8 August 2011). "Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/asia/09japan.html. 
419. ^ a b Charles Digges (10 August 2011). "Japan ignored its own radiation forecasts in days following disaster, imperiling thousands". Bellona. http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/rad_forcasts_ignored. 
420. ^ "Analysis: A month on, Japan nuclear crisis still scarring," International Business Times (Australia). 9 April 2011, retrieved 12 April 2011; excerpt, According to James Acton, Associate of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Fukushima is not the worst nuclear accident ever but it is the most complicated and the most dramatic ... This was a crisis that played out in real time on TV. Chernobyl did not."
421. ^ Hiroko Tabuchi (13 July 2011). "Japan Premier Wants Shift Away From Nuclear Power". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14japan.html. 
422. ^ (dutch)Nu.nl (22 August 2011)Area around Fukushima maybe a forbidden zone for decades to come
423. ^ The Guardian (22 August 2011)residents may never return to radiation-hit homes
424. ^ Earthquake Report – JAIF, No. 45: 20:00, 7 April. JAIF / NHK, 7 April 2011, archived from original on 9 April 2011, Retrieved 9 April 2011.
425. ^ Al-Jazeera English: Citizen group tracks down Japan's radiation (10 August 2011)
426. ^ Safecast Organization Official Blog
427. ^ UC Berkeley Nuclear Engineering Air Monitoring Station | The Nuclear Engineering Department at UC Berkely web site
428. ^ 14 March 2011 (14 March 2011). "USS Ronald Reagan Exposed to Radiation". Navy Handbook. http://navyhandbook.org/190/uss-ronald-reagan-exposed-to-radiation/. Retrieved 18 March 2011. 
429. ^ Julie Makinen, Ralph Vartabedian (9 April 2011). "Containing a calamity creates another nuclear nightmare". Sydney Morning Herald. http://www.smh.com.au/environment/containing-a-calamity-creates-another-nuclear-nightmare-20110408-1d7qn.html. 
430. ^ Michael Cooper (22 March 2011). "Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html. 
431. ^ Thibaut Madelin (12 April 2011). "Nucléaire : une trentaine de réacteurs dans le monde risquent d'être fermés" (in French). Les Échos. http://www.lesechos.fr/entreprises-secteurs/energie-environnement/actu/0201298382424-nucleaire-une-trentaine-de-reacteurs-dans-le-monde-risquent-d-etre-fermes.htm. Retrieved 28 January 2012. 
432. ^ "AREVA provides support to Japan". Areva. 18 March 2011. http://www.areva.com/EN/news-8775/earthquake-and-tsunami-in-japan.html. Retrieved 28 January 2012. 
433. ^ "High stakes for cleaning system / New technology could provide big boost to end Fukushima N-plant crisis (englisch). Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 August 2011, archived from original, retrieved 21 August 2011. Für die Woche ab dem 3. August sind 77% Auslastung angegeben, aber aus der Zahl 6.720 errechnen sich 80%.
434. ^ AP/Mari Yamaguchi (21 December 2011). "Japan Releases 40-Year Nuke Plant Cleanup Plan". Time. Associated Press. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2102899,00.html. 
435. ^ Nagata, Kazuaki, "Public mulls Noda's definition of 'safe'", Japan Times, 9 March 2012, p. 1.
436. ^ Rie Ishiguro (20 October 2011). "Japan to spend at least $13 billion for decontamination". Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-japan-nuclear-noda-idUSTRE79J3W020111020. 
437. ^ "Fukushima Starts Long Road To Recovery". NPR. 2012-03-10. http://www.npr.org/2012/03/10/148351019/fukushima-starts-long-road-to-recovery. Retrieved 2012-04-16. 
438. ^ "Neon city goes dim as power shortage threatens traffic lights and telephones in Tokyo". news.com.au. 15 March 2011. http://www.news.com.au/world/neon-city-goes-dim-as-power-shortage-threatens-traffic-lights-and-telephones-in-tokyo/story-e6frfkyi-1226021645448. 
439. ^ Yuri Kageyama, Automakers dealing with power shortage. Associated Press, 22 May 2011
440. ^ Kazuaki Nagata (3 January 2012). "Fukushima meltdowns set nuclear energy debate on its ear". The Japan Times. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120103f1.html. 
441. ^ Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada (28 Oct 2011). "Nuclear Promotion Dropped in Japan Energy Policy After Fukushima". Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-28/nuclear-promotion-dropped-in-japan-energy-policy-after-fukushima.html. 
442. ^ Denis Gray (6 April 2011). "Activists call for renewable energy at UN meeting". The Guardian (London). http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9582305. 
443. ^ Benjamin K. Sovacool (2011). Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power: A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy, World Scientific, p. 287.
444. ^ Justin McCurry (3 May 2011). "Japan's nuclear energy debate: some see spur for a renewable revolution". CSMonitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0503/Japan-s-nuclear-energy-debate-some-see-spur-for-a-renewable-revolution. 
445. ^ Chisaki Watanabe (26 August 2011). "Japan Spurs Solar, Wind Energy With Subsidies, in Shift From Nuclear Power". Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-26/japan-passes-renewable-energy-bill-one-precondition-of-kan-s-resignation.html. 
446. ^ Mycle Schneider (9 September 2011). "Fukushima crisis: Can Japan be at the forefront of an authentic paradigm shift?". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/fukushima-crisis-can-japan-be-the-forefront-of-authentic-paradigm-shift. 
447. ^ a b "Japan Plans Floating Wind Power Plant". Breakbulk. 16 September 2011. http://www.breakbulk.com/wind-renewables/japan-plans-floating-wind-power-plant. Retrieved 12 October 2011. 
448. ^ "Canadian Solar to build factory in Japan: report". Reuters. 22 February 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/us-canadiansolarinc-idUSTRE81L1QF20120222. 
449. ^ Carol J. Williams (September 14, 2012). "In wake of Fukushima disaster, Japan to end nuclear power by 2030s". LA Times. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/09/in-wake-of-fukushima-disaster-japan-to-end-nuclear-power-by-2030s.html. 
450. ^ Harlan, Chico (5 July 2012). "Report blasts Japan’s preparation for, response to Fukushima disaster". The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-report-blasts-japans-preparation-for-response-to-fukushima-disaster/2012/07/05/gJQAN1OEPW_story.html. Retrieved 9 July 2012. 
451. ^ Hiroko Tabuchi (5 July 2012). "Inquiry Declares Fukushima Crisis a Man-Made Disaster". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/world/asia/fukushima-nuclear-crisis-a-man-made-disaster-report-says.html?_r=2. Retrieved 9 July 2012. 
452. ^ "Fukushima nuclear accident 'man-made', not natural disaster". Bloomberg (The Sydney Morning Herald). 5 July 2012. http://www.smh.com.au/world/fukushima-nuclear-accident--manmade-not-natural--disaster-20120705-21jrl.html. Retrieved 9 July 2012. 
453. ^ Editorial Board (6 July 2012). "Japan’s nuclear meltdown could have been prevented". The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/japans-nuclear-meltdown-could-have-been-prevented/2012/07/05/gJQAf9nPQW_story.html. Retrieved 9 July 2012. 
454. ^ Dennis Normile (13 July 2012). "Commission Spreads Blame for 'Manmade' Disaster". Science 337: 143. 
455. ^ "Japan leaders, utility slammed for 'man-made' nuclear disaster". The Los Angeles Times. 5 July 2012. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/07/panel-slams-tokyo-government-utility-for-manmade-nuclear-disaster.html. Retrieved 9 July 2012. 
456. ^ Yoko Wakatsuki and Jethro Mullen (5 July 2012). "Japanese parliament report: Fukushima nuclear crisis was 'man-made'". CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/asia/japan-fukushima-report/index.html. Retrieved 9 July 2012. 
457. ^ "Official website of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company". http://icanps.go.jp/eng/. Retrieved 29 July 2012. "This committee was established with the aim of conducting an investigation to determine the causes of the accident that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, and those of the damages generated by the accident, and thereby making policy proposals designed to prevent the expansion of the damages and the recurrence of similar accidents in the future." 
458. ^ a b "Japan nuclear plants 'still not safe'". Al Jazeera Online. 23 July 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/20127236623434937.html. Retrieved 29 July 2012. 
459. ^ "Japan, TEPCO ignored atomic accident risks due to 'myth of nuclear safety': Report". Asian News International (ANI). News Track India. 23 July 2012. http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2012/07/23/330-Japan-TEPCO-ignored-atomic-accident-risks-due-to-myth-of-nuclear-safety-Report.html. Retrieved 29 July 2012. 
460. ^ Mitsuru Obe and Eleanor Warnock (23 July 2012). "Japan Panel Says Plant Operator Falls Short on Nuclear Safety". The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444025204577544732979462706.html. Retrieved 30 July 2012. 
461. ^ a b c Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada (23 July 2012). "Fukushima Investigators Say More Study Needed on What Went Wrong". Bloomsberg Businessweek. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-23/fukushima-investigators-say-more-study-needed-on-what-went-wrong. Retrieved 29 July 2012. 
462. ^ Hancocks, Paula (23 July 2012). "New report criticizes TEPCO over Fukushima nuclear crisis". CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/23/world/asia/japan-fukushima-report/index.html. Retrieved 29 July 2012. 
463. ^ a b Mari Yamaguchi (23 July 2012). "Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Report: Plant Operators Tokyo Electric And Government Still Stumbling". The Associated Press (The Huffington Post). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/23/fukushima-dai-ichi-nuclear-plant-operators_n_1694476.html. Retrieved 29 July 2012. 
464. ^ Willacy, Mark (23 July 2012). "New report says Japan ignored nuclear safety risks". Australia Network News. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-07-23/an-fukushima-report/4148874. Retrieved 29 July 2012. 
465. ^ Wallace, Rick (24 July 2012). "Fukushima crushed by 'myth', says panel". The Australian. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/fukushima-crushed-by-myth-says-panel/story-e6frg6so-1226433149824. Retrieved 30 July 2012. 
466. ^ Kazuaki Nagata (24 July 2012). "Government, Tepco again hit for nuke crisis". The Japan Times. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120724a1.html. Retrieved 29 July 2012. 
467. ^ "Japan begins criminal probe into Fukushima nuke disaster". 3 August 2012. http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/japan-begins-criminal-probe-into-fukushima-nuke-disaster_791397.html. 

[edit] External links

• The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission Report website in English
• Executive summary of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission Report
• Fukushima report: Key points in nuclear disaster report - An outline of key quotes, findings and recommendations from the 88-page executive summary of the Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission's report, as provided by the BBC, 5 July 2012
• Webcam Fukushima nuclear power plant I, Unit 1 through Unit 4
• Investigation Committee on the accidents at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company
• Schematic drawing of Unit 1 reactor building
• TEPCO News Releases, Tokyo Electric Power Company
• NISA Information update, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the nuclear safety authority of Japan
• JAIF Information update, Japan Atomic International Forum
• JAEA Information update, Japan Atomic Energy Agency
• IAEA Update on Japan Earthquake, International Atomic Energy Agency
• Nature Journal – Specials: Japan earthquake and nuclear crisis
• TerraFly Timeline Aerial Imagery of Fukushima Nuclear Reactor after 2011 Tsunami and Earthquake
• Documentary photographs: residential damage within "No Go" Zone
• In graphics: Fukushima nuclear alert, as provided by the BBC, 9 July 2012
• PreventionWeb Japan: 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
• "What should we learn from the severe accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant?" by Kenichi Ohmae, Team H2O Project. 28 October 2011

Category:Nuclear accidents and incidents

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Subcategories

This category has the following 3 subcategories, out of 3 total.

Pages in category "Nuclear accidents and incidents"

The following 35 pages are in this category, out of 35 total. This list may not reflect recent changes (learn more).

Black Wind, White Land
Directed by	Gerry Hoban
Written by	Gene Kerrigan
Release date(s)	1993
Running time	53 min
Country	Ireland
Language	English

Black Wind, White Land is a 1993 documentary film, researched and produced by the founders of the Chernobyl Children's Project International and explores the tragedy about the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 and its consequences and handicapped development for the people of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

The film was directed by Gene Kerrigan and produced by Ali Hewson, the wife of U2's singer Bono.

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

Chernobyl Heart
Directed by	Maryann DeLeo
Produced by	Maryann DeLeo
Editing by	John Custodio
Running time	39 minutes
Country	United States

Chernobyl Heart is a 2003 documentary film by Maryann DeLeo. The film won the Best Documentary Short Subject award at the 2004 Academy Awards.[1]

In the film, DeLeo travels through Ukraine and Belarus with Adi Roche, the Irish founder of the Chernobyl Children's Project International, observing the effects of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on the health of children in the area. Many children suffered from a previously unknown cardiac degradation condition[2] known in the area as "Chernobyl heart", in addition to other severe radiation poisoning effects[3]

DeLeo explored the Chernobyl disaster again in 2008 with the film White Horse.

[edit] Broadcast and release details

[edit] See also

[edit] References

1. ^ 76th Academy Awards Nominees and Winners, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, February 29, 2004.
2. ^ PubMed 19647162
3. ^ Kinkead, Gwen: Brooklyn Girl Journeys To Chernobyl's Heart, The New York Observer, July 11, 2004.
4. ^ Special commemorative meeting to observe the twentieth anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe, United Nations, 28 April 2006.
5. ^ Chernobyl Heart (HBO).
6. ^ Ukraine - Chernobyl Heart, Foreign Correspondent (ABC TV), 26 April 2005.

[edit] External links

Chernobyl: The Final Warning is a 1991 made for television movie. The film chronicles the Chernobyl disaster.

[edit] Cast of Characters

[edit] Also Starring

• Debora Weston as Tamar Gale
• Jonathan Hachett as George Castle
• Keith Edwards as Champlin
• Vladimir Troshin as Mikhail Gorbachev
• Vadim Ledogorov as Leonid Scherchenko
• Nicholas Locker as Dr. Gale's Son
• Shir Gale as Dr. Gale's Daughter

[edit] External links

The Unnamed Zone (Spanish: La Zona) is a 2006 Spanish documentary film by director Carlos Rodríguez about the lives of three young Ukrainian children directly affected by the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

[edit] Synopsis

The Spanish film crew led by Carlos Rodriguez is following the life stories of three children - Lidia Pidvalna, Anastasia Pavlenko, and Andriy Kovalchuk - whose lives were drastically changed after an explosion at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station on April 26th, 1986. Through the documentary, the children and their families "living perilously close to the exclusion zone around the destroyed station recount their fears, dreams, fantasies, and hopes for the future."[1] Each child holds a "Chernobyl certificate" which bestows access to government grants and aid and is a gruesome reminder of their existential reality.

In the words of Nathan Southern, "through his film, Rodriguez paints a melancholic, enduring portrait of three young lives, forever damaged by falling into the path of a cataclysmic disaster that both preceded them and overtook them."[2]

Rodriguez own take on the synopsis for his documentary is revealing: "after our experiences in... Ukraine, we believe that a nuclear disaster has consequences that are far more terrible and complex than its purely medical effects, as they pervade every single aspect of life in the area for several generations.[1]

[edit] References

1. ^ a b The Unnamed Zone. Ukrainian Film Club of Columbia University.
2. ^ Southern, Nathan. La Zona aka The Zone. From Allmovie in The New York Times.

[edit] External links

White Horse is a short documentary by filmmakers Maryann DeLeo and Christophe Bisson that features a man (Maxym Surkov) returning to his Ukraine home for the first time in twenty years. Evacuated from the city of Pripyat, Ukraine in 1986 due to the Chernobyl disaster, he has not returned since then. DeLeo is the same filmmaker of the 2004 Academy Award-winning short film Chernobyl Heart.[1]

The beginning of the film starts with DeLeo, Bisson and Surkov driving through Kiev. This is introduced as the beginning of their journey to Pripyat, near the ground zero of Chernobyl. Once they reach the outpost outside the exclusion zone, we see that the area surrounding Pripyat is very deserted and dark. Once in the city, we see Surkov's old home, which he explains has been robbed of almost all its belongings due to looters. Yet there are still some mementos in the old apartment, including the wallpaper he and his mother put up, the training bars his father bought for him, an old rubber ball he claims was his favorite and a white horse poster plastered on the wall of his old bedroom. The pain he feels is evident. When he sees an old calendar on a door, he rips a large portion off, claiming "the year ended on April 26th". Outside the door of the apartment, he remarks how he wishes he could stay forever. He throws his old ball through the door and walks out of the apartment complex. The film ends with Surkov snapping some twigs in an old courtyard and then an image of the car they traveled in leaving the exclusion zone.[2]

Film-makers attempted to contact Maxym Surkov, the featured interviewee, when the film debuted. They were informed that he had died from a heart attack in February 2008, shortly after the completion of the film. He is survived by his wife and one daughter.[3]

[edit] Reception

In 2008, the film was nominated for a Golden Bear at the Berlin International Film Festival.[4] It also went to the Viennale Film Festival in Vienna, the Lisbon International Film Festival, and showed in Paris at Cinema Du Reel. It was shown on HBO in the USA in April 2009. There is an interview with the directors on the HBO website. http://www.hbo.com/docs/programs/whitehorse/index.html

[edit] See also

[edit] References

1. ^ White Horse | IMDb
2. ^ HBO: White Horse - Synopsis | HBO
3. ^ Christophe Bisson personal correspondence.
4. ^ White Horse - Awards | IMDb

[edit] External links

The Chernobyl disaster (Ukrainian: Чорнобильська катастрофа, Chornobylska Katastrofa – Chornobyl Catastrophe) was a catastrophic nuclear accident that occurred on 26 April 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (then officially Ukrainian SSR), which was under the direct jurisdiction of the central authorities of the Soviet Union. An explosion and fire released large quantities of radioactive contamination into the atmosphere, which spread over much of Western USSR and Europe.

The Chernobyl disaster is widely considered to have been the worst nuclear power plant accident in history, and is one of only two classified as a level 7 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale (the other being the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011).[1] The battle to contain the contamination and avert a greater catastrophe ultimately involved over 500,000 workers and cost an estimated 18 billion rubles.[2] The official Soviet casualty count of 31 deaths has been disputed, and long-term effects such as cancers and deformities are still being accounted for.

Summary

The disaster began during a systems test on Saturday, 26 April 1986 at reactor number four of the Chernobyl plant, which is near the city of Prypiat and in proximity to the administrative border with Belarus and Dnieper river. There was a sudden power output surge, and when an emergency shutdown was attempted, a more extreme spike in power output occurred, which led to a reactor vessel rupture and a series of explosions. These events exposed the graphite moderator of the reactor to air, causing it to ignite.[3] The resulting fire sent a plume of highly radioactive smoke fallout into the atmosphere and over an extensive geographical area, including Pripyat. The plume drifted over large parts of the western Soviet Union and Europe. From 1986 to 2000, 350,400 people were evacuated and resettled from the most severely contaminated areas of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine.[4][5] According to official post-Soviet data,[6][7] about 60% of the fallout landed in Belarus.

The accident raised concerns about the safety of the Soviet nuclear power industry, as well as nuclear power in general, slowing its expansion for a number of years and forcing the Soviet government to become less secretive about its procedures.[8][notes 1] The government coverup of the Chernobyl disaster was a "catalyst" for glasnost, which "paved the way for reforms leading to the Soviet collapse."[9]

Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus have been burdened with the continuing and substantial decontamination and health care costs of the Chernobyl accident. A report of the International Atomic Energy Agency,[7] examines the environmental consequences of the accident. Another UN agency, UNSCEAR, has estimated a global collective dose of radiation exposure from the accident "equivalent on average to 21 additional days of world exposure to natural background radiation"; individual doses were far higher than the global mean among those most exposed, including 530,000 local recovery workers who averaged an effective dose equivalent to an extra 50 years of typical natural background radiation exposure each.[10][11][12] Estimates of the number of deaths that will eventually result from the accident vary enormously; disparities reflect both the lack of solid scientific data and the different methodologies used to quantify mortality – whether the discussion is confined to specific geographical areas or extends worldwide, and whether the deaths are immediate, short term, or long term.

Thirty one deaths are directly attributed to the accident, all among the reactor staff and emergency workers.[13] An UNSCEAR report places the total confirmed deaths from radiation at 64 as of 2008. The Chernobyl Forum estimates that the eventual death toll could reach 4,000 among those exposed to the highest levels of radiation (200,000 emergency workers, 116,000 evacuees and 270,000 residents of the most contaminated areas); this figure includes some 50 emergency workers who died of acute radiation syndrome, nine children who died of thyroid cancer and an estimated total of 3940 deaths from radiation-induced cancer and leukemia.[14]

The Union of Concerned Scientists estimates that, among the hundreds of millions of people living in broader geographical areas, there will be 50,000 excess cancer cases resulting in 25,000 excess cancer deaths.[15] For this broader group, the 2006 TORCH report predicts 30,000 to 60,000 excess cancer deaths,[16] and a Greenpeace report puts the figure at 200,000 or more.[17] The Russian publication Chernobyl, which has received criticism for its methodology and sourcing, concludes that among the billions of people worldwide who were exposed to radioactive contamination from the disaster, nearly a million premature cancer deaths occurred between 1986 and 2004.[18]

Accident

On 26 April 1986, at 01:23 (UTC+3), reactor four suffered a catastrophic power increase, leading to explosions in its core. This dispersed large quantities of radioactive fuel and core materials into the atmosphere[19]:73 and ignited the combustible graphite moderator. The burning graphite moderator increased the emission of radioactive particles, carried by the smoke, as the reactor had not been encased by any kind of hard containment vessel. The accident occurred during an experiment scheduled to test a potential safety emergency core cooling feature, which took place during a normal shutdown procedure.

Steam turbine tests

An inactive nuclear reactor continues to generate a significant amount of residual decay heat. In an initial shut-down state (for example, following an emergency SCRAM) the reactor produces around 7 percent of its total thermal output and requires cooling to avoid core damage. RBMK reactors, like those at Chernobyl, use water as coolant.[20][21] Reactor 4 at Chernobyl consisted of about 1,600 individual fuel channels; each required a coolant flow of 28 metric tons (28,000 liters / 7,400 US gallons) per hour.[19]:7

Since cooling pumps require electricity to cool a reactor after a SCRAM, in the event of a power grid failure, Chernobyl's reactors had three backup diesel generators; these could start up in 15 seconds, but took 60–75 seconds[19]:15 to attain full speed and reach the 5.5‑megawatt (MW) output required to run one main pump.[19]:30

To solve this one-minute gap, considered an unacceptable safety risk, it had been theorised that rotational energy from the steam turbine (as it wound down under residual steam pressure) could be used to generate the required electrical power. Analysis indicated that this residual momentum and steam pressure might be sufficient to run the coolant pumps for 45 seconds,[19]:16 bridging the gap between an external power failure and the full availability of the emergency generators.[22]

This capability still needed to be confirmed experimentally, and previous tests had ended unsuccessfully. An initial test carried out in 1982 showed that the excitation voltage of the turbine-generator was insufficient; it did not maintain the desired magnetic field after the turbine trip. The system was modified, and the test was repeated in 1984 but again proved unsuccessful. In 1985, the tests were attempted a third time but also yielded negative results. The test procedure was to be repeated again in 1986, and it was scheduled to take place during the maintenance shutdown of Reactor Four.[22]

The test focused on the switching sequences of the electrical supplies for the reactor. The test procedure was to begin with an automatic emergency shutdown. No detrimental effect on the safety of the reactor was anticipated, so the test program was not formally coordinated with either the chief designer of the reactor (NIKIET) or the scientific manager. Instead, it was approved only by the director of the plant (and even this approval was not consistent with established procedures).[23]

According to the test parameters, the thermal output of the reactor should have been no lower than 700 MW at the start of the experiment. If test conditions had been as planned, the procedure would almost certainly have been carried out safely; the eventual disaster resulted from attempts to boost the reactor output once the experiment had been started, which was inconsistent with approved procedure.[23]

The Chernobyl power plant had been in operation for two years without the capability to ride through the first 60–75 seconds of a total loss of electric power, and thus lacked an important safety feature. The station managers presumably wished to correct this at the first opportunity, which may explain why they continued the test even when serious problems arose, and why the requisite approval for the test had not been sought from the Soviet nuclear oversight regulator (even though there was a representative at the complex of 4 reactors).[notes 2]:18–20

The experimental procedure was intended to run as follows:

1. The reactor was to be running at a low power level, between 700 MW and 800 MW.
2. The steam-turbine generator was to be run up to full speed.
3. When these conditions were achieved, the steam supply for the turbine generator was to be closed off.
4. Turbine generator performance was to be recorded to determine whether it could provide the bridging power for coolant pumps until the emergency diesel generators were sequenced to start and provide power to the cooling pumps automatically.
5. After the emergency generators reached normal operating speed and voltage, the turbine generator would be allowed to freewheel down.

Conditions prior to the accident

The conditions to run the test were established before the day shift of 25 April 1986. The day shift workers had been instructed in advance and were familiar with the established procedures. A special team of electrical engineers was present to test the new voltage regulating system.[24] As planned, a gradual reduction in the output of the power unit was begun at 01:06 on 25 April, and the power level had reached 50% of its nominal 3200 MW thermal level by the beginning of the day shift.

At this point, another regional power station unexpectedly went offline, and the Kiev electrical grid controller requested that the further reduction of Chernobyl's output be postponed, as power was needed to satisfy the peak evening demand. The Chernobyl plant director agreed, and postponed the test.

At 23:04, the Kiev grid controller allowed the reactor shut-down to resume. This delay had some serious consequences: the day shift had long since departed, the evening shift was also preparing to leave, and the night shift would not take over until midnight, well into the job. According to plan, the test should have been finished during the day shift, and the night shift would only have had to maintain decay heat cooling systems in an otherwise shut down plant.[19]:36–8

The night shift had very limited time to prepare for and carry out the experiment. A further rapid reduction in the power level from 50% was executed during the shift change-over. Alexander Akimov was chief of the night shift, and Leonid Toptunov was the operator responsible for the reactor's operational regimen, including the movement of the control rods. Toptunov was a young engineer who had worked independently as a senior engineer for approximately three months.[19]:36–8

The test plan called for a gradual reduction in power output from reactor 4 to a thermal level of 700–1000 MW.[25] An output of 700 MW was reached at 00:05 on 26 April. However, due to the natural production of xenon-135, a neutron absorber, core power continued to decrease without further operator action - a process known as reactor poisoning. As the reactor power output dropped further, to approximately 500 MW, Toptunov mistakenly inserted the control rods too far - the exact circumstances leading to this are unknown because both Akimov and Toptunov were killed during the later explosion. This combination of factors rendered the reactor in an unintended near-shutdown state, with a power output of 30 MW thermal or less.

The reactor was now only producing around 5 percent of the minimum initial power level established as safe for the test.[23]:73 Control-room personnel consequently made the decision to restore power by extracting the majority of the reactor control rods to their upper limits.[26] Several minutes elapsed between their extraction and the point that the power output began to increase and subsequently stabilize at 160–200 MW (thermal), a much smaller value than the planned 700 MW. The rapid reduction in the power during the initial shutdown, and the subsequent operation at a level of less than 200 MW led to increased poisoning of the reactor core by the accumulation of xenon-135.[27][28] This restricted any further rise of reactor power, and made it necessary to extract additional control rods from the reactor core in order to counteract the poisoning.

The operation of the reactor at the low power level and high poisoning level, was accompanied by unstable core temperature and coolant flow, and possibly by instability of neutron flux (see reactor poisoning). Various alarms started going off at this point. The control room received repeated emergency signals regarding the levels in the steam/water separator drums, and large excursions or variations in the flow rate of feed water, as well as from relief valves opened to relieve excess steam into a turbine condenser, and from the neutron power controller. In the period between 00:35 and 00:45, emergency alarm signals concerning thermal-hydraulic parameters were ignored, apparently to preserve the reactor power level. Emergency signals from the reactor emergency protection system (EPS-5) triggered a trip which turned off both turbine-generators.[29]

After a while, a more or less stable state at a power level of 200 MW was achieved, and preparation for the experiment continued. As part of the test plan, extra water pumps were activated at 01:05 on 26 April, increasing the water flow. The increased coolant flow rate through the reactor produced an increase in the inlet coolant temperature of the reactor core, which now more closely approached the nucleate boiling temperature of water, reducing the safety margin.

The flow exceeded the allowed limit at 01:19. At the same time, the extra water flow lowered the overall core temperature and reduced the existing steam voids in the core.[30] Since water also absorbs neutrons (and the higher density of liquid water makes it a better absorber than steam), turning on additional pumps decreased the reactor power further still. This prompted the operators to remove the manual control rods further to maintain power.[31]

All these actions led to an extremely unstable reactor configuration. Nearly all of the control rods were removed, which would limit the value of the safety rods when initially inserted in a SCRAM condition. Further, the reactor coolant had reduced boiling, but had limited margin to boiling, so any power excursion would produce boiling, reducing neutron absorption by the water. The reactor was in an unstable configuration that was clearly outside the safe operating envelope established by the designers.

Experiment and explosion

At 1:23:04 a.m. the experiment began. Four (of eight total) Main Circulating Pumps (MCP) were active. The steam to the turbines was shut off, and a run down of the turbine generator began. The diesel generator started and sequentially picked up loads, which was complete by 01:23:43. During this period, the power for the four MCPs was supplied by the turbine generator as it coasted down. As the momentum of the turbine generator decreased, the water flow rate decreased, leading to increased formation of steam voids (bubbles) in the core.

Because of the positive void coefficient of the RBMK reactor at low reactor power levels, it was now primed to embark on a positive feedback loop, in which the formation of steam voids reduced the ability of the liquid water coolant to absorb neutrons, which in turn increased the reactor's power output. This caused yet more water to flash into steam, giving yet a further power increase. However, during almost the entire period of the experiment the automatic control system successfully counteracted this positive feedback, continuously inserting control rods into the reactor core to limit the power rise.

At 1:23:40, as recorded by the SKALA centralized control system, an emergency shutdown of the reactor, which inadvertently triggered the explosion, was initiated. The SCRAM was started when the EPS-5 button (also known as the AZ-5 button) of the reactor emergency protection system was pressed: this fully inserted all control rods, including the manual control rods that had been incautiously withdrawn earlier. The reason why the EPS-5 button was pressed is not known, whether it was done as an emergency measure or simply as a routine method of shutting down the reactor upon completion of the experiment.

There is a view[who?] that the SCRAM may have been ordered as a response to the unexpected rapid power increase, although there is no recorded data conclusively proving this. Some[who?] have suggested that the button was not pressed, and instead the signal was automatically produced by the emergency protection system; however, the SKALA clearly registered a manual SCRAM signal. In spite of this, the question as to when or even whether the EPS-5 button was pressed has been the subject of debate. There are assertions[who?] that the pressure was caused by the rapid power acceleration at the start, and allegations that the button was not pressed until the reactor began to self-destruct but others assert that it happened earlier and in calm conditions.[32]:578[33]

After the EPS-5 button was pressed, the insertion of control rods into the reactor core began. The control rod insertion mechanism moved the rods at 0.4 m/s, so that the rods took 18 to 20 seconds to travel the full height of the core, about 7 meters. A bigger problem was a flawed graphite-tip control rod design, which initially displaced coolant before inserting neutron-absorbing material to slow the reaction. As a result, the SCRAM actually increased the reaction rate in the lower half of the core.

A few seconds after the start of the SCRAM, a massive power spike occurred, the core overheated, and seconds later this overheating resulted in the initial explosion. Some of the fuel rods fractured, blocking the control rod columns and causing the control rods to become stuck at one-third insertion. Within three seconds the reactor output rose above 530 MW.[19]:31

The subsequent course of events was not registered by instruments: it is known only as a result of mathematical simulation. Apparently, a great rise in power first caused an increase in fuel temperature and massive steam buildup, leading to a rapid increase in steam pressure. This destroyed fuel elements and ruptured the channels in which these elements were located.[34]

Then, according to some estimations[who?], the reactor jumped to around 30 GW thermal, ten times the normal operational output. The last reading on the control panel was 33 GW. It was not possible to reconstruct the precise sequence of the processes that led to the destruction of the reactor and the power unit building, but a steam explosion, like the explosion of a steam boiler from excess vapor pressure, appears to have been the next event. There is a general understanding that it was steam from the wrecked channels entering the reactor's inner structure that caused the destruction of the reactor casing, tearing off and lifting the 2,000-ton upper plate, to which the entire reactor assembly is fastened. Apparently, this was the first explosion that many[who?] heard.[35]:366 This explosion ruptured further fuel channels, and as a result the remaining coolant flashed to steam and escaped the reactor core. The total water loss in combination with a high positive void coefficient further increased the reactor power.

A second, more powerful explosion occurred about two or three seconds after the first; evidence indicates that the second explosion was from the core itself undergoing runaway criticality.[36] The nuclear excursion dispersed the core and effectively terminated the nuclear chain reaction. However, a graphite fire was burning by now, greatly contributing to the spread of radioactive material and the contamination of outlying areas.[37]

There were initially several hypotheses about the nature of the second explosion. One view was that "the second explosion was caused by the hydrogen which had been produced either by the overheated steam-zirconium reaction or by the reaction of red-hot graphite with steam that produced hydrogen and carbon monoxide." Another hypothesis was that the second explosion was a thermal explosion of the reactor as a result of the uncontrollable escape of fast neutrons caused by the complete water loss in the reactor core.[38] A third hypothesis was that the explosion was caused by steam. According to this version, the flow of steam and the steam pressure caused all the destruction that followed the ejection from the shaft of a substantial part of the graphite and fuel.

According to observers outside Unit 4, burning lumps of material and sparks shot into the air above the reactor. Some of them fell on to the roof of the machine hall and started a fire. About 25 percent of the red-hot graphite blocks and overheated material from the fuel channels was ejected. ...Parts of the graphite blocks and fuel channels were out of the reactor building. ...As a result of the damage to the building an airflow through the core was established by the high temperature of the core. The air ignited the hot graphite and started a graphite fire.[19]:32

However, the ratio of xenon radioisotopes released during the event indicates that the second explosion could be a nuclear power transient. This nuclear transient released 40 GJ of energy, the equivalent of about ten tons of TNT. The analysis indicates that the nuclear excursion was limited to a small portion of the core.[36]

Contrary to safety regulations, bitumen, a combustible material, had been used in the construction of the roof of the reactor building and the turbine hall. Ejected material ignited at least five fires on the roof of the adjacent reactor 3, which was still operating. It was imperative to put those fires out and protect the cooling systems of reactor 3.[19]:42 Inside reactor 3, the chief of the night shift, Yuri Bagdasarov, wanted to shut down the reactor immediately, but chief engineer Nikolai Fomin would not allow this. The operators were given respirators and potassium iodide tablets and told to continue working. At 05:00, however, Bagdasarov made his own decision to shut down the reactor, leaving only those operators there who had to work the emergency cooling systems.[19]:44

Radiation levels

Approximate radiation levels at different locations shortly after the explosion were as follows:[39]

Location	Radiation (Roentgens per hour)	Sieverts per hour (SI Unit)
Vicinity of the reactor core	30,000	300
Fuel fragments	15,000–20,000	150–200
Debris heap at the place of circulation pumps	10,000	100
Debris near the electrolyzers	5,000–15,000	50–150
Water in the Level +25 feedwater room	5,000	50
Level 0 of the turbine hall	500–15,000	5–150
Area of the affected unit	1,000–1,500	10–15
Water in Room 712	1,000	10
Control room	3–5	0.03–0.05
Gidroelektromontazh depot	30	0.3
Nearby concrete mixing unit	10–15	0.10–0.15

Plant layout

Based on the image of the plant[40]

Level	Objects
Metres	Levels are distances above (or below for minus values) ground level at the site.
49.6	Roof of the reactor building, gallery of the refueling mechanism
39.9	Roof of the deaerator gallery
35.5	Floor of the main reactor hall
31.6	Upper side of the upper biological shield, floor of the space for pipes to steam separators
28.3	Lower side of the turbine hall roof
24.0	Deaerator floor, measurement and control instruments room
16.4	Floor of the pipe aisle in the deaerator gallery
12.0	Main floor of the turbine hall, floor of the main circulation pump motor compartments
10.0	Control room, floor under the reactor lower biological shield, main circulation pumps
6.0	Steam distribution corridor
2.2	Upper pressure suppression pool
0.0	Ground level; house switchgear, turbine hall level
−0.5	Lower pressure suppression pool
−5.2, −4.2	Other turbine hall levels
−6.5	Basement floor of the turbine hall

Individual involvement

Immediate crisis management

Radiation levels

The radiation levels in the worst-hit areas of the reactor building have been estimated to be 5.6 roentgens per second (R/s) (1.4 milliamperes per kilogram), equivalent to more than 20,000 roentgens per hour. A lethal dose is around 500 roentgens (0.13 coulombs per kilogram) over 5 hours, so in some areas, unprotected workers received fatal doses within minutes. However, a dosimeter capable of measuring up to 1,000 R/s (0.3 A/kg) was inaccessible because of the explosion, and another one failed when turned on. All remaining dosimeters had limits of 0.001 R/s (0.3 µA/kg) and therefore read "off scale." Thus, the reactor crew could ascertain only that the radiation levels were somewhere above 0.001 R/s (3.6 R/h, or 0.3 µA/kg), while the true levels were much higher in some areas.[19]:42–50

Because of the inaccurate low readings, the reactor crew chief Alexander Akimov assumed that the reactor was intact. The evidence of pieces of graphite and reactor fuel lying around the building was ignored, and the readings of another dosimeter brought in by 04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that the new dosimeter must have been defective.[19]:42–50 Akimov stayed with his crew in the reactor building until morning, trying to pump water into the reactor. None of them wore any protective gear. Most, including Akimov, died from radiation exposure within three weeks.[41]:247–48

Fire containment

Shortly after the accident, firefighters arrived to try to extinguish the fires. First on the scene was a Chernobyl Power Station firefighter brigade under the command of Lieutenant Volodymyr Pravik, who died on 9 May 1986 of acute radiation sickness. They were not told how dangerously radioactive the smoke and the debris were, and may not even have known that the accident was anything more than a regular electrical fire: "We didn't know it was the reactor. No one had told us."[42]

Grigorii Khmel, the driver of one of the fire engines, later described what happened:

We arrived there at 10 or 15 minutes to two in the morning... We saw graphite scattered about. Misha asked: "Is that graphite?" I kicked it away. But one of the fighters on the other truck picked it up. "It's hot," he said. The pieces of graphite were of different sizes, some big, some small, enough to pick them up...

We didn't know much about radiation. Even those who worked there had no idea. There was no water left in the trucks. Misha filled a cistern and we aimed the water at the top. Then those boys who died went up to the roof – Vashchik, Kolya and others, and Volodya Pravik.... They went up the ladder ... and I never saw them again.[43]:54

However, Anatoli Zakharov, a fireman stationed in Chernobyl since 1980, offers a different description:

I remember joking to the others, "There must be an incredible amount of radiation here. We'll be lucky if we're all still alive in the morning."

Twenty years after the disaster, he said the firefighters from the Fire Station No. 2 were aware of the risks.

Of course we knew! If we'd followed regulations, we would never have gone near the reactor. But it was a moral obligation – our duty. We were like kamikaze.[44]

The immediate priority was to extinguish fires on the roof of the station and the area around the building containing Reactor No. 4 to protect No. 3 and keep its core cooling systems intact. The fires were extinguished by 5:00, but many firefighters received high doses of radiation. The fire inside reactor 4 continued to burn until 10 May 1986; it is possible that well over half of the graphite burned out.[19]:73

The fire was extinguished by a combined effort of helicopters dropping over 5,000 metric tons of sand, lead, clay, and neutron absorbing boron onto the burning reactor and injection of liquid nitrogen. The Ukrainian filmmaker Vladimir Shevchenko captured film footage of an Mi-8 helicopter as its main rotor collided with a nearby construction crane cable, causing the helicopter to fall near the damaged reactor building and killing its four-man crew.[45] It is now known that virtually none of the neutron absorbers reached the core.[46]

From eyewitness accounts of the firefighters involved before they died (as reported on the CBC television series Witness), one described his experience of the radiation as "tasting like metal," and feeling a sensation similar to that of pins and needles all over his face. (This is similar to the description given by Louis Slotin, a Manhattan Project physicist who died days after a fatal radiation overdose from a criticality accident.)[47]

The explosion and fire threw hot particles of the nuclear fuel and also far more dangerous fission products, radioactive isotopes such as caesium-137, iodine-131, strontium-90 and other radionuclides, into the air: the residents of the surrounding area observed the radioactive cloud on the night of the explosion.

Timeline

• 1:26:03 – fire alarm activated
• 1:28 – arrival of local firefighters, Pravik's guard
• 1:35 – arrival of firefighters from Pripyat, Kibenok's guard
• 1:40 – arrival of Telyatnikov
• 2:10 – turbine hall roof fire extinguished
• 2:30 – main reactor hall roof fires suppressed
• 3:30 – arrival of Kiev firefighters[48]
• 4:50 – fires mostly localized
• 6:35 – all fires extinguished‡[49]

‡With the exception of the fire contained inside Reactor 4, which continued to burn for many days.[19]:73

Evacuation developments

The nearby city of Prypiat was not immediately evacuated after the incident. The townspeople went about their usual business, completely oblivious to what had just happened. However, within a few hours of the explosion, dozens of people fell ill. Later, they reported severe headaches and metallic tastes in their mouths, along with uncontrollable fits of coughing and vomiting.[50]

The general population of the Soviet Union was first informed of the disaster on 28 April, two days after the explosion, with a 20 second announcement in the TV news program Vremya.[51] At that time ABC released its report about the disaster.[52] During that time, all radio broadcasts run by the state were replaced with classical music, which was a common method of preparing the public for an announcement of a tragedy that had taken place. Scientist teams were armed and placed on alert as instructions were awaited.

Only after radiation levels set off alarms at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden,[53] over one thousand kilometers from the Chernobyl Plant, did the Soviet Union admit that an accident had occurred. Nevertheless, authorities attempted to conceal the scale of the disaster. For example, after evacuating the city of Prypiat, the following warning message was read on the state TV:

There has been an accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. One of the nuclear reactors was damaged. The effects of the accident are being remedied. Assistance has been provided for any affected people. An investigative commission has been set up.

A state commission was set up the same day (26 April) and tasked with investigating the accident. It was headed by Valery Legasov, who arrived at Chernobyl in the evening of 26 April. By the time Legasov arrived, two people had already died and 52 were receiving medical attention in hospital. By the night of 26–27 April – more than 24 hours after the explosion – Legasov's committee had ample evidence that extremely high levels of radiation had caused a number of cases of radiation exposure. Based on the evidence at hand, Legasov's committee acknowledged the destruction of the reactor and ordered the evacuation of Pripyat.

The evacuation began at 14:00 on 27 April. An excerpt of the evacuation announcement was translated into English in the program Seconds From Disaster on the National Geographic Channel in 2004.[54] A translation of the rest of the audio follows.

For the attention of the residents of Pripyat! The City Council informs you that due to the accident at Chernobyl Power Station in the city of Pripyat the radioactive conditions in the vicinity are deteriorating. The Communist Party, its officials and the armed forces are taking necessary steps to combat this. Nevertheless, with the view to keep people as safe and healthy as possible, the children being top priority, we need to temporarily evacuate the citizens in the nearest towns of Kiev Oblast. For these reasons, starting from April 27, 1986 2 pm each apartment block will be able to have a bus at its disposal, supervised by the police and the city officials. It is highly advisable to take your documents, some vital personal belongings and a certain amount of food, just in case, with you. The senior executives of public and industrial facilities of the city has decided on the list of employees needed to stay in Pripyat to maintain these facilities in a good working order. All the houses will be guarded by the police during the evacuation period. Comrades, leaving your residences temporarily please make sure you have turned off the lights, electrical equipment and water off and shut the windows. Please keep calm and orderly in the process of this short-term evacuation.

—Evacuation announcement in Pripyat, 27 April 1986 (14:00)

In order to expedite the evacuation, the residents were told to bring only what was necessary, as the authorities had said it would only last approximately three days. As a result, most of the residents left their personal belongings, which are still there today. An exclusion zone of 30 km (19 mi) remains in place today, although its shape has changed and its size has been expanded.

As the plant was run by authorities in Moscow, the government of Ukraine did not receive prompt information on the situation at the site, according to the former chairman of Presidium of Verkhovna Rada of Ukrainian SSR, Valentyna Shevchenko.[55] In her recollections she stated that she was at work when at 09:00 Vasyl Durdynets who performed duties of the Minister of Internal Affairs at the time (as the First Deputy Minister) called in with a report on the recent situation, adding at the end that there was a fire at the Chernobyl AES (AES – an abbreviation for a nuclear power plant), which was extinguished and everything was fine (see Fire containment). When Shevchenko asked "How are the people?", he replied that there was nothing to be concerned with: "some are celebrating a wedding, others are gardening, and others are fishing in the Pripyat River".[55]

On 25 April 2011 the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych awarded Durdynets the "Distinguished Juror of Ukraine" as an advisor of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a participant in the liquidation of consequences of Chernobyl disaster, and a general of Internal Service of Ukraine.[56] After the report Shevchenko called in to Volodymyr Shcherbytsky (Head of the Central Committee of CP(b)U, de facto – a head of state).[55] Shcherbytsky stated that he anticipated a delegation of the state commission headed by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR.[55]

Among the delegation's officials were academic Evgeny Velikhov, a leading nuclear specialist in the Soviet Union; a head of Hydro-Meteorologic Service of USSR Yuriy Izrael; a chief radiologist of the country Leonid Ilyin; and others. From the Boryspil International Airport the delegation drove to the power plant, realised the seriousness of the situation that night, and decided to evacuate the residents of Prypiat.[55] On 26 April 2011 Velikhov was awarded Order of Merit of the III degree from the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych for his contributions in the liquidation of consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.[57]

By the morning of 27 April, buses arrived in Prypiat to start the evacuation at 11:00. By 15:00, 53,000 people were evacuated to various villages of Kiev region.[55] At first it was decided to evacuate the population temporarily for three days, however later it was postponed permanently. Many took only the most necessary items and their documents leaving all the rest behind.[55] The next day, talks began for evacuating people from the 10 km zone.

Shevchenko was the first of the Ukrainian state top officials to arrive at the disaster site early on 28 April. There she spoke with members of medical staff and people, who were calm and hopeful that they could soon return to their homes. Shevchenko returned home near midnight, stopping at a radiological checkpoint in Vilcha, one of the first which were set up soon after the accident.[55]

There was a notification from Moscow that there was no reason to postpone the 1 May celebrations (including the annual parade), but on 30 April a meeting of the Political bureau of the Central Committee of CP(b)U took place to discuss the plan for the upcoming celebration. Scientists were reporting that the radiological background in Kiev city was normal. At the meeting, which was finished at 18:00, it was decided to shorten celebrations from the regular 3.5–4 to under 2 hours.[55]

Steam explosion risk

Two floors of bubbler pools beneath the reactor served as a large water reservoir for the emergency cooling pumps and as a pressure suppression system capable of condensing steam in case of a small broken steam pipe; the third floor above them, below the reactor, served as a steam tunnel. The steam released by a broken pipe was supposed to enter the steam tunnel and be led into the pools to bubble through a layer of water. After the disaster, the pools and the basement were flooded because of ruptured cooling water pipes and accumulated firefighting water, and constituted a serious steam explosion risk.

The smoldering graphite, fuel and other material above, at more than 1200 °C,[59] started to burn through the reactor floor and mixed with molten concrete from the reactor lining, creating corium, a radioactive semi-liquid material comparable to lava.[58][60] If this mixture had melted through the floor into the pool of water, it was feared it could have created a serious steam explosion that would have ejected more radioactive material from the reactor. It became necessary to drain the pool.[61]

The bubbler pool could be drained by opening its sluice gates. Volunteers in diving suits entered the radioactive water and managed to open the gates. These were the engineers Alexei Ananenko (who knew where the valves were) and Valeri Bezpalov, accompanied by a third man, Boris Baranov, who provided them with light from a lamp, though this lamp failed, leaving them to find the valves by feeling their way along a pipe. All of them returned to the surface and according to Ananenko, their colleagues jumped in joy when they heard they had managed to open the valves.

Despite their apparently good condition after completing the work, all three suffered from radiation sickness and later died.[62] Some sources claim incorrectly that they died in the plant.[63] It is likely that intense alpha radiation hydrolyzed the water, generating a low-pH hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) solution akin to an oxidizing acid.[64] Conversion of bubbler pool water to H2O2 is confirmed by the presence in the Chernobyl lavas of studtite and metastudtite,[65][66] the only minerals that contain peroxide.[67]

Fire brigade pumps were then used to drain the basement. The operation was not completed until 8 May, after 20,000 metric tons of highly radioactive water were pumped out.

With the bubbler pool gone, a meltdown was less likely to produce a powerful steam explosion. To do so, the molten core would now have to reach the water table below the reactor. To reduce the likelihood of this, it was decided to freeze the earth beneath the reactor, which would also stabilize the foundations. Using oil drilling equipment, the injection of liquid nitrogen began on 4 May. It was estimated that 25 metric tons of liquid nitrogen per day would be required to keep the soil frozen at −100 °C.[19]:59 This idea[68] was soon scrapped and the bottom room where the cooling system would have been installed was filled with concrete.

Debris removal

The worst of the radioactive debris was collected inside what was left of the reactor, much of it shoveled in by liquidators wearing heavy protective gear (dubbed "bio-robots" by the military); these workers could only spend a maximum of 40 seconds at a time working on the rooftops of the surrounding buildings because of the extremely high doses of radiation given off by the blocks of graphite and other debris. The reactor itself was covered with bags of sand, lead and boric acid dropped from helicopters: some 5,000 metric tons of material were dropped during the week that followed the accident.

At the time there was still fear that the reactor could re-enter a self-sustaining nuclear chain-reaction and explode again, and a new containment structure was planned to prevent rain entering and triggering such an explosion, and to prevent further release of radioactive material. This was the largest civil engineering task in history, involving a quarter of a million construction workers who all reached their official lifetime limits of radiation.[46] By December 1986, a large concrete sarcophagus had been erected to seal off the reactor and its contents.[69] A unique "clean up" medal was given to the workers.[70]

Many of the vehicles used by the "liquidators" remain parked in a field in the Chernobyl area.[71]

During the construction of the sarcophagus, a scientific team re-entered the reactor as part of an investigation dubbed "Complex Expedition", to locate and contain nuclear fuel in a way that could not lead to another explosion. These scientists manually collected cold fuel rods, but great heat was still emanating from the core. Rates of radiation in different parts of the building were monitored by drilling holes into the reactor and inserting long metal detector tubes. The scientists were exposed to high levels of radiation and radioactive dust.[46]

After six months of investigation, in December 1986, they discovered with the help of a remote camera an intensely radioactive mass in the basement of Unit Four, more than two metres wide and weighing hundreds of tons, which they called "the elephant's foot" for its wrinkled appearance. The mass was composed of sand, glass and a large amount of nuclear fuel that had escaped from the reactor. The concrete beneath the reactor was steaming hot, and was breached by solidified lava and spectacular unknown crystalline forms termed chernobylite. It was concluded that there was no further risk of explosion.[46]

Causes

Operator error initially faulted

There were two official explanations of the accident: the first, later acknowledged to be erroneous, was published in August 1986 and effectively placed the blame on the power plant operators. To investigate the causes of the accident the IAEA created a group known as the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), which in its report of 1986, INSAG-1, on the whole also supported this view, based on the data provided by the Soviets and the oral statements of specialists.[72] In this view, the catastrophic accident was caused by gross violations of operating rules and regulations. "During preparation and testing of the turbine generator under run-down conditions using the auxiliary load, personnel disconnected a series of technical protection systems and breached the most important operational safety provisions for conducting a technical exercise."[73]:311

The operator error was probably due to their lack of knowledge of nuclear reactor physics and engineering, as well as lack of experience and training. According to these allegations, at the time of the accident the reactor was being operated with many key safety systems turned off, most notably the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), LAR (Local Automatic control system), and AZ (emergency power reduction system). Personnel had an insufficiently detailed understanding of technical procedures involved with the nuclear reactor, and knowingly ignored regulations to speed test completion.[73]

The developers of the reactor plant considered this combination of events to be impossible and therefore did not allow for the creation of emergency protection systems capable of preventing the combination of events that led to the crisis, namely the intentional disabling of emergency protection equipment plus the violation of operating procedures. Thus the primary cause of the accident was the extremely improbable combination of rule infringement plus the operational routine allowed by the power station staff.[73]:312

In this analysis of the causes of the accident, deficiencies in the reactor design and in the operating regulations that made the accident possible were set aside and mentioned only casually. Serious critical observations covered only general questions and did not address the specific reasons for the accident. The following general picture arose from these observations. Several procedural irregularities also helped to make the accident possible. One was insufficient communication between the safety officers and the operators in charge of the experiment being run that night.

The reactor operators disabled safety systems down to the generators, which the test was really about. The main process computer, SKALA, was running in such a way that the main control computer could not shut down the reactor or even reduce power. Normally the reactor would have started to insert all of the control rods. The computer would have also started the "Emergency Core Protection System" that introduces 24 control rods into the active zone within 2.5 seconds, which is still slow by 1986 standards. All control was transferred from the process computer to the human operators.

This view is reflected in numerous publications and also artistic works on the theme of the Chernobyl accident that appeared immediately after the accident,[19] and for a long time remained dominant in the public consciousness and in popular publications.

Operating instructions and design deficiencies found

In 1991 a Commission of the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Safety in Industry and Nuclear Power has reassessed the causes and circumstances of the Chernobyl accident and came to new insights and conclusions. Based on it, in 1992 the IAEA Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) published an additional report, INSAG-7,[23] which reviewed "that part of the INSAG-1 report in which primary attention is given to the reasons for the accident." and included the USSR State Commission report as Appendix I.[23]

In this INSAG report, most of the earlier accusations against staff for breach of regulations were acknowledged to be either erroneous, based on incorrect information obtained in August 1986, or less relevant. This report reflected another view of the main reasons for the accident, presented in Appendix I. According to this account, the operators' actions in turning off the Emergency Core Cooling System, interfering with the settings on the protection equipment, and blocking the level and pressure in the separator drum did not contribute to the original cause of the accident and its magnitude, although they may have been a breach of regulations. Turning off the emergency system designed to prevent the two turbine generators from stopping was not a violation of regulations.[23]

Human factors contributed to the conditions that led to the disaster. These included operating the reactor at a low power level – less than 700 MW – a level documented in the run-down test program, and operating with a small operational reactivity margin (ORM). The 1986 assertions of Soviet experts notwithstanding, regulations did not prohibit operating the reactor at this low power level.[23]:18

However, regulations did forbid operating the reactor with a small margin of reactivity. Yet "post-accident studies have shown that the way in which the real role of the ORM is reflected in the Operating Procedures and design documentation for the RBMK-1000 is extremely contradictory," and furthermore, "ORM was not treated as an operational safety limit, violation of which could lead to an accident."[23]:34–25

According to the INSAG-7 Report, the chief reasons for the accident lie in the peculiarities of physics and in the construction of the reactor. There are two such reasons:[23]:18

• The reactor had a dangerously large positive void coefficient. The void coefficient is a measurement of how a reactor responds to increased steam formation in the water coolant. Most other reactor designs have a negative coefficient, i.e. the nuclear reaction rate slows when steam bubbles form in the coolant, since as the vapor phase in the reactor increases, fewer neutrons are slowed down. Faster neutrons are less likely to split uranium atoms, so the reactor produces less power (a negative feed-back). Chernobyl's RBMK reactor, however, used solid graphite as a neutron moderator to slow down the neutrons, and the water in it, on the contrary, acts like a harmful neutron absorber. Thus neutrons are slowed down even if steam bubbles form in the water. Furthermore, because steam absorbs neutrons much less readily than water, increasing the intensity of vaporization means that more neutrons are able to split uranium atoms, increasing the reactor's power output. This makes the RBMK design very unstable at low power levels, and prone to suddenly increasing energy production to a dangerous level. This behavior is counter-intuitive, and this property of the reactor was unknown to the crew.

• A more significant flaw was in the design of the control rods that are inserted into the reactor to slow down the reaction. In the RBMK reactor design, the lower part of each control rod was made of graphite and was 1.3 meters shorter than necessary, and in the space beneath the rods were hollow channels filled with water. The upper part of the rod, the truly functional part that absorbs the neutrons and thereby halts the reaction, was made of boron carbide. With this design, when the rods are inserted into the reactor from the uppermost position, the graphite parts initially displace some water (which absorbs neutrons, as mentioned above), effectively causing less neutrons to be absorbed initially. Thus for the first few seconds of control rod activation, reactor power output is increased, rather than reduced as desired. This behavior is counter-intuitive and was not known to the reactor operators.

• Other deficiencies besides these were noted in the RBMK-1000 reactor design, as were its non-compliance with accepted standards and with the requirements of nuclear reactor safety.

Both views were heavily lobbied by different groups, including the reactor's designers, power plant personnel, and the Soviet and Ukrainian governments. According to the IAEA's 1986 analysis, the main cause of the accident was the operators' actions. But according to the IAEA's 1993 revised analysis the main cause was the reactor's design.[74] One reason there were such contradictory viewpoints and so much debate about the causes of the Chernobyl accident was that the primary data covering the disaster, as registered by the instruments and sensors, were not completely published in the official sources.

Once again, the human factor had to be considered as a major element in causing the accident. INSAG notes that both the operating regulations and staff handled the disabling of the reactor protection easily enough: witness the length of time for which the ECCS was out of service while the reactor was operated at half power. INSAG's view is that it was the operating crew's deviation from the test program that was mostly to blame. "Most reprehensibly, unapproved changes in the test procedure were deliberately made on the spot, although the plant was known to be in a very different condition from that intended for the test."[23]:24

As in the previously released report INSAG-1, close attention is paid in report INSAG-7 to the inadequate (at the moment of the accident) "culture of safety" at all levels. Deficiency in the safety culture was inherent not only at the operational stage but also, and to no lesser extent, during activities at other stages in the lifetime of nuclear power plants (including design, engineering, construction, manufacture and regulation). The poor quality of operating procedures and instructions, and their conflicting character, put a heavy burden on the operating crew, including the Chief Engineer. "The accident can be said to have flowed from a deficient safety culture, not only at the Chernobyl plant, but throughout the Soviet design, operating and regulatory organizations for nuclear power that existed at that time."[23]:24

Effects

International spread of radioactive substances

Four hundred times more radioactive material was released than had been by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The disaster released 1/100 to 1/1000 of the total amount of radioactivity released by nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s.[82] Approximately 100,000 km² of land was significantly contaminated with fallout, the worst hit regions being in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia[83] Slighter levels of contamination were detected over all of Europe except for the Iberian Peninsula.[16][84][85]

The initial evidence that a major release of radioactive material was affecting other countries came not from Soviet sources, but from Sweden, where on the morning of 28 April[86] workers at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant (approximately 1,100 km (680 mi) from the Chernobyl site) were found to have radioactive particles on their clothes.[87]

It was Sweden's search for the source of radioactivity, after they had determined there was no leak at the Swedish plant, that at noon on 28 April led to the first hint of a serious nuclear problem in the western Soviet Union. Hence the evacuation of Pripyat on 27 April 36 hours after the initial explosions, was silently completed before the disaster became known outside the Soviet Union. The rise in radiation levels had at that time already been measured in Finland, but a civil service strike delayed the response and publication.[88]

Areas of Europe contaminated with 137Cs[89] Country 37–185 k Bq/m2 185–555 kBq/m2 555–1480 kBq/m2 >1480 kBq/m2   km2 % of country km2 % of country km2 % of country km2 % of country Belarus 29 900 14.4 % 10 200 4.9 % 4 200 2.0 % 2 200 1.1 % Ukraine 37 200 6.2 % 3 200 0.53 % 900 0.15 % 600 0.1 % Russia 49 800 0.29 % 5 700 0.03 % 2 100 0.01 % 300 0.002 % Sweden 12 000 2.7 % — — — — — — Finland 11 500 3.4 % — — — — — — Austria 8 600 10.3 % — — — — — — Norway 5 200 1.3 % — — — — — — Bulgaria 4 800 4.3 % — — — — — — Switzerland 1 300 3.1 % — — — — — — Greece 1 200 0.91 % — — — — — — Slovenia 300 1.5 % — — — — — — Italy 300 0.1 % — — — — — — Moldova 60 0.2 % — — — — — — Totals 162 160 km2 19 100 km2 7 200 km2 3 100 km2

Contamination from the Chernobyl accident was scattered irregularly depending on weather conditions, much of it deposited on mountainous regions such as the Alps, Wales and the Scottish Highlands, where adibatic cooling caused rainfall. The resulting patches of contamination could be highly localised, and water-flows across the ground contributed further to large variations in radioactivity over small areas. Sweden and Norway also received heavy fallout when the contaminated air collided with a cold front, bringing rain.[90]:43–44, 78

Rain was purposely seeded over 10,000 km2 of the Belorussian SSR by the Soviet air force to remove radioactive particles from clouds heading toward highly populated areas. Heavy, black-coloured rain fell on the city of Gomel.[91] Reports from Soviet and Western scientists indicate that Belarus received about 60% of the contamination that fell on the former Soviet Union. However, the 2006 TORCH report stated that half of the volatile particles had landed outside Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. A large area in Russia south of Bryansk was also contaminated, as were parts of northwestern Ukraine. Studies in surrounding countries indicate that over one million people could have been affected by radiation.[92]

Recently published data from a long-term monitoring program (The Korma Report)[93] shows a decrease in internal radiation exposure of the inhabitants of a region in Belarus close to Gomel. Resettlement may even be possible in prohibited areas provided that people comply with appropriate dietary rules.

In Western Europe, precautionary measures taken in response to the radiation included seemingly arbitrary regulations banning the importation of certain foods but not others. In France some officials stated that the Chernobyl accident had no adverse effects.[94] Official figures in southern Bavaria in Germany indicated that some wild plant species contained substantial levels of caesium, which were believed to have been passed onto them by wild boars, a significant number of which had already contained radioactive particles above the allowed level, consuming them.[clarification needed][95]

Radioactive release

Like many other releases of radioactivity into the environment, the Chernobyl release was controlled by the physical and chemical properties of the radioactive elements in the core. While the general population often perceives plutonium as a particularly dangerous nuclear fuel, its effects are almost eclipsed by those of its fission products. Particularly dangerous are highly radioactive compounds that accumulate in the food chain, such as some isotopes of iodine and strontium.

Two reports on the release of radioisotopes from the site were made available, one by the OSTI and a more detailed report by the OECD, both in 1998.[96][97] At different times after the accident, different isotopes were responsible for the majority of the external dose. The dose that was calculated is that received from external gamma irradiation for a person standing in the open. The dose to a person in a shelter or the internal dose is harder to estimate.

The release of radioisotopes from the nuclear fuel was largely controlled by their boiling points, and the majority of the radioactivity present in the core was retained in the reactor.

• All of the noble gases, including krypton and xenon, contained within the reactor were released immediately into the atmosphere by the first steam explosion.
• 55% of the radioactive iodine in the reactor, containing about 1760 PBq or 400 kg of I-131, was released, as a mixture of vapor, solid particles, and organic iodine compounds.
• Caesium (85 PBq Cs-137[98]) and tellurium were released in aerosol form.
• An early estimate for fuel material released to the environment was 3 ± 1.5%; this was later revised to 3.5 ± 0.5%. This corresponds to the atmospheric emission of 6 t of fragmented fuel.[97]
• Total atmospheric release is estimated at 5200 PBq.[99]

Two sizes of particles were released: small particles of 0.3 to 1.5 micrometers (aerodynamic diameter) and large particles of 10 micrometers. The large particles contained about 80% to 90% of the released nonvolatile radioisotopes zirconium-95, niobium-95, lanthanum-140, cerium-144 and the transuranic elements, including neptunium, plutonium and the minor actinides, embedded in a uranium oxide matrix.

Health of plant workers and local people

In the aftermath of the accident, 237 people suffered from acute radiation sickness (ARS), of whom 31 died within the first three months.[13][100] Most of the victims were fire and rescue workers trying to bring the accident under control, who were not fully aware of how dangerous the exposure to radiation in the smoke was. Whereas, in the World Health Organization's 2006 report of the Chernobyl Forum expert group on the 237 emergency workers who were diagnosed with ARS, ARS was identified as the cause of death for 28 of these people within the first few months after the disaster.

No further ARS-related deaths were identified in the general population affected by the disaster. Of the 72,000 Russian Emergency Workers being studied, 216 non-cancer deaths are attributed to the disaster, between 1991 and 1998.[citation needed] Of all 66,000 Belarusian emergency workers, by the mid-1990s only 150 (roughly 0.2%) were reported by their government as having died. In contrast, 5,722 casualties were reported among Ukrainian clean-up workers up to the year 1995, by the National Committee for Radiation Protection of the Ukrainian Population.[83]

The latency period for solid cancers caused by excess radiation exposure is 10 or more years; thus at the time of the WHO report being undertaken, the rates of solid cancer deaths were no greater than the general population.[citation needed][dubious – discuss] Some 135,000 people were evacuated from the area, including 50,000 from Pripyat.[citation needed]

Residual radioactivity in the environment

Rivers, lakes and reservoirs

The Chernobyl nuclear power plant is located next to the Pripyat River, which feeds into the Dnipro River reservoir system, one of the largest surface water systems in Europe, which at the time supplied water to Kiev's 2.4 million residents, and was still in spring flood when the accident occured.[101]:60 The radioactive contamination of aquatic systems therefore became a major problem in the immediate aftermath of the accident.[102] In the most affected areas of Ukraine, levels of radioactivity (particularly from radionuclides 131I, 137Cs and 90Sr) in drinking water caused concern during the weeks and months after the accident,[102] though officially it was stated that all contaminants had settled to the bottom "in an insoluble phase" and would not dissolve for 800–1,000 years.[101]:64 Guidelines for levels of radioiodine in drinking water were temporarily raised to 3,700 Bq/L, allowing most water to be reported as safe,[102] and a year after the accident it was announced that even the water of the Chernobyl plant's cooling pond was within acceptable norms. Despite this, two months after the disaster the Kiev water supply was abruptly switched from the Dnieper to the Desna River.[101]:64–5 Meanwhile, massive silt traps were constructed, along with an enormous 30m-deep underground barrier to prevent groundwater from the destroyed reactor entering the Pripyat River.[101]:65–7

Bio-accumulation of radioactivity in fish[103] resulted in concentrations (both in western Europe and in the former Soviet Union) that in many cases were significantly above guideline maximum levels for consumption.[102] Guideline maximum levels for radiocaesium in fish vary from country to country but are approximately 1,000 Bq/kg in the European Union.[104] In the Kiev Reservoir in Ukraine, concentrations in fish were several thousand Bq/kg during the years after the accident.[103]

In small "closed" lakes in Belarus and the Bryansk region of Russia, concentrations in a number of fish species varied from 100 to 60,000 Bq/kg during the period 1990–92.[105] The contamination of fish caused short-term concern in parts of the UK and Germany and in the long term (years rather than months) in the affected areas of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia as well as in parts of Scandinavia.[102]

Groundwater

Groundwater was not badly affected by the Chernobyl accident since radionuclides with short half-lives decayed away long before they could affect groundwater supplies, and longer-lived radionuclides such as radiocaesium and radiostrontium were adsorbed to surface soils before they could transfer to groundwater.[106] However, significant transfers of radionuclides to groundwater have occurred from waste disposal sites in the 30 km (19 mi) exclusion zone around Chernobyl. Although there is a potential for transfer of radionuclides from these disposal sites off-site (i.e. out of the 30 km (19 mi) exclusion zone), the IAEA Chernobyl Report[106] argues that this is not significant in comparison to current levels of washout of surface-deposited radioactivity.

Flora and fauna

After the disaster, four square kilometers of pine forest directly downwind of the reactor turned reddish-brown and died, earning the name of the "Red Forest".[107] Some animals in the worst-hit areas also died or stopped reproducing. Most domestic animals were removed from the exclusion zone, but horses left on an island in the Pripyat River 6 km (4 mi) from the power plant died when their thyroid glands were destroyed by radiation doses of 150–200 Sv.[108] Some cattle on the same island died and those that survived were stunted because of thyroid damage. The next generation appeared to be normal.[108]

A robot sent into the reactor itself has returned with samples of black, melanin-rich radiotrophic fungi that are growing on the reactor's walls.[109]

Of the 440,350 wild boar killed in the 2010 hunting season in Germany, over 1,000 were found to be contaminated with levels of radiation above the permitted limit of 600 bequerels, due to residual radioactivity from Chernobyl.[110] Germany has "banned wild game meat because of contamination linked to radioactive mushrooms".[111]

The Norwegian Agricultural Authority reported that in 2009 a total of 18,000 livestock in Norway needed to be given uncontaminated feed for a period of time before slaughter in order to ensure that their meat was safe for human consumption. This was due to residual radioactivity from Chernobyl in the plants they graze on in the wild during the summer. The after-effects of Chernobyl were expected to be seen for a further 100 years, although the severity of the effects would decline over that period.[112] In Britain and Norway, as of 2011, "slaughter restrictions remain for sheep raised on pasture contaminated by radiation fallout".[111]

Human impact

The Chernobyl Forum first met on 3 February 2003 for a three day meeting. It consisted of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), other United Nations organizations (FAO, UN-OCHA, UNDP, UNEP, UNSCEAR, WHO, and the World Bank), and the governments of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. A second meeting was held on 10–11 March 2004, and a third on 18–20 April 2005. The aim of the Forum was to "scientifically clarify the radiological environmental and health consequences of the Chernobyl accident, to provide advice on and to contribute to a scientifically sound remediation and health care programmes, and to consider the necessity of, and opportunities for continued research/learning lessons."[113]

Thyroid cancer

A report was published by Chernobyl Forum in 2005 which revealed thyroid cancer among children to be one of the main health impacts from the Chornobyl accident. In that publication more than 4000 cases were reported, and that there was no evidence of an increase in solid cancers or leukemia. It said that there was an increase in psychological problems among the affected population. The report says it is impossible to reliably predict the number of fatal cancers arising from the incident as small differences in assumptions can result in large differences in the estimated health costs. The report says it represents the consensus view of the eight UN organisations.[114]
On the death toll of the accident, the report states that twenty-eight emergency workers ("liquidators") died from acute radiation syndrome including beta burns and 15 patients died from thyroid cancer in the following years, and it roughly estimated that cancer deaths caused by Chernobyl may reach a total of about 4,000 among the 5 million persons residing in the contaminated areas, the report projected cancer mortality "increases of less than one per cent" (~0.3%) on a time span of 80 years, cautioning that this estimate was "speculative" since at this time only a few tens of cancer deaths are linked to the Chernobyl disaster.[114]
According to UNSCEAR, up to the year 2005 more than 6000 cases of thyroid cancer were reported in children and adolescents exposed at the time of the accident, a number that is expected to increase. They concluded that was no other evidence of major health impacts from the radiation exposure.[115]
Well-differentiated thyroid cancers are generally treatable,[116] and when treated the five-year survival rate of thyroid cancer is 96%, and 92% after 30 years.[117] UNSCEAR had reported 15 deaths from thyroid cancer in 2011.[118] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also states that there has been no increase in the rate of birth defects or abnormalities, or solid cancers (such as lung cancer) corroborating UNSCEAR's assessments.[119] UNSCEAR does raise the possibility of long term genetic defects, pointing to a doubling of radiation-induced minisatellite mutations among children born in 1994.[120] However, the risk of thyroid cancer associated with the Chernobyl accident is still high according to published studies.[121][122]

Other health disorders

Fred Mettler, a radiation expert at the University of New Mexico, puts the number of worldwide cancer deaths outside the highly contaminated zone at "perhaps" 5000, for a total of 9000 Chernobyl-associated fatal cancers, saying "the number is small (representing a few percent) relative to the normal spontaneous risk of cancer, but the numbers are large in absolute terms".[123] The same report outlined studies based in data found in the Russian Registry from 1991 to 1998 that suggested that "of 61,000 Russian workers exposed to an average dose of 107 mSv about 5% of all fatalities that occurred may have been due to radiation exposure."[114]

The report went into depth about the risks to mental health of exaggerated fears about the effects of radiation.[114] According to the IAEA the "designation of the affected population as "victims" rather than "survivors" has led them to perceive themselves as helpless, weak and lacking control over their future". The IAEA says that this may have led to behaviour that has caused further health effects.[124]

Fred Mettler commented that 20 years later "The population remains largely unsure of what the effects of radiation actually are and retain a sense of foreboding. A number of adolescents and young adults who have been exposed to modest or small amounts of radiation feel that they are somehow fatally flawed and there is no downside to using illicit drugs or having unprotected sex. To reverse such attitudes and behaviors will likely take years although some youth groups have begun programs that have promise."[125] In addition, disadvantaged children around Chernobyl suffer from health problems that are attributable not only to the Chernobyl accident, but also to the poor state of post-Soviet health systems.[119]

The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), part of the Chernobyl Forum, have produced their own assessments of the radiation effects.[126] UNSCEAR was set up as a collaboration between various United Nation bodies, including the World Health Organisation, after the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to assess the long-term effects of radiation on human health.[127]

Deaths due to radiation exposure

The number potential deaths arising from the Chernobyl disaster is heavily debated. The WHO's prediction of 9000 future cancer deaths in surrounding countries[128] is based on the Linear no-threshold model (LNT), which assumes that the damage inflicted by radiation at low doses is directly proportional to the dose.[129]Radiation epidemiologist Roy Shore contends that estimating health effects in a population from the LNT model "is not wise because of the uncertainties".[130]

According to the Union of Concerned Scientists the number of excess cancer deaths worldwide (including all contaminated areas) is approximately 27,000 based on the same LNT.[131]

Another study critical of the Chernobyl Forum report was commissioned by Greenpeace, which asserts that "the most recently published figures indicate that in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine alone the accident could have resulted in an estimated 200,000 additional deaths in the period between 1990 and 2004."[132] The Scientific Secretary of the Chernobyl Forum criticized the report's exclusive reliance on non-peer reviewed locally produced studies (in fact, most of the study's sources are from peer-reviewed journals, including many Western medical journals, or from proceedings of scientific conferences[132]), while Gregory Härtl (spokesman for the WHO) suggested that the conclusions were motivated by ideology.[133]

The German affiliate of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) argued that more than 10,000 people are today affected by thyroid cancer and 50,000 cases are expected in the future.[134]

Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment is an English translation of the 2007 Russian publication Chernobyl. It was published in 2009 by the New York Academy of Sciences in their Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. It presents an analysis of scientific literature and concludes that medical records between 1986, the year of the accident, and 2004 reflect 985,000 premature deaths as a result of the radioactivity released.[135]

The authors suggest that most of the deaths were in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, though others occurred worldwide throughout the many countries that were struck by radioactive fallout from Chernobyl. The literature analysis draws on over 1,000 published titles and over 5,000 internet and printed publications discussing the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. The authors contend that those publications and papers were written by leading Eastern European authorities and have largely been downplayed or ignored by the IAEA and UNSCEAR.[135] This estimate has however been criticized as exaggerated, lacking a proper scientific base.[136]

Other conditions

According to Kenneth Mossman, a Professor of Health Physics and member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission advisory committee,[137] the "LNT philosophy is overly conservative, and low-level radiation may be less dangerous than commonly believed".[138] Yoshihisa Matsumoto, a radiation biologist at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, cites laboratory experiments on animals to suggest there must be a threshold dose below which DNA repair mechanisms can completely repair any radiation damage.[130] Mossman suggests that the proponents of the current model believe that being conservative is justified due to the uncertainties surrounding low level doses and it is better to have a "prudent public health policy".[137]

Another significant issue is establishing consistent data on which to base the analysis of the impact of the Chernobyl accident. Since 1991 large social and political changes have occurred within the affected regions and these changes have had significant impact on the administration of health care, on socio-economic stability, and the manner in which statistical data is collected.[139] Ronald Chesser, a radiation biologist at Texas Tech University, says that "the subsequent Soviet collapse, scarce funding, imprecise dosimetry, and difficulties tracking people over the years have limited the number of studies and their reliability."[130]

Economic and political consequences

It is difficult to establish the total economic cost of the disaster. According to Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union spent 18 billion rubles (the equivalent of US$18 billion at that time) on containment and decontamination, virtually bankrupting itself.[2] In Belarus the total cost over 30 years is estimated at US$235 billion (in 2005 dollars).[119] On-going costs are well known; in their 2003–2005 report, The Chernobyl Forum stated that between 5% and 7% of government spending in Ukraine still related to Chernobyl, while in Belarus over $13 billion is thought to have been spent between 1991 and 2003, with 22% of national budget having been Chernobyl-related in 1991, falling to 6% by 2002.[119] Much of the current cost relates to the payment of Chernobyl-related social benefits to some 7 million people across the 3 countries.[119]

A significant economic impact at the time was the removal of 784,320 ha (1,938,100 acres) of agricultural land and 694,200 ha (1,715,000 acres) of forest from production. While much of this has been returned to use, agricultural production costs have risen due to the need for special cultivation techniques, fertilizers and additives.[119]

Politically, the accident gave great significance to the new Soviet policy of glasnost,[140][141]:196–7 and helped forge closer Soviet-US relations at the end of the Cold War, through bioscientific cooperation.[142]:44–48 But the disaster also became a key factor in the Union's eventual 1991 dissolution, and a major influence in shaping the new Eastern Europe.[142]:20–21

Aftermath

Following the accident, questions arose about the future of the plant and its eventual fate. All work on the unfinished reactors 5 and 6 was halted three years later. However, the trouble at the Chernobyl plant did not end with the disaster in reactor 4. The damaged reactor was sealed off and 200 cubic meters (260 cu yd) of concrete was placed between the disaster site and the operational buildings.[citation needed] The Ukrainian government continued to let the three remaining reactors operate because of an energy shortage in the country.

Decommissioning

In 1991, a fire broke out in the turbine building of reactor 2;[143] the authorities subsequently declared the reactor damaged beyond repair and had it taken offline. Reactor 1 was decommissioned in November 1996 as part of a deal between the Ukrainian government and international organizations such as the IAEA to end operations at the plant. On 15 December 2000, then-President Leonid Kuchma personally turned off Reactor 3 in an official ceremony, shutting down the entire site.[144]

Radioactive waste management

Containment of the reactor

The Chernobyl reactor is now enclosed in a large concrete sarcophagus, which was built quickly to allow continuing operation of the other reactors at the plant.[145]

A New Safe Confinement was to have been built by the end of 2005; however, it has suffered ongoing delays and as of 2010[update], when construction finally began, is expected to be completed in 2013. The structure is being built adjacent to the existing shelter and will be slid into place on rails. It is to be a metal arch 105 metres (344 ft) high and spanning 257 metres (843 ft), to cover both unit 4 and the hastily built 1986 structure. The Chernobyl Shelter Fund, set up in 1997, has received €810 million from international donors and projects to cover this project and previous work. It and the Nuclear Safety Account, also applied to Chernobyl decommissioning, are managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).[citation needed]

By 2002, roughly 15,000 Ukrainian workers were still working within the Zone of Exclusion, maintaining the plant and performing other containment- and research-related tasks, often in dangerous conditions.[142]:2 A handful of Ukrainian scientists work inside the sarcophagus, but outsiders are rarely granted access. In 2006 an Australian 60 Minutes team led by reporter Richard Carleton and producer Stephen Rice were allowed to enter the sarcophagus for 15 minutes and film inside the control room.[146]

Radioactive materials and waste management

As of 2006[update], some fuel remained in the reactors at units 1 through 3, most of it in each unit's cooling pond, as well as some material in a small spent fuel interim storage facility pond (ISF-1).

In 1999 a contract was signed for construction of a radioactive waste management facility to store 25,000 used fuel assemblies from units 1–3 and other operational wastes, as well as material from decommissioning units 1–3 (which will be the first RBMK units decommissioned anywhere). The contract included a processing facility able to cut the RBMK fuel assemblies and to put the material in canisters, which were to be filled with inert gas and welded shut.

The canisters were to be transported to dry storage vaults, where the fuel containers would be enclosed for up to 100 years. This facility, treating 2500 fuel assemblies per year, would be the first of its kind for RBMK fuel. However, after a significant part of the storage structures had been built, technical deficiencies in the concept emerged, and the contract was terminated in 2007. The interim spent fuel storage facility (ISF-2) will now be completed by others by mid-2013.[citation needed]

Another contract has been let for a liquid radioactive waste treatment plant, to handle some 35,000 cubic meters of low- and intermediate-level liquid wastes at the site. This will need to be solidified and eventually buried along with solid wastes on site.[citation needed]

In January 2008, the Ukrainian government announced a 4-stage decommissioning plan that incorporates the above waste activities and progresses towards a cleared site .[92]

Lava-like fuel-containing materials (FCMs)

According to official estimates, about 95% of the fuel in the reactor at the time of the accident (about 180 metric tons) remains inside the shelter, with a total radioactivity of nearly 18 million curies (670 PBq). The radioactive material consists of core fragments, dust, and lava-like "fuel containing materials" (FCM, also called "corium") that flowed through the wrecked reactor building before hardening into a ceramic form.

Three different lavas are present in the basement of the reactor building: black, brown, and a porous ceramic. They are silicate glasses with inclusions of other materials within them. The porous lava is brown lava that dropped into water and thus cooled rapidly.

Degradation of the lava

It is unclear how long the ceramic form will retard the release of radioactivity. From 1997 to 2002 a series of papers were published that suggested that the self-irradiation of the lava would convert all 1,200 metric tons into a submicrometer and mobile powder within a few weeks.[147] But it has been reported that the degradation of the lava is likely to be a slow and gradual process rather than sudden and rapid.[148] The same paper states that the loss of uranium from the wrecked reactor is only 10 kg (22 lb) per year. This low rate of uranium leaching[disambiguation needed] suggests that the lava is resisting its environment. The paper also states that when the shelter is improved, the leaching rate of the lava will decrease.

Some of the surfaces of the lava flows have started to show new uranium minerals such as Na4(UO2)(CO3)3 and uranyl carbonate. However, the level of radioactivity is such that during one hundred years the self irradiation of the lava (2 × 1016 α decays per gram and 2 to 5 × 105 Gy of β or γ) will fall short of the level of self irradiation required to greatly change the properties of glass (1018 α decays per gram and 108 to 109 Gy of β or γ). Also the rate of dissolution of the lava in water is very low (10−7 g-cm−2 day−1), suggesting that the lava is unlikely to dissolve in water.[148]

The Exclusion Zone

An area extending 19 miles (31 km) in all directions from the plant is known as the "zone of alienation." It is largely uninhabited, except for a few residents who have refused to leave. The area has largely reverted to forest. Even today, radiation levels are so high that the workers responsible for rebuilding the sarcophagus are only allowed to work five hours a day for one month before taking 15 days of rest. Ukrainian officials estimate the area will not be safe for human life again for another 20,000 years.[50]

In 2011, Ukraine opened up the sealed zone around the Chernobyl reactor to tourists who wish to learn more about the tragedy that occurred in 1986.[149][150]

Recovery projects

The Chernobyl Shelter Fund

The Chernobyl Shelter Fund was established in 1997 at the Denver 23rd G8 summit to finance the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP). The plan calls for transforming the site into an ecologically safe condition by means of stabilization of the sarcophagus followed by construction of a New Safe Confinement (NSC). While the original cost estimate for the SIP was US$768 million, the 2006 estimate was $1.2 billion. The SIP is being managed by a consortium of Bechtel, Battelle, and Electricité de France, and conceptual design for the NSC consists of a movable arch, constructed away from the shelter to avoid high radiation, to be slid over the sarcophagus. The NSC is expected to be completed in 2015,[151] and will be the largest movable structure ever built.

Dimensions:

• Span: 270 m (886 ft)
• Height: 100 m (330 ft)
• Length: 150 m (492 ft)

The United Nations Development Programme

The United Nations Development Programme has launched in 2003 a specific project called the Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (CRDP) for the recovery of the affected areas.[152] The programme was initiated in February 2002 based on the recommendations in the report on Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. The main goal of the CRDP's activities is supporting the Government of Ukraine in mitigating long-term social, economic, and ecological consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. CRDP works in the four most Chernobyl-affected areas in Ukraine: Kyivska, Zhytomyrska, Chernihivska and Rivnenska.

The International Project on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident

The International Project on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPEHCA) was created and received US $20 million, mainly from Japan, in hopes of discovering the main cause of health problems due to 131I radiation. These funds were divided between Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, the three main affected countries, for further investigation of health effects. As there was significant corruption in former Soviet countries, most of the foreign aid was given to Russia, and no positive outcome from this money has been demonstrated.[citation needed]

Commemoration

The Front Veranda (1986), a lithograph by Susan Dorothea White in the National Gallery of Australia, exemplifies worldwide awareness of the event. Heavy Water: A film for Chernobyl was released by Seventh Art in 2006 to commemorate the disaster through poetry and first-hand accounts.[153] The film secured the Cinequest Award as well as the Rhode Island "best score" award[154] along with a screening at Tate Modern.[155]

Chernobyl Way is an annual rally run on 26 April by the opposition in Belarus as a remembrance of the Chernobyl disaster.

Cultural impact

The Chernobyl accident attracted a great deal of interest. Because of the distrust that many people (both within and outside the USSR) had in the Soviet authorities, a great deal of debate about the situation at the site occurred in the first world during the early days of the event. Because of defective intelligence based on photographs taken from space, it was thought that unit number three had also suffered a dire accident.

Journalists mistrusted many professionals (such as the spokesman from the UK NRPB), and in turn encouraged the public to mistrust them.[156]

In Italy, the Chernobyl accident was reflected in the outcome of the 1987 referendum. As a result of that referendum, Italy began phasing out its nuclear power plants in 1988, a decision that was effectively reversed in 2008. A referendum in 2011 reiterated Italians' strong objections to nuclear power, thus abrogating the government's decision of 2008.

See also

Notes

1. ^ "No one believed the first newspaper reports, which patently understated the scale of the catastrophe and often contradicted one another. The confidence of readers was re-established only after the press was allowed to examine the events in detail without the original censorship restrictions. The policy of openness (glasnost) and 'uncompromising criticism' of outmoded arrangements had been proclaimed back at the 27th Congress (of KPSS), but it was only in the tragic days following the Chernobyl disaster that glasnost began to change from an official slogan into an everyday practice. The truth about Chernobyl which eventually hit the newspapers opened the way to a more truthful examination of other social problems. More and more articles were written about drug abuse, crime, corruption and the mistakes of leaders of various ranks. A wave of 'bad news' swept over the readers in 1986–87, shaking the consciousness of society. Many were horrified to find out about the numerous calamities of which they had previously had no idea. It often seemed to people that there were many more outrages in the epoch of perestroika than before although, in fact, they had simply not been informed about them previously." -Kagarlitsky pp 333–334
2. ^ "The mere fact that the operators were carrying out an experiment that had not been approved by higher officials indicates that something was wrong with the chain of command. The State Committee on Safety in the Atomic Power Industry is permanently represented at the Chernobyl station. Yet the engineers and experts in that office were not informed about the program. In part, the tragedy was the product of administrative anarchy or the attempt to keep everything secret." Medvedev, Z., pp. 18–20

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111. ^ a b Rosslyn Beeby (27 April 2011). "World's nuclear power industry in decline". Canberra Times. http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/world/world/general/worlds-nuclear-power-industry-in-decline/2145234.aspx#. 
112. ^ "Fortsatt nedforing etter radioaktivitet i dyr som har vært på utmarksbeite – Statens landbruksforvaltning". SLF. 30 June 2010. https://www.slf.dep.no/no/erstatning/palegg-og-restriksjoner/radioaktivitet/Fortsatt+nedforing+etter+radioaktivitet+i+dyr+som+har+v%C3%A6rt+p%C3%A5+utmarksbeite.10694.cms. Retrieved 20 August 2011. 
113. ^ "Chernobyl Forum summaries". International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www-ns.iaea.org/meetings/rw-summaries/chernobyl_forum.htm. Retrieved 31 July 2010. 
114. ^ a b c d "Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts". Chernobyl Forum assessment report. Chernobyl Forum. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf. Retrieved 21 April 2012. 
115. ^ "UNSCEAR – Chernobyl health effects". Unscear.org. http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/chernobyl.html#Health. Retrieved 23 March 2011. 
116. ^ Rosenthal, Elisabeth. (6 September 2005) Experts find reduced effects of Chernobyl. nytimes.com. Retrieved 14 February 2008.
117. ^ "Thyroid Cancer". Genzyme.ca. http://www.genzyme.ca/thera/ty/ca_en_p_tp_thera-ty.asp. Retrieved 31 July 2010. 
118. ^ "CHERNOBYL at 25th anniversary Frequently Asked Questions April 2011". World Health Organisation. 23 April 2011. http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/20110423_FAQs_Chernobyl.pdf. Retrieved 14 April 2012. 
119. ^ a b c d e f "Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socia-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine" (PDF). International Atomic Energy Agency – The Chernobyl Forum: 2003–2005. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf. Retrieved 31 July 2010. 
120. ^ "Excerpt from UNSCEAR 2001 REPORT ANNEX – Hereditary effects of radiation" (PDF). http://www.unscear.org/docs/chernobylherd.pdf. Retrieved 20 August 2011. 
121. ^ Bogdanova TI, Zurnadzhy LY, Greenebaum E, McConnell RJ, Robbins J, Epstein OV, Olijnyk VA, Hatch M, Zablotska LB, Tronko MD. (2006). "A cohort study of thyroid cancer and other thyroid diseases after the Chornobyl accident: pathology analysis of thyroid cancer cases in Ukraine detected during the first screening (1998-2000).". Cancer 11 (107): 2599-66. doi:10.1002/cncr.22321. PMID 17083123. 
122. ^ Dinets A, Hulchiy M, Sofiadis A, Ghaderi M, Höög A, Larsson C, Zedenius J. (2012). "Clinical, Genetic and Immunohistochemical Characterization of 70 Ukrainian Adult Cases with Post-Chornobyl Papillary Thyroid Carcinoma.". Eur J Endocrinol 166: 1049–60. doi:10.1530/EJE-12-0144. PMID 22457234. 
123. ^ Mettler, Fred. "IAEA Bulletin Volume 47, No. 2 – Chernobyl's Legacy". Iaea.org. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull472/htmls/chernobyls_legacy2.html. Retrieved 20 August 2011. 
124. ^ "What's the situation at Chernobyl?". Iaea.org. http://www.iaea.org/blog/Infolog/?page_id=25. Retrieved 20 August 2011. 
125. ^ Mettler, Fred. "Chernobyl's living legacy". Iaea.org. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull472/htmls/chernobyls_legacy2.html. Retrieved 20 August 2011. 
126. ^ "UNSCEAR assessment of the Chernobyl accident". United Nations Scientific Committee of the Effects of Atomic Radiation. http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/chernobyl.html. Retrieved 31 July 2010. 
127. ^ "Historical milestones". United Nations Scientific Committee of the Effects of Atomic Radiation. http://www.unscear.org/unscear/about_us/history.html. Retrieved 14 April 2012. 
128. ^ World Health Organisation "World Health Organization report explains the health impacts of the world's worst-ever civil nuclear accident", WHO, 26 April 2006. Retrieved 4 April 2011.
129. ^ Amy Berrington de González, Mahadevappa Mahesh, Kwang-Pyo Kim, Mythreyi Bhargavan, Rebecca Lewis, Fred Mettler, and Charles Land (2009). "Projected Cancer Risks From Computed Tomographic Scans Performed in the United States in 2007". Arch Intern Med 22 (169): 2071–2077. http://archinte.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/169/22/2071. 
130. ^ a b c Normile, D. (2011). "Fukushima Revives the Low-Dose Debate". Science 332 (6032): 908–910. doi:10.1126/science.332.6032.908. PMID 21596968.  edit
131. ^ "How Many Cancers Did Chernobyl Really Cause?". UCSUSA.org. 17 April 2011. http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/4704112149/how-many-cancers-did-chernobyl-really-cause-updated. 
132. ^ a b "The Chernobyl Catastrophe – Consequences on Human Health". Greenpeace. 18 April 2006. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet-2/report/2006/4/chernobylhealthreport.pdf. Retrieved 15 December 2008. 
133. ^ Hawley, Charles. "Greenpeace vs. the United Nations". The Chernobyl Body Count Controversy. SPIEGEL. http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,411864,00.html. Retrieved 15 March 2011. 
134. ^ "20 years after Chernobyl – The ongoing health effects". IPPNW. April 2006. http://www.ippnw-students.org/chernobyl/research.html. Retrieved 24 April 2006. 
135. ^ a b "Details". Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. http://www.nyas.org/publications/annals/Detail.aspx?cid=f3f3bd16-51ba-4d7b-a086-753f44b3bfc1. Retrieved 15 March 2011. 
136. ^ M. I. Balonov (28 April 2010). "Review of Volume 1181". New York Academy of Sciences. http://www.nyas.org/publications/annals/Detail.aspx?cid=f3f3bd16-51ba-4d7b-a086-753f44b3bfc1. Retrieved 15 September 2011.  Full text PDF
137. ^ a b "ASU school of life scientist:Kenneth Mossman". http://sols.asu.edu/people/faculty/kmossman.php. 
138. ^ Mossman, K. L. (1998). "The linear no-threshold debate: Where do we go from here?". Medical Physics 25 (3): 279–284; discussion 284. doi:10.1118/1.598208. PMID 9547494.  edit
139. ^ Shkolnikov, V.; McKee, M.; Vallin, J.; Aksel, E.; Leon, D.; Chenet, L.; Meslé, F. (1999). "Cancer mortality in Russia and Ukraine: Validity, competing risks and cohort effects". International Journal of Epidemiology 28 (1): 19–29. doi:10.1093/ije/28.1.19. PMID 10195659.  edit
140. ^ Shlyakhter, Alexander & Wilson, Richard (1992), “Chernobyl and Glasnost: The Effects of Secrecy on Health and Safety”, in Environment, Vol. 34 no. 5, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
141. ^ Petryna, Adriana (1995), “Sarcophagus: Chernobyl in Historical Light”, in Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, no. 2, Blackwell Publishing.
142. ^ a b c Petryna, Adriana (2002). Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
143. ^ "Information Notice No. 93-71". Nrc.gov. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1993/in93071.html. Retrieved 20 August 2011. 
144. ^ IAEA's Power Reactor Information System polled in May 2008 reports shut down for units 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively at 30 November 1996, 11 October 1991, 15 December 2000 and 26 April 1986.
145. ^ Чернобыль, Припять, Чернобыльская АЭС и зона отчуждения. ""Shelter" object description". Chornobyl.in.ua. http://www.chornobyl.in.ua/en/shelter.htm. Retrieved 8 May 2012. 
146. ^ "Inside Chernobyl". 60 Minutes Australia, Nine Network Australia. 16 April 2006. http://video.au.msn.com/watch/video/return-to-chernobyl/xf09iii. 
147. ^ V. Baryakhtar, V. Gonchar, A. Zhidkov and V. Zhidkov, Radiation damages and self-spluttering of high radioactive dielectrics: Spontaneous emission of submicrometre dust particles, Condensed Matter Physics, 2002, 5(3{31}), 449–471.
148. ^ a b Borovoi, A. A. (2006). "Nuclear fuel in the shelter". Atomic Energy 100 (4): 249–256. doi:10.1007/s10512-006-0079-3. 
149. ^ "News". Associated Press. Yahoo News. 13 December 2010. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/12/13/ukraine-open-chernobyl-area-tourists-1172479551/. Retrieved 2 March 2012. 
150. ^ "Tours of Chernobyl sealed zone officially begin". TravelSnitch. TravelSnitch. 18 March 2011. http://www.travelsnitch.org/categories/features/tours-of-chernobyl-sealed-zone-officially-begin/. 
151. ^ "NOVARKA and Chernobyl Project Management Unit confirm cost and time schedule for Chernobyl New Safe Confinement". 8 April 2011. http://www.ebrd.com/pages/news/press/2011/110408e.shtml. Retrieved 28 March 2012. 
152. ^ "CRDP: Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (United Nations Development Programme)". Undp.org.ua. http://www.undp.org.ua/?page=projects&projects=14. Retrieved 31 July 2010. 
153. ^ "Processing the Dark: Heavy Water – A Film for Chernobyl | Movie Mail UK". Moviemail-online.co.uk. http://www.moviemail-online.co.uk/scripts/article.pl?articleID=308. Retrieved 31 July 2010. 
154. ^ "Blog". http://www.heavy-water.co.uk/. Retrieved 11 September 2010. 
155. ^ "Heavy Water: a film for Chernobyl". Atomictv.com. 26 April 1986. http://www.atomictv.com/Hwater.html. Retrieved 31 July 2010. 
156. ^ Kasperson, Roger E.; Stallen, Pieter Jan M. (1991). Communicating Risks to the Public: International Perspectives. Berlin: Springer Science and Media. pp. 160–162. ISBN 0-7923-0601-5. 

Further reading

• Abbott, Pamela (2006). Chernobyl: Living With Risk and Uncertainty. Health, Risk & Society 8.2. pp. 105–121. 
• Cheney, Glenn Alan (1995). Journey to Chernobyl: Encounters in a Radioactive Zone. Academy Chicago. ISBN 0-89733-418-3. OCLC 231661295. 
• Cohen, Bernard Leonard (1990). "(7) The Chernobyl accident – can it happen here?". The Nuclear Energy Option: An Alternative for the 90's. Plenum Press. ISBN 978-0-306-43567-6. 
• Dyatlov, Anatoly (2003) (in Russian). Chernobyl. How did it happen.. Nauchtechlitizdat, Moscow. ISBN 5-93728-006-7 (paperback). 
• Hoffmann, Wolfgang (2001). Fallout From the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster and Congenital Malformations in Europe. Archives of Environmental Health. 
• Karpan, Nikolaj V. (2006) (in Russian). Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom.. Dnepropetrovsk: IKK "Balance Club". ISBN 966-8135-21-0 (paperback). 
• Medvedev, Grigori (1989). The Truth About Chernobyl. VAAP. First American edition published by Basic Books in 1991. ISBN 2-226-04031-5 (Hardcover). 
• Medvedev, Zhores A. (1990). The Legacy of Chernobyl (paperback ed.). W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0-393-30814-3. 
• Read, Piers Paul (1993). Ablaze! The Story of the Heroes and Victims of Chernobyl. Random House UK (paperback 1997). ISBN 978-0-7493-1633-4 (paperback). 
• Shcherbak, Yurii (1991/1989) (in Russian/English). Chernobyl. New York: Soviet Writers/St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-03097-5. http://www.x-libri.ru/elib/sherb000/index.htm. 

Documents

The source documents, which relate to the emergency, published in unofficial sources:

External links

Coordinates: 51°23′23″N 30°05′57″E / 51.38972°N 30.09917°E / 51.38972; 30.09917 (Chernobyl disaster)

The Truth About Chernobyl is a 1991 book by Grigori Medvedev. Medvedev served as deputy chief engineer at the No. 1 reactor unit of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the 1970s. At the time of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, Medvedev was deputy director of the main industrial department in the Soviet Ministry of Energy dealing with the construction of nuclear power stations. Since Medvedev knew the Chernobyl plant well, he was sent back as a special investigator immediately after the 1986 catastrophe.

In his book, Medvedev provides extensive first-hand testimony, based on many interviews, describing minute by minute precisely what was and was not done both before and after the explosion. It has been described as a tragic tale of pervasive, institutionalized, bureaucratic incompetence leading up to the accident; and heroic, heartbreaking sacrifice among those who had to deal with the emergency afterwards.[1]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

1. ^ The Truth About Chernobyl. Grigori Medvedev. New York: Basic Books, 1991

[edit] External links

Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment is a translation of a 2007 Russian publication by Alexey V. Yablokov, Vassily B. Nesterenko, and Alexey V. Nesterenko. It was published by the New York Academy of Sciences in 2009 in their Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences series.[1] The primary author, Alexey V. Yablokov, is a co-founder of Greenpeace Russia.[2]

The book presents an analysis of scientific literature and concludes that medical records between 1986, the year of the Chernobyl disaster, and 2004 reflect 985,000 premature deaths as a result of the radioactivity released. The authors suggest that most of the deaths were in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, though others occurred worldwide throughout the many countries that were struck by radioactive fallout from Chernobyl.[1] The literature analysis draws on over 1,000 published titles and over 5,000 internet and printed publications discussing the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. The authors contend that those publications and papers were written by leading Eastern European authorities and have largely been downplayed or ignored by the IAEA and UNSCEAR.[3]

The book was not peer reviewed by the New York Academy of Sciences.[4][5] Five reviews were published in the academic press, with four of them considering the book severely flawed and contradictory, and one praising it while noting some shortcomings. The review by M. I. Balonov published by the New York Academy of Sciences concludes that the value of the report is negative, because it has very little scientific merit while being highly misleading to the lay reader. It also characterized the estimate of nearly a million deaths as more in the realm of science fiction than science.[6]

[edit] Reviews

Two expert reviews of the book were commissioned by the Oxford journal Radiation Protection Dosimetry.[7] The first, by Dr. Ian Fairlie,[8] generally endorses the book's conclusions. Dr. Fairlie is one of two authors of the TORCH report commissioned by the anti-nuclear European Green Party.[9] He greets the book as a

... welcome addition to the literature in English. The New York Academy of Sciences [is] to be congratulated for publishing this volume. [...] In the opinion of the reviewer, this volume makes it clear that international nuclear agencies and some national authorities remain in denial about the scale of the health disasters in their countries due to Chernobyl's fallout. This is shown by their reluctance to acknowledge contamination and health outcomes data, their ascribing observed morbidity/mortality increases to non-radiation causes, and their refusal to devote resources to rehabilitation and disaster management.

Fairlie notes two shortcomings of the book: that it does not sufficiently investigate the large decrease in average male life spans throughout Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, in both contaminated and uncontaminated areas; and that it does not make enough effort to reconstruct estimated doses of contamination and discuss their implications for eastern and western Europe (though Fairlie agrees with the authors that studies should not be rejected for failing to contain dose estimates—a criterion commonly applied by western nuclear agencies such as the IAEA).

Fairlie specifically concurs with Yablakov et al. on three points:

• The IAEA's exclusion of data where estimated dose is below a certain threshold (following ICRP recommendations) is contrary to normal practice, even the ICRP's own practice, and contradicts the linear no-threshold model (LNT). The ICRP's recommendation in this regard is inconsistent with LNT and its own practices.
• The IAEA/WHO have often sought to justify their dismissal of eastern European epidemiological studies by citing questionable scientific practices: but epidemiology is not an exact science, and the same shortcomings exist in western studies uncriticised by the IAEA. The IAEA also point to shortcomings with pre-Chernobyl Soviet cancer registries, but cancer registries in western countries had similar issues at that time.
• In observational epidemiological studies where certain data is already known and certain effects are expected, statistical tests for significance of the results are not normally required. Yet the IAEA has challenged such papers that do not include statistical tests and confidence intervals, and questioned whether the observed effects are due to chance. Eastern scientists are faced with a catch-22 situation whereby they either leave out statistical tests, and are dismissed, or else apply the tests, leading western scientists to conclude that there is no real effect.

The second review (in the same volume), by Dr. Monty Charles,[10] is largely critical, noting several problems:

• The authors expressly discount socioeconomic or screening factors when considering increased occurrence of diseases, but this methodology does not seem to account for variations between territories prior to the accident.
• Their discussion of 'hot particle' poisoning is cursory, and is unclear regarding dosage figures.
• The chapter on health effects, 60% of the book, contains inadequate explanation or critical evaluation of many cited facts and figures, and in many instances related tables, figures and statements appear to contradict each other.
• A section abstract predicted numbers of casualties due to cancer, however the section did not contain any discussion to support these numbers.

While Charles agrees with the importance of making eastern research more available in the west, he states that he cannot tell which of the publications referred to by the book would sustain critical peer-review in western scientific literature, and that verifying these sources would require considerable effort. Charles sees the book as representing one end of a spectrum of views, and believes that works from the entire spectrum must be critically evaluated in order to develop an informed opinion.

A third review by Mona Dreicer was published in the journal Environmental Health Perspectives.[11] It was highly critical of the book's methodology:

... by discounting the widely accepted scientific method for associating cause and effect (while taking into account the uncertainties of dose assessment and measurement of impacts), the authors leave us with only with their assertion that the data in this volume "document the true scale of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe."

The New York Academy of Sciences published a fourth review, by M. I. Balonov of Institute of Radiation Hygiene, St. Petersburg, Russia. The reviewer condemned the book for completely discounting dosimetry and radiation dose reconstruction, relying instead on inferior, simplistic methodologies, such as ecological and geographical techniques and tracking health indicators over time, which are known to give erroneous conclusions. He also noted the inexplicable selection of publications for analysis, which included media reports, websites of public organizations and even unidentified persons. At the same time, a lot of respected, peer-reviewed work from Russian-language authors was ignored.[6]

The value of this review is not zero, but negative, as its bias is obvious only to specialists, while inexperienced readers may well be put into deep error. ... Yablokov's assessment for the mortality from Chernobyl fallout of about one million ... puts this book in a range of rather science fiction than science.

A fifth review, by Sergei V. Jargin, was published in the journal Radiation and Environmental Biophysics which described Consequences as overestimating the health impacts and containing "poorly substantiated information".[12] A reply to this by Yablokov and A. Nesterenko was also published in the same issue.[13]

[edit] Reaction

The environmentalist Amory Lovins endorsed the report and has written:[14]

The International Atomic Energy Agency's 2005 estimate of about 4,000 Chernobyl deaths contrasts with a rigorous 2009 review of 5,000 mainly Slavic-language scientific papers the IAEA overlooked. It found deaths approaching a million through 2004, nearly 170,000 of them in North America. The total toll now exceeds a million

In George Monbiot's exchanges with anti-nuclear activist Helen Caldicott and John Vidal on the matter of the total death toll of Chernobyl, Caldicott and Vidal made reference to Yablokov's book. Monbiot responded by saying:[15]

A devastating review in the journal Radiation Protection Dosimetry[10] points out that the book achieves this figure by the remarkable method of assuming that all increased deaths from a wide range of diseases – including many which have no known association with radiation – were caused by the Chernobyl accident. There is no basis for this assumption, not least because screening in many countries improved dramatically after the disaster and, since 1986, there have been massive changes in the former eastern bloc. The study makes no attempt to correlate exposure to radiation with the incidence of disease.

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

[edit] References

1. ^ a b "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment". Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. http://www.nyas.org/publications/annals/Detail.aspx?cid=f3f3bd16-51ba-4d7b-a086-753f44b3bfc1. Retrieved 15 March 2011. 
2. ^ http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/center_for_safe_energy2/
3. ^ "Details". Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. http://www.nyas.org/publications/annals/Detail.aspx?cid=f3f3bd16-51ba-4d7b-a086-753f44b3bfc1. Retrieved 2011-03-15. 
4. ^ Correspondence (see reference 17) to George Monbiot from Douglas Braaten, Director and Executive Editor, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, dated 2nd April 2011: "In no sense did Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences or the New York Academy of Sciences commission this work; nor by its publication do we intend to independently validate the claims made in the translation or in the original publications cited in the work. The translated volume has not been peer-reviewed by the New York Academy of Sciences, or by anyone else."
5. ^ New York Academy of Sciences (2010-04-28). "Statement on Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences volume entitled “Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment”". http://www.nyas.org/AboutUs/MediaRelations/Detail.aspx?cid=16b2d4fe-f5b5-4795-8d38-d59a76d1ef33. Retrieved 15/09/2011. 
6. ^ a b M. I. Balonov (2010-04-28). "Review of Volume 1181". New York Academy of Sciences. http://www.nyas.org/publications/annals/Detail.aspx?cid=f3f3bd16-51ba-4d7b-a086-753f44b3bfc1. Retrieved 2011-09-15. 
7. ^ "Radiation Protection Dosimetry". http://rpd.oxfordjournals.org/content/141/1/101.extract. 
8. ^ Fairlie, Ian (2010). "Chernobyl: Consequences of the catastrophe for people and the environment". Radiation Protection Dosimetry (Oxford Journals) 141 (1): 97–101. http://wonkythinking.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Fairlie-review.pdf. 
9. ^ Torch: The Other Report On Chernobyl summary
10. ^ a b Charles, Monty (2010). "Chernobyl: consequences of the catastrophe for people and the environment (2010)". Radiation Protection Dosimetry 141 (1): 101–104. doi:10.1093/rpd/ncq185. http://wonkythinking.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Charles-review.pdf. 
11. ^ Dreicer, Mona (2010). "Book Review: Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment". Environmental Health Perspectives 118: a500. doi:10.1289/ehp.118-a500. http://ehp03.niehs.nih.gov/article/fetchArticle.action?articleURI=info%3Adoi%2F10.1289%2Fehp.118-a500. 
12. ^ Jargin, Sergei V. (2010). "Overestimation of Chernobyl consequences: poorly substantiated information published". Radiation and Environmental Biophysics (SpringerLink) 49 (4): 743-745. doi:10.1007/s00411-010-0313-1. PMID 20640449. http://www.springerlink.com/content/e706705592415435/. Retrieved 25 March 2012. 
13. ^ Yablokov, Alexey; Nesterenko, Alexey (2010). "Reply to letter by Jargin on “overestimation of Chernobyl consequences: poorly substantiated information published”". Radiation and Environmental Biophysics (SpringerLink) 49 (4): 747-748. doi:10.1007/s00411-010-0314-0. http://www.springerlink.com/content/xq0125082478x3g3/. Retrieved 25 March 2012. 
14. ^ Amory Lovins (2011-03-18). "With Nuclear Power, "No Acts of God Can Be Permitted"". Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amory-lovins/nuclear-power-fukushima-_b_837643.html. 
15. ^ George Monbiot (2011-04-05). "The unpalatable truth is that the anti-nuclear lobby has misled us all". The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/05/anti-nuclear-lobby-misled-world. 

Category:2011 Japanese nuclear incidents and accidents

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This category collects articles on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and other nuclear power stations damaged by the Miyagi-Ibaraki offshore earthquake.

Pages in category "2011 Japanese nuclear incidents and accidents"

The following 21 pages are in this category, out of 21 total. This list may not reflect recent changes (learn more).

Category:Three Mile Island accident

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Pages in category "Three Mile Island accident"

The following 12 pages are in this category, out of 12 total. This list may not reflect recent changes (learn more).

Coordinates: 45°15′21″N 0°41′35″W / 45.255833°N 0.693056°W / 45.255833; -0.693056

The 1999 Blayais Nuclear Power Plant flood was a flood that took place on the evening of December 27, 1999. It was caused when a combination of the tide and high winds led to the sea walls of the Blayais Nuclear Power Plant in France being overwhelmed.[1] The event resulted in the loss of the plant's off-site power supply and knocked out several safety-related systems, resulting in a Level 2 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale.[2] The incident illustrated the potential for flooding to damage multiple items of equipment throughout a plant, weaknesses in safety measures, systems and procedures, and resulted in fundamental changes to the evaluation of flood risk at nuclear power plants and in the precautions taken.[1][3]

[edit] Background

The Blayais plant, equipped with four pressurized water reactors, is located on the Gironde estuary near Blaye, South Western France, operated by Électricité de France. Due to records of over 200 floods along the estuary dating back to 585 AD, some 40 of which had been particularly extensive, the location of the plant was known to be susceptible to flooding, and reports of the 1875 floods mentioned that they were caused by a combination of a high tides and violent winds blowing along the axis of the estuary.[4] The area had also experienced flooding during storms in the recent past, on December 13, 1981 and March 18, 1988.[4] An official report on the 1981 floods, published in 1982,[5] noted that it 'would be dangerous to underestimate' the combined effects of tide and storm, and also noted that the wind had led to 'the formation of real waves on the lower flooded floodplain'.[4]

When the Blayais plant was designed in 1970s, it was on the basis that a height of 4.0 m (13.1 ft) above NGF level would provide an 'enhanced safety level', and the base on which the plant was built was set at 4.5 m (15 ft) above NGF,[4] although some components were located in basements at lower levels. The protective sea walls around the Blayais plant were originally built to be 5.2 m (17 ft) above NGF level at the front of the site, and 4.75 m (15.6 ft) along the sides.[6] The 1998 annual review of plant safety for the plant identified the need for the sea walls to be raised to 5.7 m (19 ft) above NGF, and envisaged that this would be carried out in 2000, although EDF later postponed the work until 2002.[6] On 29 November 1999, the Regional Directorate for Industry, Research and the Environment sent a letter to EDF asking them to explain this delay.[6]

[edit] Flooding

On December 27, 1999, a combination of the incoming tide and exceptionally high winds produced by Storm Martin caused a sudden rise of water in the estuary, flooding parts of the plant.[1] The flooding began at around 7:30 pm, two hours before high tide, and it was later found that at its height the water had reached between 5.0 m (16.4 ft) and 5.3 m (17 ft) above NGF.[6] The flooding also damaged the sea wall facing the Gironde, with the upper portion of the rock armour being washed away.[1]

Prior to the flooding, units 1, 2 and 4 were at full power, while unit 3 was shut down for refuelling.[1] Starting from 7:30 pm all four units lost their 225 kV power supplies, while units 2 and 4 also lost their 400 kV power supplies.[1][6] The isolator circuits that should have allowed units 2 and 4 to supply themselves with electricity also failed, causing these two reactors to automatically shut down, and diesel backup generators started up, maintaining power to plants 2 and 4 until the 400 kV supply was restored at around 10:20 pm.[1][6] In the pumping room for unit 1, one set of the two pairs of pumps in the Essential Service Water System failed due to flooding; had both sets failed then the safety of plant would have been endangered.[1][6] In both units 1 and 2, flooding in the fuel rooms put the low-head safety injection pumps and the containment spray pumps, part of the Emergency Core Cooling System (a back-up system in case of coolant loss) out of use.[1][6] Over the following days, an estimated 90,000 m3 (3,200,000 cu ft) of water would be pumped out of the flooded buildings.[1]

[edit] Response

Around two and a half hours after the flooding began, a high-tide alarm for the estuary was triggered in the observation room of plant 4, although those in the other plants failed to activate. This should have caused the control room operators to launch a 'Level 2 Internal Emergency Plan', however this was not done as the requirement had been omitted from the operation room manual;[1] instead they continued to follow the procedure for the loss of the off-site power supply, so failing to shut down the operating reactors at the earliest opportunity to allow the decay heat to start to dissipate.[6] At 3:00 am on December 28, the power plant's emergency teams were called to reinforce the staff already on site; at 6:30 the management of the Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety (now part of the Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute) were informed, and a meeting of experts was convened at the IPSN at 7:45 am.[6] At 9:00 am the Level 2 Internal Emergency Plan was finally activated by the Directorate of Nuclear Installation Safety (now the Nuclear Safety Authority) and a full emergency management team of 25 people was formed, working in shifts around the clock.[6] At noon on December 28, the incident was provisionally rated at 'level 1' on the International Nuclear Event Scale[7] before being reclassified at 'level 2' the following day.[8] The team was scaled back during December 30, and stood down around 6 pm the same day.[6]

During the morning of December 28, the Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety estimated that, if the emergency cooling water supply failed, there would have been over 10 hours in which to act before core meltdown started.[6]

On 5 January, the regional newspaper Sud-Ouest ran the following headline without being contradicted: "Very close to a major accident", explaining that a catastrophe had been narrowly avoided.[9]

A report on a number of samples taken after the flooding on January 8 and 9 found that the event had had no quantifiable effect on radiation levels.[10]

[edit] Aftermath

The Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety issued a report on January 17, 2000, calling for a review of the data used to calculate the height of the surface on which nuclear power stations are built. It suggested that two criteria should be met: that buildings containing equipment important for safety should be built on a surface at least as high as the highest water level plus a safety margin (the cote majorée de sécurité or 'enhanced safety height'), and that any such buildings below this level should be sealed to prevent water ingress.[6] It also contained an initial analysis which found that, in addition to Blayais, the plants as Belleville, Chinon, Dampierre, Gravelines and Saint-Laurent were all below the 'enhanced safety height' and that their safety measures should be re-examined.[6] It also found that although the plants at Bugey, Cruas, Flamanville, Golfech, Nogent, Paluel, Penly and Saint-Alban met the first criterion, the second should be verified; and called for the plants at Fessenheim and Tricastin to be re-examined since they were below the level of major adjacent canals.[6] The consequent upgrading work, implemented over the following years, is estimated to have cost approximately 110,000,000 euro.[3]

In Germany, the flooding prompted the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety to order an evaluation of the German nuclear power plants.[1]

Following the events at Blayais, a new method of evaluating flood risk was developed. Instead of evaluating only the five factors required by Rule RFS I.2.e (river flood, dam failure, tide, storm surge and tsunami), a further eight factors are now also evaluated: waves caused by wind on the sea; waves caused by wind on river or channel; swelling due to the operation of valves or pumps; deterioration of water retaining structures (other than dams); circuit or equipment failure; brief and intense rainfall on site; regular and continuous rainfall on site; and rises in groundwater. In addition, realistic combinations of such factors are taken into account.[3]

Among the remedial actions taken at Blayais itself, the sea walls were raised to 8.0 m (26.2 ft) above NFG,[4] – up to 3.25 m (10.7 ft) higher than before – and openings have been sealed to prevent water ingress.[3]

[edit] Protests

Twelve days prior to the floods, a local anti-nuclear group was formed by Stéphane Lhomme under the TchernoBlaye banner (a portmanteau of the French spelling of Chernobyl and Blaye, the nearest town).[11] The group gained support following the flood and their first protest march of between 1,000 and 1,500 people took place on April 23, but was blocked from reaching the plant by police using tear gas.[11][12] The group continue their opposition to the plant, still under the presidency of Stéphane Lhomme.

[edit] Ongoing concerns

Due to the remedial works the plant is now believed to be adequately protected from flooding, however the access roadway remains low-lying and vulnerable. Due to this, particularly since the 2011 Fukushima I nuclear accidents in Japan, concerns have been raised over the potential difficulty of getting help to the plant in an emergency.[13][14]

The adequacy of the sea walls has, however, been disputed by Professor Jean-Noël Salomon, head of the Laboratory of Applied Physical Geography at Michel de Montaigne University Bordeaux 3, who believes that, due to the potential harm and economic cost that would result from a future flood-related disaster, the sea walls should be designed to withstand simultaneous extreme events, rather than simultaneous major events.[4]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Generic Results and Conclusions of Re-evaluating the Flooding in French and German Nuclear Power Plants J. M. Mattéi, E. Vial, V. Rebour, H. Liemersdorf, M. Türschmann, Eurosafe Forum 2001, published 2001, accessed 2011-03-21
2. ^ COMMUNIQUE N°7 - INCIDENT SUR LE SITE DU BLAYAIS ASN, published 1999-12-30, accessed 2011-03-22
3. ^ a b c d Lessons Learned from 1999 Blayais Flood: Overview of the EDF Flood Risk Management Plan, Eric de Fraguier, EDF, published 2010-03-11, accessed 2011-03-22
4. ^ a b c d e f L'inondation dans la basse vallée de la Garonne et l'estuaire de la Gironde lors de la "tempête du siècle" (27-28 décembre 1999) / Flooding in the Garonne valley and the Gironde estuary caused by the "storm of the century" (27-28 December 1999) Salomon Jean-Noël, Géomorphologie : relief, processus, environnement, Avril-juin, vol. 8, n°2. pp. 127-134, doi : 10.3406/morfo.2002.1134, accessed 2011-03-25
5. ^ Crue de la Garonne, décembre 1981 : éléments pour une analyse, A Dalmolin, Délégation régionale à l'architecture et à l'environnement d'Aquitaine, published 1982
6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Rapport sur l'inondation du site du Blayais survenue le 27 décembre 1999 Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety, published 2000-01-17, accessed 2011-03-21
7. ^ COMMUNIQUE N° 2 - INCIDENT SUR LE SITE DU BLAYAIS ASN, published 1999-12-28, accessed 2011-03-22
8. ^ COMMUNIQUE N° 4 - INCIDENT SUR LE SITE DU BLAYAIS ASN, published 1999-12-29, accessed 2011-03-22
9. ^ Sud-Ouest, 5 janvier 2000 - Centrale de Blaye : Très près de l'accident majeur
10. ^ Point radioécologique de l'estuaire de la Gironde immédiatement après l'inondation du 27 décembre 1999 (Prélèvements des 8 et 9 janvier 2000) Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety, published 2000-01-17, accessed 2011-03-21
11. ^ a b L'histoire de TchernoBlaye TchernoBlaye, accessed 2011-03-29
12. ^ In brief WISE, accessed 2011-03-29
13. ^ Inquiétudes sur la centrale du Blayais Sud-Ouest, published 2011-03-14, accessed 2011-03-22
14. ^ La centrale nucléaire du Blayais suscite l'inquiétude, actualité Reuters Le Point, published 2011-03-21, accessed 2011-03-22

2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami東北地方太平洋沖地震

An aerial view of damage in the Sendai region with black smoke coming from the Nippon Oil Sendai oil refinery
Peak tsunami wave height summits, color-coded with red representing most severe
Date	Friday, 11 March 2011
Origin time	14:46:23 JST (UTC+09:00)
Duration	6 minutes[1]
Magnitude	9.0 (Mw)[2][3]
Depth	32 km (20 mi)
Epicenter	38°19′19″N 142°22′08″E / 38.322°N 142.369°E / 38.322; 142.369Coordinates: 38°19′19″N 142°22′08″E / 38.322°N 142.369°E / 38.322; 142.369
Type	Megathrust earthquake
Countries or regions	Japan (primary) Pacific Rim (tsunami, secondary)
Total damage	Tsunami wave, flooding, landslides, fires, building and infrastructure damage, nuclear incidents including radiation releases
Max. intensity	IX
Peak acceleration	2.99 g
Tsunami	Up to 40.5 m (133 ft) in Miyako, Iwate, Tōhoku
Landslides	Yes
Foreshocks	7
Aftershocks	1,236
Casualties	15,870 deaths,[4] 6,114 injured,[5] 2,814 people missing[6]

The 2011 earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku (東北地方太平洋沖地震, Tōhoku-chihō Taiheiyō Oki Jishin?), often referred to in Japan as Higashi nihon daishin-sai (東日本大震災?)[7] and also known as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake,[8] the Great East Japan Earthquake,[9][10][fn 1] and the 3.11 Earthquake, was a magnitude 9.03 (Mw) undersea megathrust earthquake off the coast of Japan that occurred at 14:46 JST (05:46 UTC) on Friday, 11 March 2011,[2][3][11] with the epicenter approximately 70 kilometres (43 mi) east of the Oshika Peninsula of Tōhoku and the hypocenter at an underwater depth of approximately 32 km (20 mi).[2][12] It was the most powerful known earthquake ever to have hit Japan, and one of the five most powerful earthquakes in the world since modern record-keeping began in 1900.[11][13][14] The earthquake triggered powerful tsunami waves that reached heights of up to 40.5 metres (133 ft) in Miyako in Tōhoku's Iwate Prefecture,[15][16] and which, in the Sendai area, travelled up to 10 km (6 mi) inland.[17] The earthquake moved Honshu (the main island of Japan) 2.4 m (8 ft) east and shifted the Earth on its axis by estimates of between 10 cm (4 in) and 25 cm (10 in).[18][19][20]

On 12 September 2012, a Japanese National Police Agency report confirmed 15,870 deaths,[21] 6,114 injured,[22] and 2,814 people missing[23] across twenty prefectures, as well as 129,225 buildings totally collapsed, with a further 254,204 buildings 'half collapsed', and another 691,766 buildings partially damaged.[24] The earthquake and tsunami also caused extensive and severe structural damage in north-eastern Japan, including heavy damage to roads and railways as well as fires in many areas, and a dam collapse.[17][25] Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan said, "In the 65 years after the end of World War II, this is the toughest and the most difficult crisis for Japan."[26] Around 4.4 million households in northeastern Japan were left without electricity and 1.5 million without water.[27]

The tsunami caused a number of nuclear accidents, primarily the level 7 meltdowns at three reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex, and the associated evacuation zones affecting hundreds of thousands of residents.[28][29] Many electrical generators were taken down, and at least three nuclear reactors suffered explosions due to hydrogen gas that had built up within their outer containment buildings after cooling system failure. Residents within a 20 km (12 mi) radius of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and a 10 km (6.2 mi) radius of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant were evacuated. In addition, the U.S. recommended that its citizens evacuate up to 80 km (50 mi) of the plant.[30]

Early estimates placed insured losses from the earthquake alone at US$14.5 to $34.6 billion.[31] The Bank of Japan offered ¥15 trillion (US$183 billion) to the banking system on 14 March in an effort to normalize market conditions.[32] The World Bank's estimated economic cost was US$235 billion, making it the most expensive natural disaster in world history.[33][34]

[edit] Earthquake

Map showing the epicenter of the earthquake

The 9.0 magnitude (MW) undersea megathrust earthquake occurred on 11 March 2011 at 14:46 JST (05:46 UTC) in the north-western Pacific Ocean at a relatively shallow depth of 32 km (19.9 mi),[35] with its epicenter approximately 72 km (45 mi) east of the Oshika Peninsula of Tōhoku, Japan, lasting approximately six minutes.[1][2] The earthquake was initially reported as 7.9 MW by the USGS before it was quickly upgraded to 8.8  MW, then to 8.9  MW,[36] and then finally to 9.0  MW.[3][37]Sendai was the nearest major city to the earthquake, 130 km (81 mi) from the epicenter; the earthquake occurred 373 km (232 mi) from Tokyo.[2]

The main earthquake was preceded by a number of large foreshocks, with hundreds of aftershocks reported. The first major foreshock was a 7.2 MW event on 9 March, approximately 40 km (25 mi) from the epicenter of the 11 March earthquake, with another three on the same day in excess of 6.0 MW.[2][38] Following the main earthquake on 11 March, a 7.0 MW aftershock was reported at 15:06 JST (6:06 UTC), succeeded by a 7.4  MW at 15:15 JST (6:16 UTC) and a 7.2  MW at 15:26 JST (6:26 UTC).[39] Over eight hundred aftershocks of magnitude 4.5  MW or greater have occurred since the initial quake.[40] Aftershocks follow Omori's Law, which states that the rate of aftershocks declines with the reciprocal of the time since the main quake. The aftershocks will thus taper off in time, but could continue for years.[41]

One minute before the earthquake was felt in Tokyo, the Earthquake Early Warning system, which includes more than 1,000 seismometers in Japan, sent out warnings of impending strong shaking to millions. It is believed that the early warning by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) saved many lives.[42][43] The warning for the general public was delivered about 8 seconds after the first P wave was detected, or about 31 seconds after the earthquake occurred. However, the estimated intensities were smaller than the actual ones in some places in Kanto and Tohoku regions. This was thought to be because of smaller estimated earthquake magnitude, smaller estimated fault plane, shorter estimated fault length, not having considered the shape of the fault, etc.[44] There were also cases where large differences between estimated intensities by the Earthquake Early Warning system and the actual intensities occurred in the aftershocks and triggered earthquakes.[45]

[edit] Geology

This earthquake occurred where the Pacific Plate is subducting under the plate beneath northern Honshu; which plate is a matter of debate amongst scientists.[19][46] The Pacific plate, which moves at a rate of 8 to 9 cm (3.1 to 3.5 in) per year, dips under Honshu's underlying plate releasing large amounts of energy. This motion pulls the upper plate down until the stress builds up enough to cause a seismic event. The break caused the sea floor to rise by several meters.[46] A quake of this magnitude usually has a rupture length of at least 480 km (300 mi) and generally requires a long, relatively straight fault surface. Because the plate boundary and subduction zone in the area of the rupture is not very straight, it is unusual for the magnitude of an earthquake to exceed 8.5; the magnitude of this earthquake was a surprise to some seismologists.[47] The hypocentral region of this earthquake extended from offshore Iwate Prefecture to offshore Ibaraki Prefecture.[48] The Japanese Meteorological Agency said that the earthquake may have ruptured the fault zone from Iwate to Ibaraki with a length of 500 km (310 mi) and a width of 200 km (120 mi).[49][50] Analysis showed that this earthquake consisted of a set of three events.[51] The earthquake may have had a mechanism similar to that of another large earthquake in 869 with an estimated surface wave magnitude (Ms) of 8.6, which also created a large tsunami.[52] Other major earthquakes with tsunamis struck the Sanriku Coast region in 1896 and in 1933.

In a study of N. Uchida and T. Matsuzawa, it was pointed out that the source area of this earthquake has a relatively high coupling coefficient surrounded by areas of relatively low coupling coefficients in the west, north, and south. From the averaged coupling coefficient of 0.5~0.8 in the source area and the seismic moment, it was estimated that the slip deficit of this earthquake was accumulated over a period of 260~880 years, which is consistent with the recurrence interval of such great earthquakes estimated from the tsunami deposit data. The seismic moment of this earthquake accounts for about 93% of the estimated cumulative moment from 1926 to March 2011. Hence, earthquakes with magnitudes about 7 since 1926 in this area only had released part of the accumulated energy. In the area near the trench, the coupling coefficient is high, which could act as the source of the large tsunami.[53]

Most of the foreshocks are interplate earthquakes with thrust-type focal mechanisms. Both interplate and intraplate earthquakes appeared in the aftershocks offshore Sanriku coast with considerable proportions.[54]

The strong ground motion registered at the maximum of 7 on the Japan Meteorological Agency seismic intensity scale in Kurihara, Miyagi Prefecture.[55] Three other prefectures—Fukushima, Ibaraki and Tochigi—recorded an upper 6 on the JMA scale. Seismic stations in Iwate, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba Prefecture measured a lower 6, recording an upper 5 in Tokyo.

In Russia, the main shock could be felt in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (MSK 4) and Kurilsk (MSK 4). The aftershock at 06:25 UTC could be felt in Yuzhno-Kurilsk (MSK 5) and Kurilsk (MSK 4).[56]

[edit] Energy

This earthquake released a surface energy (Me) of 1.9 ± 0.5×1017 joules,[57] dissipated as shaking and tsunamic energy, which is nearly double that of the 9.1-magnitude 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami that killed 230,000 people. If harnessed, the surface energy from this earthquake would power a city the size of Los Angeles for an entire year.[41] The total energy released, also known as the seismic moment (M0), was more than 200,000 times the surface energy and was calculated by the USGS at 3.9×1022 joules,[58] slightly less than the 2004 Indian Ocean quake. This is equivalent to 9,320 gigatons of TNT, or approximately 600 million times the energy of the Little Boy bomb.

Japan's National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention (NIED) calculated a peak ground acceleration of 2.99 g (29.33 m/s²).[59][fn 2] The largest individual recording in Japan was 2.7g, in the Miyagi Prefecture, 75 km from the epicentre; the highest reading in the Tokyo metropolitan area was 0.16g.[62]

[edit] Geophysical effects

The quake moved portions of northeastern Japan by as much as 2.4 m (7.9 ft) closer to North America,[18][19] making portions of Japan's landmass wider than before.[19] Portions of Japan closest to the epicenter experienced the largest shifts.[19] A 400 km (250 mi) stretch of coastline dropped vertically by 0.6 m (2.0 ft), allowing the tsunami to travel farther and faster onto land.[19] One early estimate suggested that the Pacific plate may have moved westward by up to 20 m (66 ft),[63] and another early estimate put the amount of slippage at as much as 40 m (130 ft).[64] On 6 April the Japanese coast guard said that the quake shifted the seabed near the epicenter 24 meters (79 ft) and elevated the seabed off the coast of Miyagi prefecture by 3 meters.[65] A report by the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology, published in Science on 2 December 2011, concluded that the seabed in the area between the epicenter and the Japan Trench moved 50 meters east-southeast and rose about 7 meters as a result of the quake. The report also stated that the quake had caused several major landslides on the seabed in the affected area.[66]

The earthquake shifted the Earth's axis by estimates of between 10 cm (4 in) and 25 cm (10 in).[18][19][20] This deviation led to a number of small planetary changes, including the length of a day, the tilt of the Earth, and the Chandler wobble.[20] The speed of the Earth's rotation increased, shortening the day by 1.8 microseconds due to the redistribution of Earth's mass.[67] The axial shift was caused by the redistribution of mass on the Earth's surface, which changed the planet's moment of inertia. Because of conservation of angular momentum, such changes of inertia result in small changes to the Earth's rate of rotation.[68] These are expected changes[20] for an earthquake of this magnitude.[18][67]

Soil liquefaction was evident in areas of reclaimed land around Tokyo, particularly in Urayasu,[69][70]Chiba City, Funabashi, Narashino (all in Chiba Prefecture) and in the Koto, Edogawa, Minato, Chūō, and Ōta Wards of Tokyo. Approximately 30 homes or buildings were destroyed and 1,046 other buildings were damaged to varying degrees.[71] Nearby Haneda Airport, built mostly on reclaimed land, was not damaged. Odaiba also experienced liquefaction, but damage was minimal.[72]

Shinmoedake, a volcano in Kyushu, erupted two days after the earthquake. The volcano had previously erupted in January 2011; it is not known if the later eruption was linked to the earthquake.[73] In Antarctica, the seismic waves from the earthquake were reported to have caused the Whillans Ice Stream to slip by about 0.5 m (1.6 ft).[74]

The first sign international researchers had that the earthquake caused such a dramatic change in the Earth’s rotation came from the United States Geographical Survey which monitors Global Positioning Satellite stations across the world. The Survey team had several GPS monitors located near the scene of the earthquake. The GPS station located nearest the epicenter moved almost 13 feet (4.0 m). This motivated government researchers to look into other ways the earthquake may have had large scale effects on the planet. Scientists at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory did some calculations and determined that the Earth’s rotation was changed by the earthquake to the point where the days are now one point eight (1.8) microseconds shorter.

[75]

Dr. Richard Gross, one of the head researchers working for NASA, explained that even a difference of 1.8 microseconds is important to his team because it affects the way that spacecraft being sent to Mars are navigated. Not taking the changes into account could increase the chances of failure of the mission. Gross noted that the way the Earth rotates is not very smooth, like an old car wobbling on its axle. The earthquake's effect was as if a person took a hammer and whacked the car's axle, causing it to shift and the car to drive differently. The powerful earthquake hit the Earth’s axle, causing it to spin in a slightly different way.[76]

[edit] Aftershocks

Japan experienced over 1000 aftershocks since the earthquake, with 80 registering over magnitude 6.0 Mw and three of which were over magnitude 7.0 Mw. A magnitude 7.7 Mw and a 7.9 Mw quake occurred on 11 March[77] and the third one struck offshore on 7 April with a disputed magnitude. Its epicenter was underwater, 66 km (41 mi) off the coast of Sendai. The Japan Meteorological Agency assigned a magnitude of 7.4 MJMA, while the U.S. Geological Survey lowered it to 7.1 Mw.[78] At least four people were killed, and electricity was cut off across much of northern Japan including the loss of external power to Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant and Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.[79][80][81] Four days later on 11 April, another strong magnitude 6.6 Mw aftershock struck Fukushima, causing additional damage and killing a total of three people.[82][83]

As of 16 Mar 2012 aftershocks continued, totaling 1887 events over magnitude 4.0; a regularly updated map showing all shocks of magnitude 4.5 and above near or off the east coast of Honshu in the last seven days[84] showed over 20 events.

[edit] Tsunami

The earthquake, caused by 5 to 8 meters upthrust on a 180-km wide seabed at 60 km offshore from the east coast of Tōhoku,[85] resulted in a major tsunami that brought destruction along the Pacific coastline of Japan's northern islands. Thousands of lives were lost when entire towns were devastated. The tsunami propagated throughout the Pacific Ocean region reaching the entire Pacific coast of North and South America from Alaska to Chile. Warnings were issued and evacuations carried out in many countries bordering the Pacific. However, while the tsunami affected many of these places, the extent was minor.[86][87][88] Chile's Pacific coast, one of the furthest from Japan at about 17,000 km (11,000 mi) distant, was struck by waves 2 m (6.6 ft) high,[89][90][91] compared with an estimated wave height of 38.9 meters (128 ft) at Omoe peninsula, Miyako city, Japan.[16]

The tsunami warning issued by the Japan Meteorological Agency was the most serious on its warning scale; it rated as a "major tsunami", being at least 3 m (9.8 ft) high.[92] The actual height prediction varied, the greatest being for Miyagi at 6 m (20 ft) high.[93] The tsunami inundated a total area of approximately 561 km2 (217 sq mi) in Japan.[94]

The earthquake took place at 14:46 JST around 67 km (42 mi) from the nearest point on Japan's coastline, and initial estimates indicated the tsunami would have taken 10 to 30 minutes to reach the areas first affected, and then areas farther north and south based on the geography of the coastline.[95][96] Just over an hour after the earthquake at 15:55 JST, a tsunami was observed flooding Sendai Airport, which is located near the coast of Miyagi Prefecture,[97][98] with waves sweeping away cars and planes and flooding various buildings as they traveled inland.[99][100] The image of the tsunami sweeping cars on the street in Sendai was caught by an in-car camera. The impact of the tsunami in and around Sendai Airport was filmed by an NHK News helicopter, showing a number of vehicles on local roads trying to escape the approaching wave and being engulfed by it.[101] A 4 m high tsunami hit Iwate Prefecture.[102]Wakabayashi Ward in Sendai was also particularly hard hit.[103] At least 101 designated tsunami evacuation sites were hit by the wave.[104]

Like the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the damage by surging water, though much more localized, was far more deadly and destructive than the actual quake. There were reports of entire towns destroyed from tsunami-hit areas in Japan, including 9,500 missing in Minamisanriku;[105] one thousand bodies had been recovered in the town by 14 March 2011.[106]

Among several factors causing the high death toll from the tsunami, one was the unexpectedly large size of the water surge. The tsunami walls at several of the affected cities were based on much smaller tsunami heights. Also, many people caught in the tsunami thought that they were located on high enough ground to be safe.[107]

Large parts of Kuji and the southern section of Ōfunato including the port area were almost entirely destroyed[108][109] Also largely destroyed was Rikuzentakata, where the tsunami was reportedly three stories high.[110][111][112] Other cities reportedly destroyed or heavily damaged by the tsunami include Kamaishi, Miyako, Ōtsuchi, and Yamada (in Iwate Prefecture), Namie, Sōma and Minamisōma (in Fukushima Prefecture) and Shichigahama, Higashimatsushima, Onagawa, Natori, Ishinomaki, and Kesennuma (in Miyagi Prefecture).[113][114][115][116][117][118][119] The most severe effects of the tsunami were felt along a 670-km (420 mi)-long stretch of coastline from Erimo, Hokkaido, in the north to Ōarai, Ibaraki, in the south, with most of the destruction in that area occurring in the hour following the earthquake.[120] Near Ōarai, people captured images of a huge whirlpool that had been generated by the tsunami.[121] The tsunami washed away the sole bridge to Miyatojima, Miyagi, isolating the island's 900 residents.[122] A two meter high tsunami hit Chiba Prefecture about 2 1/2 hours after the quake, causing heavy damage to cities such as Asahi.[123]

On 13 March 2011, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) published details of tsunami observations recorded around the coastline of Japan following the earthquake. These observations included tsunami maximum readings of over 3 m (9.8 ft) at the following locations and times on 11 March 2011, following the earthquake at 14:46 JST:[124]

• 15:12 JST – off Kamaishi – 6.8 m (22 ft)
• 15:15 JST – Ōfunato – 3.2 m (10 ft) or higher
• 15:20 JST – Ishinomaki-shi Ayukawa – 3.3 m (11 ft) or higher
• 15:21 JST – Miyako – 4.0 m (13.1 ft) or higher
• 15:21 JST – Kamaishi – 4.1 m (13 ft) or higher
• 15:44 JST – Erimo-cho Shoya – 3.5 m (11 ft)
• 15:50 JST – Sōma – 7.3 m (24 ft) or higher
• 16:52 JST – Ōarai – 4.2 m (14 ft)

Many areas were also affected by waves of 1 to 3 meters (3.3 to 9.8 ft) in height, and the JMA bulletin also included the caveat that "At some parts of the coasts, tsunamis may be higher than those observed at the observation sites." The timing of the earliest recorded tsunami maximum readings ranged from 15:12 to 15:21, between 26 and 35 minutes after the earthquake had struck. The bulletin also included initial tsunami observation details, as well as more detailed maps for the coastlines affected by the tsunami waves.[125][126]

JMA also reported offshore tsunami height recorded by telemetry from moored GPS wave height meter buoys as follows:[127]

On 25 March 2011, Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI) reported tsunami height by visiting the port sites as follows:[128]

• Port of Hachinohe – 5–6 m (16–19 ft)
• Port of Hachinohe area – 8–9 m (26–29 ft)
• Port of Kuji – 8–9 m (26–29 ft)
• Port of Kamaishi – 7–9 m (23–30 ft)
• Port of Ōfunato – 9.5 m (31 ft)
• Run up height, port of Ōfunato area – 24 m (79 ft)
• Fishery port of Onagawa – 15 m (50 ft)
• Port of Ishinomaki – 5 m (16 ft)
• Shiogama section of Shiogama-Sendai port – 4 m (13 ft)
• Sendai section of Shiogama-Sendai port – 8 m (26 ft)
• Sendai Airport area – 12 m (39 ft)

A joint research team from Yokohama National University and the University of Tokyo also reported that the tsunami at Ryōri Bay (綾里白浜), Ōfunato was about 30 m high. They found fishing equipment scattered on the high cliff above the bay.[129] At Tarō, Iwate, a University of Tokyo researcher reported an estimated tsunami height of 37.9 m (124 ft) reached the slope of a mountain some 200 m (656 ft) away from the coastline.[130] Also, at slope of nearby mountain from 400 m (1,312 ft) Aneyoshi fishery port (姉吉漁港) of Omoe peninsula (重茂半島) in Miyako, Iwate, Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology found estimated tsunami run up height of 38.9 m (127 ft).[16] This height is deemed the record in Japan historically, as of reporting date, that exceeds 38.2 m (125 ft) from the 1896 Meiji-Sanriku earthquake.[131] It was also estimated that the tsunami reached heights of up to 40.5 metres (133 ft) in Miyako in Tōhoku's Iwate Prefecture. The inundated areas closely matched those of the 869 Sanriku tsunami.[132]

A Japanese government study found that only 58% of people in coastal areas in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures heeded tsunami warnings immediately after the quake and headed for higher ground. Of those who attempted to evacuate after hearing the warning, only five percent were caught in the tsunami. Of those who didn't heed the warning, 49% were hit by the water.[133]

[edit] Elsewhere across the Pacific

Shortly after the earthquake, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Hawaii issued tsunami watches and announcements for locations in the Pacific. At 07:30 UTC, PTWC issued a widespread tsunami warning covering the entire Pacific Ocean.[134][135]Russia evacuated 11,000 residents from coastal areas of the Kuril Islands.[136] The United States West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center issued a tsunami warning for the coastal areas in most of California, all of Oregon, and the western part of Alaska, and a tsunami advisory covering the Pacific coastlines of most of Alaska, and all of Washington and British Columbia, Canada.[137][138] In California and Oregon, up to 2.4 m (8 ft) high tsunami surges hit some areas, damaging docks and harbors and causing over US$10 million in damage.[139] In Curry County, Oregon $7 million in damages occurred including the destruction of 3,600 feet (1,100 m) of dockspace at the Brookings harbor; the county has received over $1 million in FEMA emergency grants.[140] Surges of up to 1 m (3.3 ft) hit Vancouver Island in Canada[138] prompting some evacuations, and causing boats to be banned from the waters surrounding the island for 12 hours following the wave strike, leaving many island residents in the area without means of getting to work.[141][142]

In the Philippines, waves up to 0.5 m (1.6 ft) high hit the eastern seaboard of the country. Some houses along the coast in Jayapura, Indonesia were destroyed.[143] Authorities in Wewak, East Sepik, Papua New Guinea evacuated 100 patients from the city's Boram Hospital before it was hit by the waves, causing an estimated US$4 million in damages.[144] Hawaii estimated damage to public infrastructure alone at US$3 million, with damage to private properties, including resort hotels such as Four Seasons Resort Hualalai, estimated at tens of millions of dollars.[145] It was reported that a 1.5 m (5 ft) high wave completely submerged Midway Atoll's reef inlets and Spit Island, killing more than 110,000 nesting seabirds at the Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge.[146] Some other South Pacific countries, including Tonga and New Zealand, and U.S. territories American Samoa and Guam, experienced larger-than-normal waves, but did not report any major damage.[147] However in Guam some roads were closed off and people were evacuated from low-lying areas.[148]

Along the Pacific Coast of Mexico and South America, tsunami surges were reported, but in most places caused little or no damage.[149] Peru reported a wave of 1.5 m (5 ft) and more than 300 homes damaged.[149] The surge in Chile was large enough to damage more than 200 houses,[150] with waves of up to 3 m (9.8 ft).[151][152] In the Galapagos Islands, 260 families received assistance following a 3 m (9.8 ft) surge which arrived 20 hours after the earthquake, after the tsunami warning had been lifted.[153][154] There was a great deal of damage to buildings on the islands and one man was injured but there were no reported fatalities.[153][155]

The tsunami broke icebergs off the Sulzberger Ice Shelf in Antarctica, 13,000 kilometres (8,100 mi) away. The main iceberg measured 9.5 by 6.5 kilometres (5.9 mi × 4.0 mi) (approximately the area of Manhattan Island) and about 80 metres (260 ft) thick. A total of 125 square kilometres (48 sq mi; 31,000 acres) of ice broke away.[156][157]

As of April 2012, wreckage from the tsunami spread around the oceans, including a soccer ball which was found in Alaska [158] and a Japanese motorcycle found in British Columbia, Canada [159]

[edit] Land subsidence

Geospatial Information Authority of Japan reported land subsidence on the height of triangulation station measured by GPS from previous value on 14 April 2011.[160]

• Miyako, Iwate – 0.50 m (1.64 ft)
• Yamada, Iwate – 0.53 m (1.73 ft)
• Ōtsuchi, Iwate – 0.35 m (1.14 ft)[161]
• Kamaishi, Iwate – 0.66 m (2.16 ft)
• Ōfunato, Iwate – 0.73 m (2.39 ft)
• Rikuzentakata, Iwate – 0.84 m (2.75 ft)
• Kesennuma, Miyagi – 0.74 m (2.42 ft)
• Minamisanriku, Miyagi – 0.69 m (2.26 ft)
• Oshika Peninsula, Miyagi – 1.2 m (3.93 ft)[161]
• Ishinomaki, Miyagi – 0.78 m (2.55 ft)
• Higashimatsushima, Miyagi – 0.43 m (1.41 ft)
• Iwanuma, Miyagi – 0.47 m (1.54 ft)
• Sōma, Fukushima – 0.29 m (0.95 ft)

Scientists say that the subsidence is permanent. As a result, the communities in question are now more susceptible to flooding during high tides.[162]

[edit] Casualties

The National Police Agency has confirmed 15,870 deaths,[21] 6,114 injured,[22] and 2,814 people missing[23] across twenty prefectures.[24]

Of the 13,135 fatalities recovered by 11 April 2011, 12,143 or 92.5% died by drowning. Victims aged 60 or older accounted for 65.2% of the deaths, with 24% of total victims being in their 70s.[163] As of March 2012, Japanese police data showed that 70% of the 3,279 still missing were aged 60 or over, including 893 in their 70s and 577 in their 80s. Of the total confirmed victims, 14,308 drowned, 667 were crushed to death or died from internal injuries, and 145 perished from burns.[164]

Save the Children reports that as many as 100,000 children were uprooted from their homes, some of whom were separated from their families because the earthquake occurred during the school day.[165] 236 children were orphaned in the prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima by the disaster;[166][167] 1,580 children lost either one or both parents,[168] 846 in Miyagi, 572 in Iwate, and 162 in Fukushima.[169] The quake and tsunami killed 378 elementary, middle-school, and high school students and left 158 others missing.[170] One elementary school in Ishinomaki, Miyagi, Okawa Elementary, lost 74 of 108 students and 10 of 13 teachers and staff.[171][172][173]

The Japanese Foreign Ministry has confirmed the deaths of nineteen foreigners.[174] Among them are two English teachers from the United States affiliated with the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program;[175] a Canadian missionary in Shiogama;[176] and citizens of China, North and South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan and the Philippines.

By 9:30 UTC on 11 March, Google Person Finder, which was previously used in the Haitian, Chilean, and Christchurch, New Zealand earthquakes, was collecting information about survivors and their locations.[177][178] The Next of Kin Registry (NOKR) is assisting the Japanese government in locating next of kin for those missing or deceased.[179]

Japanese funerals are normally elaborate Buddhist ceremonies which entail cremation. The thousands of bodies, however, exceeded the capacity of available crematoriums and morgues, many of them damaged,[180][181] and there were shortages of both kerosene—each cremation requires 50 liters—and dry ice for preservation.[182] The single crematorium in Higashimatsushima, for example, could only handle four bodies a day, although hundreds were found there.[183] Governments and the military were forced to bury many bodies in hastily dug mass graves with rudimentary or no rites, although relatives of the deceased were promised that they would be cremated later.[184]

The tsunami is reported to have caused several deaths outside of Japan. One man was killed in Jayapura, Papua, Indonesia after being swept out to sea.[185] A man who is said to have been attempting to photograph the oncoming tsunami at the mouth of the Klamath River, south of Crescent City, California, was swept out to sea.[186][187][188] His body was found on 2 April along Ocean Beach in Fort Stevens State Park, Oregon, some 330 miles (530 km) to the north.[189][190]

Noted individual fatalities within Japan included 104-year old Takashi Shimokawara, holder of the world athletics records in the men's shot put, discus throw and javelin throw for the over-100s age category. He was killed by the earthquake and tsunami at Kamaishi, Iwate.[191]

As of 27 May 2011, three Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members had died while conducting relief operations in Tōhoku.[192] As of March 2012, the Japanese government had recognized 1,331 deaths as indirectly related to the earthquake, such as caused by harsh living conditions after the disaster.[193] As of 30 April 2012, 18 people had died and 420 had been injured while participating in disaster recovery or clean-up efforts.[194]

[edit] Damage and effects

The degree and extent of damage caused by the earthquake and resulting tsunami were enormous, with most of the damage being caused by the tsunami. Video footage of the towns that were worst affected shows little more than piles of rubble, with almost no parts of any structures left standing.[195] Estimates of the cost of the damage range well into the tens of billions of US dollars; before-and-after satellite photographs of devastated regions show immense damage to many regions.[196][197] Although Japan has invested the equivalent of billions of dollars on anti-tsunami seawalls which line at least 40% of its 34,751 km (21,593 mi) coastline and stand up to 12 m (39 ft) high, the tsunami simply washed over the top of some seawalls, collapsing some in the process.[198]

Japan's National Police Agency said on 3 April 2011, that 45,700 buildings were destroyed and 144,300 were damaged by the quake and tsunami. The damaged buildings included 29,500 structures in Miyagi Prefecture, 12,500 in Iwate Prefecture and 2,400 in Fukushima Prefecture.[199] Three hundred hospitals with 20 beds or more in Tōhoku were damaged by the disaster, with 11 being completely destroyed.[200] The earthquake and tsunami created an estimated 24–25 million tons of rubble and debris in Japan.[201][202]

An estimated 230,000 automobiles and trucks were damaged or destroyed in the disaster. As of the end of May 2011, residents of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures had requested deregistration of 15,000 vehicles, meaning that the owners of those vehicles were writing them off as unrepairable or unsalvageable.[203]

All of Japan's ports were briefly closed after the earthquake, though the ones in Tokyo and southwards soon re-opened. Fifteen ports were located in the disaster zone. The north-eastern ports of Hachinohe, Sendai, Ishinomaki and Onahama were destroyed, while the Port of Chiba (which serves the hydrocarbon industry) and Japan's ninth-largest container port at Kashima were also affected though less severely. The ports at Hitachinaka, Hitachi, Soma, Shiogama, Kesennuma, Ofunato, Kamashi and Miyako were also damaged and closed to ships.[204] All 15 ports reopened to limited ship traffic by 29 March 2011.[205] A total of 319 fishing ports, about 10% of Japan's fishing ports, were damaged in the disaster.[206] Most were restored to operating condition by 18 April 2012.[207]

The Port of Tokyo suffered slight damage; the effects of the quake included visible smoke rising from a building in the port with parts of the port areas being flooded, including soil liquefaction in Tokyo Disneyland's parking lot.[208][209]

[edit] Dams and water

The Fujinuma irrigation dam in Sukagawa ruptured,[210] causing flooding and washing away five homes.[211] Eight people were missing and four bodies were discovered by the morning.[212][213] Reportedly, some locals had attempted to repair leaks in the dam before it completely failed.[214] On 12 March, 252 dams were inspected and it was discovered that six embankment dams had shallow cracks on their crests. The reservoir at one concrete gravity dam suffered a small non-serious slope failure. All damaged dams are functioning with no problems. Four dams within the quake area were unreachable. When the roads clear, experts will be dispatched to conduct further investigations.[215]

In the immediate aftermath of the calamity, at least 1.5 million households were reported to have lost access to water supplies.[27][216] By 21 March 2011, this number fell to 1.04 million.[217]

[edit] Electricity

According to the Japanese trade ministry, around 4.4 million households served by Tōhoku Electric Power (TEP) in northeastern Japan were left without electricity.[218] Several nuclear and conventional power plants went offline after the earthquake, reducing TEPCO's total capacity by 21 GW.[219]Rolling blackouts began on 14 March due to power shortages caused by the earthquake.[220] The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which normally provides approximately 40 GW of electricity, announced that it can currently provide only about 30 GW. This is because 40% of the electricity used in the greater Tokyo area is now supplied by reactors in the Niigata and Fukushima prefectures.[221] The reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Dai-ni plants were automatically taken offline when the first earthquake occurred and have sustained major damage related to the earthquake and subsequent tsunami. Rolling blackouts of approximately three hours were experienced throughout April and May while TEPCO scrambled to find a temporary power solution. The blackouts affected Tokyo, Kanagawa, Eastern Shizuoka, Yamanashi, Chiba, Ibaraki, Saitama, Tochigi, and Gunma prefectures.[222] Voluntary reduced electricity use by consumers in the Kanto area helped reduce the predicted frequency and duration of the blackouts.[223] By 21 March 2011, the number of households in the north without electricity fell to 242,927.[217]

Tōhoku Electric Power was not able to provide the Kanto region with additional power, because TEP's power plants were also damaged in the earthquake. Kansai Electric Power Company (Kepco) cannot share electricity, because its system operates at 60 hertz, whereas TEPCO and TEP operate their systems at 50 hertz; this is due to early industrial and infrastructure development in the 1880s that left Japan without a unified national power grid.[224] Two substations, one in Shizuoka Prefecture and one in Nagano Prefecture, were able to convert between frequencies and transfer electricity from Kansai to Kanto and Tōhoku, but their capacity to do so is limited to 1 GW. With the damage to so many power plants, it may be years before a long-term solution can be found.[225]

In effort to help alleviate the shortage, three steel manufacturers in the Kanto region are contributing electricity produced by their in-house conventional power stations to TEPCO for distribution to the general public. Sumitomo Metal Industries can produce up to 500 MW, JFE Steel 400 MW, and Nippon Steel 500 MW of electric power[226] Auto and auto parts makers in Kanto and Tohoku agreed in May 2011 to operate their factories on Saturdays and Sundays and close on Thursdays and Fridays to assist in alleviating the electricity shortage during the summer of 2011.[227]

[edit] Oil, gas and coal

A 220,000-barrel (35,000 m3)-per-day[228]oil refinery of Cosmo Oil Company was set on fire by the quake at Ichihara, Chiba Prefecture, to the east of Tokyo.[229][230] It was extinguished after ten days, killing[citation needed] or injuring six people, and destroying storage tanks.[231] Others halted production due to safety checks and power loss.[232][233] In Sendai, a 145,000-barrel (23,100 m3)-per-day refinery owned by the largest refiner in Japan, JX Nippon Oil & Energy, was also set ablaze by the quake.[228] Workers were evacuated,[234] but tsunami warnings hindered efforts to extinguish the fire until 14 March, when officials planned to do so.[228]

An analyst estimates that consumption of various types of oil may increase by as much as 300,000 barrels (48,000 m3) per day (as well as LNG), as back-up power plants burning fossil fuels try to compensate for the loss of 11 GW of Japan's nuclear power capacity.[235][236]

The city-owned plant for importing liquefied natural gas in Sendai was severely damaged, and supplies were halted for at least a month.[237]

In addition to refining and storage, several power plants were damaged. These include Sendai #4, New-Sendai #1 and #2, Haranomachi #1 and #2, Hirono #2 and #4 and Hitachinaka #1.[238]

[edit] Nuclear power plants

The Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini, Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant and Tōkai nuclear power stations, consisting of a total eleven reactors, were automatically shut down following the earthquake.[239]Higashidōri, also on the northeast coast, was already shut down for a periodic inspection. Cooling is needed to remove decay heat after a reactor has been shut down, and to maintain spent fuel pools. The backup cooling process is powered by emergency diesel generators at the plants and at Rokkasho nuclear reprocessing plant.[240] At Fukushima Daiichi and Daini tsunami waves overtopped seawalls and destroyed diesel backup power systems, leading to severe problems at Fukushima Daiichi, including three large explosions and radioactive leakage. Over 200,000 people were evacuated.[241]

The 7 April aftershock caused the loss of external power to Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant but backup generators were functional. Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant lost 3 of 4 external power lines and lost cooling function for as much as 80 minutes. A spill of a couple liters of radioactive water occurred at Onagawa.[242]

Europe's Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger addressed the European Parliament on 15 March, explaining that the nuclear disaster was an "apocalypse".[243] As the nuclear crisis entered a second month, experts recognized that Fukushima Daiichi is not the worst nuclear accident ever, but it is the most complicated. Nuclear experts stated that Fukushima will go down in history as the second-worst nuclear accident ever.... while not as bad as Chernobyl disaster, worse than Three Mile Island accident. It could take months or years to learn how damaging the release of dangerous isotopes has been to human health and food supplies, and the surrounding countryside.[244]

Later analysis indicated three reactors (Units 1, 2, and 3) had suffered meltdowns and continued to leak coolant water,[28] and by summer the Vice-minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, the head of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and the head of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, had lost their jobs.[245]

[edit] Fukushima meltdowns

Japan declared a state of emergency following the failure of the cooling system at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, resulting in the evacuation of nearby residents.[246][247][248] Officials from the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency reported that radiation levels inside the plant were up to 1,000 times normal levels,[249] and that radiation levels outside the plant were up to 8 times normal levels.[250] Later, a state of emergency was also declared at the Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant about 11 km (7 mi) south.[251] This brought the total number of problematic reactors to six.[252]

It was reported that radioactive iodine was detected in the tap water in Fukushima, Tochigi, Gunma, Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, and Niigata, and radioactive cesium in the tap water in Fukushima, Tochigi and Gunma.[253][254][255] Radioactive cesium, iodine, and strontium[256] were also detected in the soil in some places in Fukushima. There may be a need to replace the contaminated soil.[257] Many radioactive hotspots were found outside the evacuation zone, including Tokyo.[258] Food products were also found contaminated by radioactive matter in several places in Japan.[259] On 5 April 2011, the government of the Ibaraki Prefecture banned the fishing of sand lance after discovering that this species was contaminated by radioactive cesium above legal limits.[260] As late as July radioactive beef was found for sale at Tokyo markets.[261]

[edit] Incidents elsewhere

A fire occurred in the turbine section of the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant following the earthquake.[240][262] The blaze was in a building housing the turbine, which is sited separately from the plant's reactor,[246] and was soon extinguished.[263] The plant was shut down as a precaution.[264]

On 13 March the lowest-level state of emergency was declared regarding the Onagawa plant as radioactivity readings temporarily[265] exceeded allowed levels in the area of the plant.[266][267] Tohoku Electric Power Co. stated this may have been due to radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accidents but was not from the Onagawa plant itself.[268]

As a result of the 7 April aftershock, Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant lost 3 of 4 external power lines and lost cooling function for as much as 80 minutes. A spill of a couple liters of radioactive water occurred at Onagawa.[242]

The number 2 reactor at Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant was shut down automatically.[239] On 14 March it was reported that a cooling system pump for this reactor had stopped working;[269] however, the Japan Atomic Power Company stated that there was a second operational pump sustaining the cooling systems, but that two of three diesel generators used to power the cooling system were out of order.[270]

[edit] Wind power

None of Japan's commercial wind turbines, totaling over 2300 MW in nameplate capacity, failed as a result of the earthquake and tsunami, including the Kamisu offshore wind farm directly hit by the tsunami.[271]

[edit] Transport

Japan's transport network suffered severe disruptions. Many sections of Tōhoku Expressway serving northern Japan were damaged. The expressway did not reopen to general public use until 24 March 2011.[272][273] All railway services were suspended in Tokyo, with an estimated 20,000 people stranded at major stations across the city.[274] In the hours after the earthquake, some train services were resumed.[275] Most Tokyo area train lines resumed full service by the next day—12 March.[276] Twenty thousand stranded visitors spent the night of 11–12 March inside Tokyo Disneyland.[277]

A tsunami wave flooded Sendai Airport at 15:55 JST,[97] about 1 hour after the initial quake, causing severe damage. Narita and Haneda Airport both briefly suspended operations after the quake, but suffered little damage and reopened within 24 hours.[209] Eleven airliners bound for Narita were diverted to nearby Yokota Air Base.[278][279]

Various train services around Japan were also canceled, with JR East suspending all services for the rest of the day.[280] Four trains on coastal lines were reported as being out of contact with operators; one, a four-car train on the Senseki Line, was found to have derailed, and its occupants were rescued shortly after 8 am the next morning.[281]Minami-Kesennuma Station on the Kesennuma Line was obliterated save for its platform;[282] 62 of 70 (31 of 35) JR East train lines suffered damage to some degree;[205] in the worst-hit areas, 23 stations on 7 lines were washed away, with damage or loss of track in 680 locations and the 30-km radius around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant unable to be assessed.[283]

There were no derailments of Shinkansen bullet train services in and out of Tokyo, but their services were also suspended.[209] The Tōkaidō Shinkansen resumed limited service late in the day and was back to its normal schedule by the next day, while the Jōetsu and Nagano Shinkansen resumed services late on 12 March. Services on Yamagata Shinkansen resumed with limited numbers of trains on 31 March.[284]

The Tōhoku Shinkansen line was worst hit, with JR East estimating that 1,100 sections of the line, varying from collapsed station roofs to bent power pylons, will need repairs. Services on the Tōhoku Shinkansen partially resumed only in Kantō area on 15 March, with one round-trip service per hour between Tokyo and Nasu-Shiobara,[285] and Tōhoku area service partially resumed on 22 March between Morioka and Shin-Aomori.[286] Services on Akita Shinkansen resumed with limited numbers of trains on 18 March.[287] Service between Tokyo and Shin-Aomori was restored by May, but at lower speeds due to ongoing restoration work; the pre-earthquake timetable was not reinstated until late September.[288]

The rolling blackouts brought on by the crises at the nuclear power plants in Fukushima had a profound effect on the rail networks around Tokyo starting on 14 March. Major railways began running trains at 10–20 minute intervals, rather than the usual 3–5 minute intervals, operating some lines only at rush hour and completely shutting down others; notably, the Tokaido Main Line, Yokosuka Line, Sobu Main Line and Chūō-Sōbu Line were all stopped for the day.[289] This led to near-paralysis within the capital, with long lines at train stations and many people unable to come to work or get home. Railway operators gradually increased capacity over the next few days, until running at approximately 80% capacity by 17 March and relieving the worst of the passenger congestion.

[edit] Telecommunications

Cellular and landline phone service suffered major disruptions in the affected area.[290] On the day of the quake, American broadcaster NPR was unable to reach anyone in Sendai with working phone or Internet.[291] Internet services were largely unaffected in areas where basic infrastructure remained, despite the earthquake having damaged portions of several undersea cable systems landing in the affected regions; these systems were able to reroute around affected segments onto redundant links.[292][293] Within Japan, only a few websites were initially unreachable.[294] Several Wi-Fi hotspot providers reacted to the quake by providing free access to their networks,[294] and some American telecommunications and VoIP companies such as AT&T, Sprint, Verizon,[295]T-Mobile[296] and VoIP companies such as netTALK[297] and Vonage[298] have offered free calls to (and in some cases, from) Japan for a limited time, as did Germany's Deutsche Telekom.[299]

[edit] Defense

Matsushima Air Field of the Japan Self-Defense Force in Miyagi Prefecture was struck by the tsunami, flooding the base and resulting in damage to all 18 Mitsubishi F-2 fighter jets of the 21st Fighter Training Squadron.[300][301][302] 12 of the aircraft were scrapped, while the remaining 6 were slated for repair at a cost of 80 billion yen ($1 billion), exceeding the original cost of the aircraft.[303] At the 2nd Regional Headquarters of the Japan Coast Guard in Shiogama, Miyagi, 2 patrol boats were swept away.[304]

[edit] Space center

JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) evacuated the Tsukuba Space Center in Tsukuba, Ibaraki. The Center, which houses a control room for part of the International Space Station, was shut down and some damage was reported.[305][306] The Tsukuba control center resumed full operations for the space station's Kibo laboratory and the HTV cargo craft on 21 March 2011.[307]

[edit] Cultural Properties

754 Cultural Properties were damaged across nineteen prefectures, including five National Treasures (at Zuigan-ji, Ōsaki Hachiman-gū, Shiramizu Amidadō, and Seihaku-ji); 160 Important Cultural Properties (including at Sendai Tōshō-gū, the Kōdōkan, and Entsū-in, with its western decorative motifs); one hundred and forty-four Monuments of Japan (including Matsushima, Takata-matsubara, Yūbikan, and the Site of Tagajō); six Groups of Traditional Buildings; and four Important Tangible Folk Cultural Properties. Stone monuments at the UNESCO World Heritage Site: Shrines and Temples of Nikkō were toppled.[308][309][310] In Tokyo, there was damage to Koishikawa Kōrakuen, Rikugien, Hamarikyū Onshi Teien, and the walls of Edo Castle.[311] Information on the condition of collections held by museums, libraries and archives is still incomplete.[312] There was no damage to the Historic Monuments and Sites of Hiraizumi in Iwate prefecture, and the recommendation for their inscription on the UNESCO World Heritage List in June was seized upon as a symbol of international recognition and recovery.[313]

[edit] Aftermath

The aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami included both a humanitarian crisis and a major economic impact. The tsunami resulted in over 340,000 displaced people in the Tōhoku region, and shortages of food, water, shelter, medicine and fuel for survivors. In response the Japanese government mobilized the Self-Defence Forces, while many countries sent search and rescue teams to help search for survivors. Aid organizations both in Japan and worldwide also responded, with the Japanese Red Cross reporting $1 billion in donations. The economic impact included both immediate problems, with industrial production suspended in many factories, and the longer term issue of the cost of rebuilding which has been estimated at ¥10 trillion ($122 billion). In comparison to the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, the East Japan Earthquake brought serious damage to an extremely wide range.[314]

[edit] Humanitarian response

[edit] Media coverage

Japan's national public broadcaster, NHK, and Japan Satellite Television suspended their usual programming to provide ongoing coverage of the situation.[315] Other nationwide Japanese TV networks also broadcast uninterrupted coverage of the disaster. Ustream Asia broadcast live feeds of NHK, Tokyo Broadcasting System, Fuji TV, TV Asahi, TV Kanagawa, and CNN on the Internet starting on 12 March 2011.[316]YokosoNews, an Internet webcast in Japan, dedicated its broadcast to the latest news gathered from Japanese news stations, translating them in real time to English.[317] All warnings were broadcast by NHK in five languages: Japanese, English, Mandarin, Korean and Portuguese (Japan has small Chinese, Korean and Brazilian populations).[318]

It was noted that the Japanese news media has been at times overly cautious to avoid panic and reliant on confusing statements by experts and officials.[319]

In this national crisis, the Japanese government provided Japanese sign language (JSL) interpreting at the press conferences related to the earthquake and tsunami.[320] Television broadcasts of the press conferences of Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano included simultaneous JSL interpreters standing next to the Japanese flag on the same platform.[321]

According to Jake Adelstein, most Japanese media accepted and parroted the misinformation put out by the Japanese government and TEPCO about the unfolding Fukushima nuclear crisis. Notable exceptions, according to Adelstein, were newspapers Sankei Shimbun and Chunichi Shimbun which questioned the accuracy of the information coming from the government and TEPCO. Because of the unquestioning nature of most Japanese media to hold to the "party line", many Japanese mid-level officials and experts spoke to foreign media to get their opinions and observations publicized.[322]

[edit] Scientific and research response

A large amount of data was collected that provides "the possibility to model in great detail what happened during the rupture of an earthquake."[18] The effect of this data is expected to be felt across other disciplines as well, and this disaster "would provide unprecedented information about how buildings hold up under long periods of shaking – and thus how to build them better.[323]

Seismologists had anticipated that the "big one" would strike the same place as the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake—in the Sagami Trough, southwest of Tokyo.[324][325] Since 1976, when Katsuhiko Ishibashi said a large earthquake in the Suruga Trough was forthcoming, the government tracked plate movements, in preparation for the so-called Tokai earthquake.[326] Occurring 373 km (232 mi) northeast of Tokyo, the Tōhoku earthquake came as a surprise to seismologists, since the Japan Trench was known for creating large quakes, but was not expected to generate quakes above an 8.0 magnitude.[325][326]

[edit] See also

1. ^ In the early days after the earthquake some other names were proposed and used. The Japan Meteorological Agency announced the English name as The 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku Earthquake.[327][328] NHK[329][330] used Tōhoku Kantō Great Earthquake disaster (東北関東大震災, Tōhoku Kantō Daishinsai?); Tōhoku-Kantō Great Earthquake (東北・関東大地震, Tōhoku-Kantō Daijishin?) was used by Kyodo News,[331] Tokyo Shimbun[332] and Chunichi Shimbun;[333]East Japan Giant Earthquake (東日本巨大地震, Higashi Nihon Kyodaijishin?) was used by Yomiuri Shimbun,[334]Nihon Keizai Shimbun[335] and TV Asahi,[336] and East Japan Great Earthquake (東日本大地震, Higashi Nihon Daijishin?) was used by Nippon Television,[337]Tokyo FM[338] and TV Asahi.[339]
2. ^ The 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami has been assigned GLIDE identifier EQ-2011-000028-JPN by the Asian Disaster Reduction Center.[60][61]

[edit] References

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[edit] External links

[edit] Tsunami videos

Minami Sanriku

Miyako

Kamaishi

Kesennuma

Shiogama

Sendai

January February March Sendai, Japan (7.2, Mar 9) Yunnan, China (5.4, Mar 10) Tōhoku, Japan (Great East Japan) (9.0, Mar 11)†‡ Burma (6.8, Mar 24)† April May June July August September October November December † indicates earthquake resulting in at least 30 deaths ‡ indicates the deadliest earthquake of the year

The Blayais Nuclear Power Plant is a nuclear plant on the banks of the Gironde estuary near Blaye, South Western France operated by Électricité de France.

[edit] Description

The power plant has 4 nuclear reactors of PWR technology – pressurized water reactors – producing 951 MW each. They were commissioned from 1981 to 1983. The plant has 1200 EDF employees and 350 permanent workers.[citation needed]

The four reactors produce about 27 TWh per year which totals to 1.5 times more than the electricity needs of the Aquitaine region. Since its commissioning, the Blayais nuclear power plant has produced more than 500 TWh, the equivalent of the French electricity production in one year.[citation needed]

In its 2007 annual report, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) finds overall safety of the power plant as satisfactory but finds that the organization put in place to manage emergencies is robust and the site must be more rigorous in the preparation of interventions.[citation needed]

[edit] Selected incidents

[edit] 2005 spill

In 2005 100,000 US gallons (380 m3) of water spilled out of the plant after 3 days of heavy rainfall causing a Level 3 nuclear hazard in the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), though none of the locals were evacuated.[citation needed]

[edit] 2002 and 2005 seismic incidents

In 2002 and 2003, EDF reported two level 1 incidents on the INES scale about the seismic behavior of certain components of 900 MWe French PWR and the central Blayais.[citation needed]

The incident reported on the 14 October 2002 earthquake advised the keeping of water reservoirs to ensure the cooling of the core in case of accident. The work required to back into compliance plant was completed in December 2005.[citation needed]

The incident on 28 October 2003 reported seismic behavior of piping connected to a tank of water affected by the incident of 14 October 2002.[citation needed]

[edit] 1999 flooding

On evening of December 27, 1999, a combination of the incoming tide and high winds overwhelmed the sea walls at the plant and causing parts of the plant to be flooded.[1] The event resulted in the loss of the plant's off-site power supply and knocked out several safety-related backup systems, resulting in a 'level 2' event on the International Nuclear Event Scale.[2]

At the time, units 1, 2 and 4 were at full power, while unit 3 was shut down for refuelling.[1] The operation of units 1 and 2 were affected by flood damage to a number of water pumps and distribution panels, all four units lost their 225kV power supplies, while units 2 and 4 also lost their 400kV power supplies.[1] Diesel backup generators were employed to maintain power to plants 2 and 4 until the 400kV supply was restored.[1] Over the following days an estimated 90,000 m3 (3,200,000 cu ft) of water was pumped out of the flooded buildings.[1]

On 5 January, the regional newspaper Sud-Ouest ran the following headline without being contradicted:Very close to a major accident, explaining that a catastrophe had been narrowly avoided.[3]

The flooding resulted in fundamental changes to the evaluation of flood risk at nuclear power plants, and in the precautions taken.[4]

In Germany the flooding prompted the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety to order an evaluation of the German nuclear power plants.[1]

[edit] Opposition

The continued operation of the Blayais plant is opposed by the local anti-nuclear group 'TchernoBlaye' (a portmanteau of the French spelling of Chernobyl and Blaye, the nearest town), formed by Stéphane Lhomme on December 15, 1999.[5]

[edit] References

1. ^ a b c d e f Generic Results and Conclusions of Re-evaluating the Flooding in French and German Nuclear Power Plants J. M. Mattéi, E. Vial, V. Rebour, H. Liemersdorf, M. Türschmann, Eurosafe Forum 2001, published 2001, accessed 2011-03-21
2. ^ COMMUNIQUE N°7 - INCIDENT SUR LE SITE DU BLAYAIS ASN, published 1999-12-30, accessed 2011-03-22
3. ^ Sud-Ouest, 5 janvier 2000 - Centrale de Blaye : Très près de l'accident majeur
4. ^ Lessons Learned from 1999 Blayais Flood: Overview of the EDF Flood Risk Management Plan, Eric de Fraguier, EDF, published 2010-03-11, accessed 2011-03-22
5. ^ L'histoire de TchernoBlaye TchernoBlaye, accessed 2011-03-29

[edit] External links

The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is located on the Tennessee River near Decatur and Athens, Alabama, on the north side (right bank) of Wheeler Lake. The nuclear power plant is named after a ferry that operated at the site until the middle of the 20th century. The site has three General Electric boiling water reactor (BWR) nuclear generating units and is owned entirely by the Tennessee Valley Authority. Browns Ferry was TVA's first nuclear power plant; its approval occurred on June 17, 1966 and construction began in September 1966.[1] In 1974, the time of its initial operation, it was the largest nuclear plant in the world. It was the first nuclear plant in the world to generate more than 1 gigawatt of power.[2]

In 2006, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) renewed the licenses for all three reactors, extending them for an additional twenty years.

[edit] Surrounding population

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines two emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants: a plume exposure pathway zone with a radius of 10 miles (16 km), concerned primarily with exposure to, and inhalation of, airborne radioactive contamination, and an ingestion pathway zone of about 50 miles (80 km), concerned primarily with ingestion of food and liquid contaminated by radioactivity.[3]

The 2010 U.S. population within 10 miles (16 km) of Browns Ferry was 39,930, an increase of 12.3 percent in a decade, according to an analysis of U.S. Census data for msnbc.com. The 2010 U.S. population within 50 miles (80 km) was 977,942, an increase of 11.0 percent since 2000. Cities within 50 miles include Huntsville (28 miles to city center).[4]

[edit] Tornado of April 27, 2011

At 5:01 PM on April 27, 2011, all three reactors scrammed due to loss of external power caused by a tornado in the vicinity of the plant. Control rod insertion and cooling procedures operated as designed with no physical damage or release of radiation. Diesel backup generators provided power after a brief period of outage. An NRC Unusual Event, the lowest level of emergency classification, was declared due to loss of power exceeding 15 minutes. Additionally, a small oil leak was found on one generator. Due to widespread transmission grid damage from the storms, Browns Ferry was unable to produce power for the grid and significant blackouts occurred throughout the Southeastern United States.[5][6]

[edit] Unit One

Unit One is a 1,065 MWe BWR built by General Electric. Construction started on Unit One September 12, 1966[1] and originally came online on December 20, 1973. It is licensed to operate through December 20, 2033. However, Unit One was shut down for a year after a fire in 1975 damaged the unit. The unit was subsequently repaired and operated from 1976 through 1985, when all three Browns Ferry units were shut down for operational and management issues. Units Two and Three were restarted in 1991 and 1995, respectively.

Starting in 2002, TVA undertook an effort to restore Unit One to operational status, spending $1.8 billion to do so. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the restart of Unit 1 on May 15, 2007 and the reactor was brought up to criticality on May 22 for the first time since March 3, 1985.[7] During initial testing after restart, on May 24, 2007, a leaky hydraulic control pipe in the turbine hall burst, spilling about 600 gallons of non-radioactive fluid, and the newly restarted reactor was temporarily powered down. Reactor power-up and tests resumed on May 27 and the unit started supplying power to the electricity supply grid on June 2, 2007, reaching full power on June 8. The Browns Ferry restart is expected to pay for itself in five years.[8]

Unit One can generate 1,155 MW of electricity, and TVA plans an uprate to 1,280 MWe for this and the other two reactors.

[edit] Unit One fire

The March 22, 1975 fire started when a worker using a candle to search for air leaks accidentally set a temporary cable seal on fire. At Browns Ferry, foamed plastic, covered on both sides with two coats of a flame retardant paint, was used as a firestop. The fire spread from the temporary seal into the foamed plastic, causing significant damage to the reactor control cabling in the station.[9]

A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission bulletin explained the circumstances of the fire.

The fire started in the cable spreading room at a cable penetration through the wall between the cable spreading room and the reactor building for Unit 1. A slight differential pressure is maintained (by design) across this wall, with the higher pressure being on the cable spreading room side. The penetration seal originally present had been breached to install additional cables required by a design modification. Site personnel were resealing the penetration after cable installation and were checking the airflow through a temporary seal with a candle flame prior to installing the permanent sealing material. The temporary sealing material was highly combustible, and caught fire. Efforts were made by the workers to extinguish the fire at its origin, but they apparently did not recognize that the fire, under the influence of the draft through the penetration, was spreading on the reactor building side of the wall. The extent of the fire in the cable spreading room was limited to a few feet from the penetration; however, the presence of the fire on the other side of the wall from the point of ignition was not recognized until significant damage to cables related to the control of Units 1 and 2 had occurred.[10]

This later resulted in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission making significant additions to the standards for fire protection through the publication of 10CFR50.48 and Appendix R. According to the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, the newly-restarted Unit One does not comply with these standards. Unit Three was not affected by the accident. This event was pivotal not just for firestopping in the nuclear field, but also in commercial and industrial construction. While the nuclear field went to installations of silicone foam, a wider array of firestops became prevalent in non-nuclear construction.

In a 2005 analysis of significant nuclear safety occurrences in the US, the NRC concluded that the fire at Browns Ferry was the most likely (excluding the actual Three Mile Island accident) "precursor" incident to have led to a nuclear accident in the event of a subsequent failure.[11]

[edit] Unit Two

Unit Two is a 1,113 MWe BWR built by General Electric which originally came online on August 2, 1974, and is licensed to operate through June 28, 2034. Unit Two generated 8.911261 TW-h of electricity in 2003, achieving a capacity factor of 94.1%.

During a drought in August 2007, Unit Two was shut down for one day because water temperature in the Tennessee River rose too high for the water to be used for cooling and then discharged back into the river.[12]

Beginning in 2005 Unit 2 was loaded with BLEU (Blended Low Enriched Uranium) recovered by the DOE from weapons programs. This fuel contains quantities of U-236 and other contaminants because it was made from reprocessed fuel from weapons program reactors and therefore has slightly different characteristics when used in a reactor as compared to fresh uranium fuel. By making use of this fuel which would otherwise have been disposed of as waste the TVA is saving millions of dollars in fuel costs and accumulating a database of recycled uranium reactions in LWR use.[13]

[edit] Unit Three

Unit Three is a 1,113 MWe BWR built by General Electric which originally came online on August 18, 1976, and is licensed to operate through July 2, 2036. Unit Three generated 9.260078 TW·h, achieving a capacity factor of 99%.

[edit] Seismic risk

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's estimate of the risk each year of an earthquake intense enough to cause core damage to the reactor at Browns Ferry was: Reactor 1: 1 in 270,270; Reactors 2 and 3: 1 in 185,185, according to an NRC study published in August 2010.[14][15]

[edit] References

1. ^ a b "TVA timeline by year". Tennessee Valley Authority. http://tva.com/75th/pdf/tva_timeline_by_year.pdf. Retrieved 5 August 2009. 
2. ^ "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant". Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). http://www.tva.gov/sites/brownsferry.htm. Retrieved 2008-11-18. 
3. ^ http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/emerg-plan-prep-nuc-power-bg.html
4. ^ Bill Dedman, Nuclear neighbors: Population rises near US reactors, msnbc.com, April 14, 2011 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42555888/ns/us_news-life/ Accessed May 1, 2011.
5. ^ NRC: Event Notification Report for April 28, 2011
6. ^ TVA: Power Restoration Updates
7. ^ [1][dead link]
8. ^ Blair, Elliot (2007-07-09). "New Reactor Costs Daunt U.S. Utilities as TVA Restarts Old Unit". Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=agGMCRlWdMyU&refer=us. Retrieved 2011-03-28. 
9. ^ Fisher, Brad (April 4, 1979). "Nuclear risk-benefit ratio needs a much closer look". The Tuscaloosa News. http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=bGstAAAAIBAJ&sjid=U4oFAAAAIBAJ&pg=6822,845656&dq=. 
10. ^ "IE Bulletin No. - 75-04A: Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant". United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. April 3, 1975. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/bulletins/1975/bl75004a.html. 
11. ^ Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "NRC Commission Document SECY-05-0192 Attachment 2" (PDF). http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2005/secy2005-0192/attachment2.pdf. Retrieved 2008-01-28. 
12. ^ Mitch Weiss, Drought Could Force Nuclear Plants to Shut Down, Associated Press, January 23, 2008, retrieved from WRAL-TV website, April 7, 2009
13. ^ TVA press release[dead link]
14. ^ Bill Dedman, "What are the odds? US nuke plants ranked by quake risk," msnbc.com, March 17, 2011 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42103936/ Accessed April 19, 2011.
15. ^ http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/quake%20nrc%20risk%20estimates.pdf

[edit] External links

Media related to Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant at Wikimedia Commons

Chapelcross was a Magnox nuclear power plant located near the town of Annan in Dumfries and Galloway in south west Scotland. It was the sister plant to Calder Hall in Cumbria, England, both commissioned and originally operated by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.

The primary purpose of both plants was to produce weapons-grade plutonium for the UK's nuclear weapons programme, but they also generated electrical power for the National Grid.

[edit] Location

Chapelcross occupies a 92 hectare site on the location of former World War II training airfield, RAF Annan, located 3 km north east of the town of Annan in the Annandale and Eskdale district within the Dumfries and Galloway region of south west Scotland. The nearest hamlet is Creca.

[edit] History

Chapelcross was the sister plant to Calder Hall in Cumbria, England. Construction was carried out by Mitchell Construction and was completed in 1959.[1] The primary purpose was to produce plutonium for the UK's nuclear weapons programme (see WE.177). Electricity was always considered to be a by-product.

The Chapelcross Works was officially opened on 2 May, 1959 by the Lord Lieutenant of Dumfriesshire, Sir John Crabbe. It was initially owned and operated by the Production Group of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) until the creation of British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) in 1971 by an act of Parliament. The site then operated in conjunction with Calder Hall under the banner of BNFL’s Electricity Generation Business (EGB) until rebranding, relicensing and restructuring of the various nuclear businesses operated by HM Government under the umbrella legal entity of BNFL took place in April 2005.

Chapelcross had four Magnox reactors capable of generating 60 MWe of power each.[2] The reactors were supplied by the UKAEA and the turbines by C.A. Parsons & Company.[2]

Ownership of all of the site’s assets and liabilities was transferred to The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), a new regulatory body created as a result of The Energy Act of 2004. The site was then operated under the two-tier Site Management Company/Site License Company (SMC/SLC) model by British Nuclear Group’s Reactor Sites business as SMC and Magnox Electric Ltd as the SLC. In June 2007, EnergySolutions LLC bought the Reactor Sites Management Company Ltd (consisting of two operational divisions, Magnox North and Magnox South) from British Nuclear Group.

Several significant events in 2001 persuaded BNFL to upgrade the fuel routes of both Calder Hall and Chapelcross to near modern standards at a cost of tens of millions of pounds to guarantee that a License Instrument would be granted by the NII to permission final defuelling: the engineering work is being carried out by BNS Nuclear Services (Formally Alstec).[3]

Generation ceased in June 2004.

[edit] Decommissioning and the cooling towers

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) granted consent to carry out decommissioning projects at Chapelcross under the regulations to Magnox Electric Ltd on 26 September 2005. The first visible sign of decommissioning was controlled demolition at 09.00 BST on 20 May 2007 of the four natural draught concrete cooling towers of the same hyperboloid design as conventional inland power stations such as Didcot, Drax, Ferrybridge and Fiddlers Ferry. The explosions were designed to remove a section of the cooling towers’ shells. Approximately two thirds of the circumference and two thirds of the shell legs were removed by the blasts, causing a controlled collapse of each tower. The charges were fired sequentially, reducing the 300 ft (91 m) high towers to an estimated 25,000 tons of rubble in less than 10 seconds. Those at Calder Hall were demolished on 29 September 2007.

Some local people (including site employees) were opposed to the obliteration of such a proud symbol of the region’s industrial heritage and contribution to the local economy and national defence. The towers were considered a local landmark that could be seen from a distance of up to fifty miles in good weather conditions. British Nuclear Group and the NDA prioritised conventional demolition over deplanting and post-operational clean-out (POCO) of the nuclear facilities on the site. A large part of the shell of tower 1 managed to resist the explosives despite having a visible bulge that resulted from a construction anomaly.[4]

[edit] Plant design

The plant design was essentially the same as Calder Hall comprising four 180 MW(th) graphite moderated, carbon dioxide cooled nuclear reactors fuelled by natural abundance uranium (0.71% 235U) enclosed in magnesium-alloy cans; the principal difference being in plant layout. Since Chapelcross was commissioned from the outset as a four reactor site (the option for a further four reactors was not exercised) rather than separate two-reactor sites as at Calder ‘A’ and ‘B’ stations, the site layout was more compact. There is a single turbine hall housing all eight turbines which were originally rated at 23 MW(e) but progressively uprated to 30 MW(e) as the reactor thermal output was uprated to nominally 265 MW(th).

Reactor 1 had the same core design as Calder Hall (i.e. unsleeved), but the fuel channels of Reactors 2, 3 and 4 were fitted with graphite sleeves to allow the bulk moderator to run some 80°C hotter to limit the effects of in-service graphite damage due to irradiation. Two of the reactors were used to produce tritium for the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent and therefore required enriched uranium fuel to offset the neutron absorbing effect of the lithium target material.

[edit] Layout and facilities

The south part of the site consists of a modular administration building, four reactor buildings, turbine hall, maintenance workshops, stores, fuel element cooling pond building, tritium processing plant (CXPP) and new flask handling facility (FHB). The part of the site referred to as north site consists of legacy buildings including aircraft hangars, a graphite handling laboratory and a large building that originally housed some 10,000 drums of yellow Magnox Depleted Uranium (MDU) trioxide arising from reprocessing at Sellafield.

Liquid effluent is disposed of via a 5 km long pipeline to the Solway Firth. All environmental discharges are subject to an annual discharge authorisation which is regulated by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA).

Chapelcross produced tritium for the Polaris and Trident strategic nuclear deterrents from about 1980 until 2005. This was achieved by neutron bombardment of lithium target material and the tritium gas extracted in the Chapelcross Processing Plant (CXPP). This facility was managed by BNFL on behalf of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The material was transferred to Aldermaston via secure road convoys. Because of involvement in the defence programme, the site was not subject to international safeguards until 1998.

[edit] Operating experience and incidents

All information presented below is in the public domain and external hyperlinked references to official reports and information are included where available.

[edit] Charge pan movement relative to the core (September 2001)

Because of known shrinkage of the graphite moderator bricks in the core due to in-service irradiation effects, some of the steel charge pans on top of them had become dislocated from their design position in the interstitial channel and were suspended from the Burst Can Detection (BCD) pipework. This was most prevalent in Reactor 1 because of the different core design to Reactors 2, 3 and 4. BNFL were unable to make an adequate safety case or effect an economic repair and therefore, Reactor 1 did not return to power from its annual outage in August 2001. The core of Reactor 4 was repaired but this reactor did not return to power after the repair.[5]

[edit] Dropped basket of irradiated fuel elements (July 2001)

During routine defuelling activities on Reactor 3, a basket containing twenty-four low rated irradiated Magnox fuel elements fell a few feet within the discharge machine onto the door at the top of the fuel discharge well. Remote TV camera inspections revealed that twelve of the elements had fallen just over 80ft (24.4m) down the discharge well into a water filled transport flask at the bottom. The NII initiated an investigation because dropping irradiated fuel elements is a serious issue even when, as in this event, BNFL had advised NII that there had been no release of radiological activity.[6]

[edit] Leak of Magnox depleted uranium trioxide (July 2001)

A small amount of Magnox Depleted Uranium leaked from some corroded mild steel drums due to rainwater ingress and leaching. MDU is a dense yellow powder that is less radiologically toxic than naturally occurring uranium but chemotoxic in a similar manner to lead. Owing to its high density and low solubility, it does not tend to disperse far and dry spills are easy to clean up. This material was stored at the larger sites, including Capenhurst in mild steel drums. BNFL has upgraded the fabric of the building and the original drums are being overpacked into stainless steel drums and dispatched to Capenhurst for long-term storage.[5]

[edit] Exposure of worker to an irradiated fuel element (First Quarter 2001)

During refuelling operations on Reactor 2, an irradiated fuel element failed to release from the grab (this is used to hold an element while it is withdrawn from a reactor). Routine methods were used to release the grab. However, the irradiated fuel element snagged during the operation and was lifted out of its shielding resulting in the operators on the pile cap being exposed to the intense radiation being emitted from the irradiated fuel element. Personnel responded quickly, and the radiological dose they received was small.

The event revealed shortfalls in the safety of the refuelling operation and the licensee took the immediate step of halting all refuelling operations while it investigated the event and reviewed the safety of the equipment. The NII investigated the event and judged that it was due to inadequate design and operation of the equipment.

The incident was classified as Level 1 (anomaly) on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).[7]

[edit] Boiler shell defect (June 1997)

Cracks associated with brackets in Heat Exchanger 6 on Reactor 2 were discovered during routine ultrasonic testing. Metallurgical examination of samples of the defect showed that:

• (a) it originated during fabrication in the workshop and prior to an over-pressure test of 2.35 times the design pressure (a loading significantly in excess of a modern pressure vessel code requirement).
• (b) there was no evidence of in-service fatigue crack growth.
• (c) The material in which the crack was located was different from that specified in the design. Similar material was also identified in other heat exchangers, and no additional cracks of structural significance were revealed during comprehensive inspections. The NII considered the material to be adequate and within the bounds of the heat exchanger safety case.[8][9]

[edit] Fatal accident (ca. 1978)

Response reference 120714 in House of Commons Hansard written answers for 5 May 2000 (pt 5) shows that BNFL was fined £200 in 1978 for a fatal accident at Chapelcross.[10]

[edit] Single channel fuel clad melt (May 1967)

Fuel in a single channel in Reactor 2 that was loaded with fuel elements under evaluation for the commercial reactor programme experienced a partial blockage, attributed to the presence of graphite debris (see fuel element failure). The fuel overheated and the Magnox cladding failed, causing contamination to be deposited in one region of the core. The reactor was restarted in 1969 after successful clean-out operations and was the final reactor to cease operation in February 2004.

[edit] References

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is a nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, the United States. It has a single pressurized water reactor, also referred to as a light water reactor. As of 2011, it is operated by the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company subsidiary of FirstEnergy Corp.

On March 5, 2002, maintenance workers discovered that corrosion had eaten a football-sized hole into the reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse plant. Although the corrosion did not lead to an accident, this was considered to be a serious nuclear safety incident.[1][2] The Nuclear Regulatory Commission kept Davis-Besse shut down until March 2004, so that FirstEnergy was able to perform all the necessary maintenance for safe operations. The NRC imposed its largest fine ever -- more than $5 million -- against FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion. The company paid an additional $28 million in fines under a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice.[1]

According to the NRC, Davis-Besse has been the source of two of the top five most dangerous nuclear incidents in the United States since 1979.[3]

[edit] Location and history

The power station is located on the southwest shore of Lake Erie about 10 miles (16 km) north of Oak Harbor, Ohio and is on the north side of Highway 2 just east of Highway 19 on a 954-acre (386 ha) site in the Carroll Township. The plant only utilizes 221 acres (89 ha), with 733 acres (297 ha) devoted to the Ottawa National Wildlife Refuge. The entrance to the Magee Marsh Wildlife Area[4] is less than a mile east of the power station. The official name according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration is the Davis-Besse Nuclear Generating Station. It is the 57th commercial power reactor to commence building in the United States of America (construction began on September 1, 1970) and the 50th to come on-line July 31, 1978.[5] The plant was originally jointly owned by Cleveland Electric Illuminating (CEI) and Toledo Edison (TE) and was named for former TE Chairman John K. Davis and former CEI Chairman Ralph M. Besse.

[edit] Unit One

Unit One is an 879 MWe pressurized water reactor supplied by Babcock and Wilcox. The reactor was shut down from 2002 until early 2004 for safety repairs and upgrades, so recent operational statistics are not yet available for the unit.[citation needed]

[edit] Incident history

[edit] 1977 first stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve

On September 24, 1977, the reactor, running at only 9% power, shut down because of a disruption in the feedwater system.[6] This caused the relief valve for the pressurizer to stick open. As of 2005, the NRC considers this to be the fourth highest ranked safety incident.[7]

[edit] 1985 loss of feedwater event

On June 9, 1985, the main feedwater pumps, used to supply water to the reactor steam generators, shut down. A control room operator then attempted to start the auxiliary (emergency) feedwater pumps. These pumps both tripped on overspeed conditions because of operator error. This incident was originally classified an "NRC Unusual Event" (the lowest classification the NRC uses) but it was later determined that it should have been classified a "site area emergency".[8]

[edit] 1998 tornado

On June 24, 1998 the station was struck by an F2 tornado.[9] The plant's switchyard was damaged and access to external power was disabled. The plant's reactor automatically shut down at 8:43 pm and an alert (the next to lowest of four levels of severity) was declared at 9:18 pm. The plant's emergency diesel generators powered critical facility safety systems until external power could be restored.[10][11]

[edit] 2002 reactor head hole

In March 2002, plant staff discovered that the borated water that serves as the reactor coolant had leaked from cracked control rod drive mechanisms directly above the reactor and eaten through more than six inches[12] (150 mm) of the carbon steel reactor pressure vessel head over an area roughly the size of a football (see photo). This significant reactor head wastage on the interior of the reactor vessel head left only 3⁄8 inches (9.5 mm) of stainless steel cladding holding back the high-pressure (~2500 psi, 17 MPa) reactor coolant. A breach most likely would have resulted in a mass loss-of-coolant accident, in which superheated, superpressurized reactor coolant would have jetted into the reactor's containment building and resulted in emergency safety procedures to protect from core damage or meltdown. Because of the location of the reactor head damage, such a jet of reactor coolant might have damaged adjacent control rod drive mechanisms, hampering or preventing reactor shut-down. As part of the system reviews following the accident, significant safety issues were identified with other critical plant components, including the following:

1. the containment sump that allows the reactor coolant to be reclaimed and reinjected into the reactor;
2. the high pressure injection pumps that would reinject such reclaimed reactor coolant;
3. the emergency diesel generator system;
4. the containment air coolers that would remove heat from the containment building;
5. reactor coolant isolation valves; and
6. the plant's electrical distribution system.[13]

The resulting corrective operational and system reviews and engineering changes took two years. Repairs and upgrades cost $600 million, and the Davis-Besse reactor was restarted in March 2004.[14]

The U.S. Justice Department investigated and penalized the owner of the plant over safety and reporting violations related to the incident. The company paid $28 million in fines under a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice.[1] The NRC determined that this incident was the fifth most dangerous nuclear incident in the United States since 1979.[3] The NRC imposed its largest fine ever -- more than $5 million -- against FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion.[1]

[edit] 2003 Slammer worm

In January of 2003 the private network became infected with the slammer worm, which resulted in a five hour loss of safety monitoring at the plant [15][16]

[edit] 2006 Criminal prosecutions

On January 20, 2006, the owner of Davis-Besse, FirstEnergy Corporation of Akron, Ohio, acknowledged a series of safety violations by former workers, and entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice. The deferred prosecution agreement relates to the March 2002 incident (see above). The deferment granted by the NRC were based on letters from Davis-Besse engineers stating that previous inspections were adequate. However, those inspections were not as thorough as the company suggested, and as proved by the material deficiency discovered later. In any case, because FirstEnergy cooperated with investigators on the matter, they were able to avoid more serious penalties. Therefore, the company agreed to pay fines of $23.7 million, with an additional $4.3 million to be contributed to various groups, including the National Park Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Habitat for Humanity, and the University of Toledo as well as to pay some costs related to the federal investigation.[17]

Two former employees and one former contractor were indicted for statements made in multiple documents and one videotape, over several years, for hiding evidence that the reactor pressure vessel was being corroded by boric acid. The maximum penalty for the three is 25 years in prison. The indictment mentions that other employees also provided false information to inspectors, but does not name them.[17][18]

[edit] 2008 Discovery of tritium leak

The NRC and Ohio EPA were notified of a tritium leak accidentally discovered during an unrelated fire inspection on October 22, 2008. Preliminary indications suggest radioactive water did not infiltrate groundwater outside plant boundaries.[19]

[edit] 2010 Replacement reactor head problems

After the 2002 incident, Davis-Besse purchased a used replacement head from a mothballed reactor in Midland, Michigan. Davis-Besse operators replaced the original corroded reactor head before restarting in 2004. On March 12, 2010, during a scheduled refueling outage, ultrasonic examinations performed on the control rod drive mechanism nozzles penetrating the reactor vessel closure head identified that two of the nozzles inspected did not meet acceptance criteria. FirstEnergy investigators subsequently found new cracks in 24 of 69 nozzles, including one serious enough to leak boric acid. Root cause analysis is currently underway by the Department of Energy, First Energy, and the NRC to determine the cause of the premature failures.[20][21] Crack indications required repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. Control rod drive nozzles were repaired using techniques proven at other nuclear facilities. The plant resumed operation in 2010. The existing reactor vessel head was scheduled for replacement in 2011.[22]

[edit] 2011 Shield Building cracks

An October 2011 shutdown of the plant for maintenance revealed a 30 foot long hairline crack in the concrete shield building around the containment vessel.[23]

[edit] 2012 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Pinhole Leak

On June 6, 2012, an approximately 0.1 gpm pinhole spray leakage was identified from a weld in a seal of the Reactor Coolant Pump during a routine Reactor Coolant System walkdown inspection. The plant has entered limited operations, and root cause analysis is underway. [24]

[edit] Future

The facility's original nuclear operating license expires on April 22, 2017. On August 11, 2006 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) submitted a letter of intent (Adams Accession No. ML062290261).[25] The submission date for the application is August 10, 2010. This initiates a long process that results in an application approval or revocation. Public hearings[26] are a vital part of any application review and information on this process can be found on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) website at NRC.gov. [6]. The site map contains many valuable links [27]

[edit] Seismic risk

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's estimate of the risk each year of an earthquake intense enough to cause core damage to the reactor at Davis-Besse was 1 in 149,254, according to an NRC study published in August 2010.[28][29]

[edit] Surrounding population

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines two emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants: a plume exposure pathway zone with a radius of 10 miles (16 km), concerned primarily with exposure to, and inhalation of, airborne radioactive contamination, and an ingestion pathway zone of about 50 miles (80 km), concerned primarily with ingestion of food and liquid contaminated by radioactivity.[30]

The 2010 U.S. population within 10 miles (16 km) of Davis-Besse was 18,635, an increase of 14.2 percent in a decade, according to an analysis of U.S. Census data for msnbc.com. The 2010 U.S. population within 50 miles (80 km) was 1,791,856, an increase of 1.4 percent since 2000. Cities within 50 miles (80 km) include Sandusky, Ohio, 22 miles (35 km); Toledo, Ohio 26 miles (42 km); and Detroit, Michigan, 50 miles (80 km) (distance to the city centers).[31] U.S. Census data for Canadian population within the area is not available, though Leamington, Ontario is 39 miles (63 km) away, and Windsor, Ontario (population: 230,000) is 49 miles (79 km) from Davis-Besse.

[edit] See Also

[edit] References

1. ^ a b c d NRC (September 2009). "Fact Sheet on Improvements Resulting From Davis-Besse Incident". NRC Fact Sheet. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-davis-besse-improv.html. 
2. ^ United States Government Accountability Office (2006). "Report to Congress". p. 1. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061029.pdf. 
3. ^ a b Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2004-09-16). "Davis-Besse preliminary accident sequence precursor analysis" (PDF). http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/vessel-head-degradation/news/2004/09-16-04-ml0426005320.pdf. Retrieved 2006-06-14.  and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2004-09-20). "NRC issues preliminary risk analysis of the combined safety issues at Davis-Besse". http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2004/04-117.html. Retrieved 2006-06-14. 
4. ^ [1] - Magee Marsh Wildlife Area
5. ^ Energy Information Administration (November 2004). "U.S. Nuclear Reactor List - Operational" (XLS). http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc_reactors/operational.xls. Retrieved 2006-06-14. 
6. ^ Walker, Samuel J. (2004) Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. p 68.
7. ^ Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "NRC Commission Document SECY-05-0192 Attachment 2" (PDF). http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2005/secy2005-0192/attachment2.pdf. Retrieved 2008-01-28. 
8. ^ Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Information Notice 85-80". http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1985/in85080.html. Retrieved 2006-06-14. 
9. ^ United States Senate. "U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works Hearing Statements". http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=248112. Retrieved 2006-07-07. 
10. ^ Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "News Release III-98-040". http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps11598/www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/1998/98-40iii.html. Retrieved 2006-07-07. 
11. ^ Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "News Announcement RIII-98-40a". http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps11598/www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/1998/98-40aiii.html. Retrieved 2006-06-14. 
12. ^ NRC NUREG/BR-0353, Rev 1, pg 4
13. ^ Cleveland Plain Dealer, Problems and solutions, July 16, 2003
14. ^ NRC. EA-05-071 - Davis-Besse. April 21, 2005.
15. ^ The Register [2] 2003-08-20
16. ^ Security Focus [3] 2003-08-19
17. ^ a b United States Department of Justice (2006-01-20). "Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company to Pay $28 Million Relating to Operation of Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station". http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/January/06_enrd_029.html. Retrieved 2006-06-14.  and "Deferred prosecution agreement between the United States of America and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company" (PDF). 2006-01-20. http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/fenco_000.pdf. Retrieved 2006-06-14. 
18. ^ Toledo Blade "Ex-engineer found guilty of concealing Davis-Besse dangers"
19. ^ Davis-Besse radioactive leak is fixed
20. ^ Toledo Blade, May 15, 2010 "Meeting set to discuss Besse reactor-head flaws"
21. ^ Toledo Blade, May 4, 2010 "8 more nozzles at Davis-Besse found to be flawed"
22. ^ Funk, John (21 June 2010), "FirstEnergy to replace lid on Davis-Besse nuclear power plant", Cleveland Live, http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2010/06/firstenergy_to_place_lid_on_da.html, retrieved 21 January 2011 
23. ^ "Davis-Besse's restart proper, company, NRC officials say", Toledo Blade, 6 January 2012, http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2012/01/06/David-Besse-s-restart-proper-company-NRC-officials-say.html, retrieved 14 January 2012 
24. ^ NRC Event Report 48000, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2012/20120607en.html#en48000, retrieved 8 June 2012 
25. ^ [4][dead link] -FENOC letter of intent for license renewal.
26. ^ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "NRC public hearings in 2010"
27. ^ [5] - NRC site map
28. ^ Bill Dedman, "What are the odds? US nuke plants ranked by quake risk," msnbc.com, March 17, 2011 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42103936/ Accessed April 19, 2011.
29. ^ http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/quake%20nrc%20risk%20estimates.pdf
30. ^ http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/emerg-plan-prep-nuc-power-bg.html
31. ^ Bill Dedman, Nuclear neighbors: Population rises near US reactors, msnbc.com, April 14, 2011 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42555888/ns/us_news-life/ Accessed May 1, 2011.

[edit] External links

The Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station is a nuclear power plant on the shore of Lake Erie near Monroe, in Frenchtown Charter Township, Michigan. It is approximately halfway between Detroit, Michigan, and Toledo, Ohio. It is also visible from parts of Amherstburg and Colchester, Ontario as well as on the shore of Lake Erie in Ottawa County, Ohio. Two units have been constructed on this site. The first unit's construction started in 1963, and the second unit reached criticality in 1988.

The plant is named after the Italian nuclear physicist Enrico Fermi, most noted for his work on the development of the first nuclear reactor as well as many other major contributions to nuclear physics. Fermi won the 1938 Nobel Prize in Physics for his work on induced radioactivity.

On October 5, 1966, Fermi 1, a prototype fast breeder reactor, suffered a partial fuel meltdown, although no radioactive material was released. After repairs it was shut down by 1972.[1]

On August 8, 2008, John McCain was taken on a 45-minute tour of the plant, becoming the first actively campaigning presidential candidate to visit a nuclear plant.[2]

[edit] Fermi 1

The 94 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor Fermi 1 unit under construction and development at the site from 1957 to 1972. On October 5, 1966 Fermi 1 suffered a partial fuel meltdown. According to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, there was no abnormal radiation release to the environment.[3]

The main cause of the temperature increase was a blockage in one of the spigots that allowed the flow of cooled liquid sodium into the reactor. The blockage caused an insufficient amount of coolant to enter; this was not noticed by the operators until the core temperature alarms sounded. Several fuel rod subassemblies reached high temperatures of around 700 °F (370 °C) (with an expected range near 580 °F, 304 °C), causing them to melt.[3]

Following an extended shutdown that involved fuel replacement, repairs to vessel, and cleanup, Fermi 1 continued to operate intermittently until September 22, 1972, but was never again able to reach a fully operational state. It was officially decommissioned December 31, 1975. It is currently in SAFSTOR with a gradual "final" decommissioning in progress.[3]

A number of accounts of the accident are available. There is some debate about whether the details of the accident as written in the book Fermi-1 New Age for Nuclear Power[4] and published by the American Nuclear Society in 1979 are completely accurate. Several of the claims in the ANS's account are contradicted by certain parts of We Almost Lost Detroit, a book written by local Detroit newsman John Grant Fuller (subtitled "This Is Not A Novel").[5] The book Normal Accidents, written by Yale professor Charles Perrow, describes this accident in more details.

[edit] Fermi 2

Fermi 2 is a 1,098 net MWe General Electric boiling water reactor owned by DTE Energy and operated by subsidiary Detroit Edison. It was opened in January 1988 and is currently in operation.[6]

On June 6, 2010 a tornado touched down and damaged the Fermi 2 generator building and forced an automatic shutdown. The tornados damaged electrical transmission and distribution infrastructure in the area leaving over 30,000 people without power in the area.[7] The plant is connected to two single-circuit 345 kV Transmission Lines and 3 120 kV lines. They are operated and maintained by ITC Transmission.

[edit] Fermi 3

In September 2008, Detroit Edison filed an application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a Combined Construction and Operating License (COL) for a third reactor.[8] The new unit is supposed to be built on the same site, slightly to the southwest of Fermi 2. The reactor design selected is the 1,520 MWe GE-designed passive Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR). Review of the 17,000-page application could take four years, after which construction could take six years. The cost is estimated at as much as $10 billion.[9] CEO Anthony Earley said that DTE's analysis "so far shows that nuclear power will, over the long term, be the most cost-effective baseload option for our customers, ... We expect nuclear to remain the low-cost option, but we will continue to evaluate nuclear against other resources and will commit to proceeding with construction only at the right time and at the right cost".[10]

In March 2009, a coalition of citizen groups asked federal regulators to reject plans for Fermi 3, contending that it would pose a range of threats to public health and the environment. The groups have filed 14 contentions with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, claiming that a new plant would pose "radioactive, toxic and thermal impacts on Lake Erie's vulnerable western basin."[11][12]

This proposed plant should not be confused with the original Fermi 3 project which was to be a companion unit identical to Fermi 2. The original Fermi 3 was ordered in 1972 and cancelled in 1974. See DOE data page 67 and WNA Fermi 3 data.

[edit] Ownership

The plant is operated by the Detroit Edison Company and owned (100 percent) by DTE Energy.

[edit] Seismic risk

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's estimate of the risk each year of an earthquake intense enough to cause core damage to the reactor at Fermi was 1 in 238,095, according to an NRC study published in August 2010.[13][14]

[edit] Reactor data

The Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station consist of one operational reactor, one closed unit and one additional is planned.

Reactor unit[15]	Reactor type	Capacity	Construction started	Electricity grid connection	Commercial operation	Shutdown
Net	Gross
Enrico Fermi-1	FBR	61 MW	65 MW	01/08/1956	05/08/1966		11/29/1972
Enrico Fermi-2	BWR-4	1106 MW	1154 MW	09/26/1972	09/21/1986	01/23/1988
Enrico Fermi-3 (planned)[16]	ESBWR	1520 MW	MW

1. ^ http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/power-reactor/enrico-fermi-atomic-power-plant-unit-1.html
2. ^ NucNet. McCain Reiterates Support For Nuclear During Enrico Fermi Visit. August 8, 2008.
3. ^ a b c NRC "Fermi, Unit 1", NRC Website, 3 February 2011, accessed 17 March 2011.
4. ^ ISBN 0-89448-017-0
5. ^ Originally published 1975 by Reader's Digest Press, republished 1984 by Berkley, ISBN 0-425-06700-9
6. ^ NRC "Fermi, Unit 2", NRC Website, 13 January 2011, accessed 17 March 2011.
7. ^ Toledo On the Move News 6 June 2010
8. ^ "Fermi, Unit 3 Application". U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 2008-09-19. http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/fermi.html. Retrieved 2008-09-19. 
9. ^ Lam, Tina (2008-09-19). "DTE applies for another nuclear plant". Detroit Free Press. http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080919/NEWS05/809190398. Retrieved 2008-09-19. [dead link]
10. ^ Dolley, Steven (2008-09-18). "Detroit Edison files with NRC for license to build new nuke unit". Platts Nucleonics Week (McGraw-Hill). http://www.platts.com/Nuclear/News/6953788.xml?src=Nuclearrssheadlines1. Retrieved 2008-09-19. 
11. ^ Groups petition against new nuclear plant
12. ^ Fermi 3 opposition takes legal action to block new nuclear reactor
13. ^ Bill Dedman, "What are the odds? US nuke plants ranked by quake risk," msnbc.com, March 17, 2011 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42103936/ Accessed April 19, 2011.
14. ^ http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/quake%20nrc%20risk%20estimates.pdf
15. ^ Power Reactor Information System of the IAEA: „United States of America: Nuclear Power Reactors- Alphabetic“
16. ^ Power Reactor Information System of the IAEA: „Nuclear Power Reactor Details - ENRICO FERMI-3“

[edit] References

• We Almost Lost Detroit, John G. Fuller, Ballantine Books, 1976
• Normal Accident, Charles Perrow, Basic Books, 1984

[edit] External links

• Public Comments "Public Comments at the meeting re: FERMI 3 with the NRC. This includes youtube videos of speakers calling for an end to the new nuclear reactor project. Featured are a Professor from the U of M, Don't Waste Michigan members, Sierra Club members, and other concerned citizens."

The Fessenheim Nuclear Power Plant is located in the Fessenheim commune in the Haut-Rhin department in Alsace in north-eastern France, 15 km (9.3 mi) north east of the Mulhouse urban area,[1] within 1.5 km (0.93 mi) of the border with Germany, and approximately 40 km (25 mi) from Switzerland. Nearly 100,000 people live within 20 km (12 mi) of the plant,[2] which is located in the third most densely populated region in Metropolitan France and in the centre of the European Backbone. As of March 2011, it is the oldest operational nuclear power plant in France.[3][4]

There have been ongoing concerns about the seismic safety of the plant and, following the 2011 Fukushima I nuclear accidents, on March 21 the local Information and Oversight Commission for the plant called for the seismic risk to be re-evaluated based on a 7.2 magnitude earthquake; the plant was originally designed for a 6.7 magnitude earthquake.[4] The Swiss cantons of Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft and Jura have also said that they are to going to ask the French government to suspend the operation of Fessenheim while undertaking a safety review based on the lessons learned from Japan.[5] The German state of Baden-Württemberg has called for a temporary closure in line with the 3-month shut down of pre-1981 plants ordered in Germany.[6] On March 29 the Franche-Comté Regional Council went further and voted for the plant to be closed, the first time a French Regional Council has passed such a vote.[7] On April 6 the Grand Council of Basel-Stadt also voted for the plant to be closed[8] as did the council of the Urban Community of Strasbourg on April 12.[9][10] The European Parliament's Green members are also supporting the closure demands and are referring the matter to the European Commission.[11] Around 3,800 people demonstrated near the plant on April 8; a larger demonstration is expected on April 25.[12] The group Stop Fessenheim have collected over 63,000 signatures through an online petition calling for Fessenheim's closure,[13] and, on April 18, began a 366-day 'fasting relay' outside the préfecture office in Colmar.[14]

Following François Hollande's victory in the 2012 Presidential Election, it is expected that he will order the plant's closure, probably by 2017.[15]

[edit] Description

The Fessenheim plant has two pressurized water reactors, each generating 900 MWe. Construction at Fessenheim began in 1970 and the plant was commissioned in 1977.[16] It is built alongside the Grand Canal d'Alsace, a canal channelling the Upper Rhine river, from which it draws 2.5 km3 (0.60 cu mi) of cooling water annually.[17]

The plant permanently employs around 700 staff and 200 contractors,[18] and indirectly supports a further 600 to 2,000 people during maintenance operations. The plant contributes around 16,000,000 euro in tax to the various local authorities, including providing the commune of Fessenheim with 70% of its revenue.[19]

In October 2009 the plant's third 10-yearly inspection on reactor 1 began, in advance of a decision on whether the plant can continue to operate for a further decade.[2] A full decision is expected in 2011, but permission to restart reactor 1 in the interim has been given.[20] The second reactor is due to be shut down for inspection from mid April 2011.[21] The local Information and Oversight Commission has asked GSIEN to conduct a parallel independent inspection alongside the official inspection by the Nuclear Safety Authority.[22]

[edit] Selected incidents and accidents

On September 5, 2012, Eight employees working on the nuclear site Fessenheim in Alsace, were victims of an incident Wednesday[citation needed]. At the origin of their injuries, a release of hydrogen peroxide vapor, "following the injection of hydrogen peroxide in a tank," said Europe 1 prefecture of Haut-Rhin.

On April 10, 2011, operator error led to one of the reactors automatically shutting down. The incident had no further consequences and was rated at 'level 1' on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).[23]

On December 27, 2009, a 'level 1' incident on the INES occurred when plant matter was drawn into the Essential Service Water System intake, reducing the flow rate, although the flow remained sufficient to avoid endangering the security of the plant.[24]

On January 24, 2004, the water in the primary circuit water of Unit 1 was contaminated by radioactive resin from a system used to filter out boron, quickly blocking several filters and endangering the integrity of the joints on the pumps.[25][26] Seven EDF employees inhaled radioactive dust during the replacement of the filters, and another was slightly irradiated during the clean-up the following month.[25] The incident was categorised at 'level 1' on the INES.[27]

Due to its location, the Fessenheim plant is subject to particular risks from seismic activity and flooding, and there is an ongoing debate about its adequacy of its design in these respects.

[edit] Seismicity

The majority of the Haut-Rhin département, including Fessenheim, are classified in a zone of moderate seismicity, however the southern third is in a medium risk zone.[28] The most recent earthquake in this zone, with a magnitude 4.7, took place in this southern third at Sierentz in July 1980.[29] The last major earthquake in the region was the 1356 Basel earthquake, estimated to have had a Mw magnitude of up to 7.1.[30]

A report commissioned by the Swiss canton of Basel-Stadt, published in 2007, concluded that the previous seismic evaluations undertaken by both EDF and, to a lesser extent, by the Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute, IRSN) had underestimated the risks involved.[30] In particular, although the location of the fault in the Rhine Rift Valley that led to the 1356 Basel earthquake was sufficiently well known for national and regional purposes, its location was not known precisely enough to evaluate a particular site.[30] Studies conducted by other scientists have, for example, reached different conclusions about which faults might have been involved in the 1356 earthquake, its magnitude (ranging from 6.0 to 7.1 on the moment magnitude scale), and the distance from the fault to the plant (ranging from 2 km (1.2 mi) to 40 km (25 mi) away, compared to the distances of 34 km (21 mi) and 29 km (18 mi) used by EDF and the IRSN respectively).[30] EDF also failed to take into account the possibility of a moderate local earthquake, which may have the potential to do greater damage than one which is larger but more distant, and the report was also critical of some aspects of the RFS 2001-01 assessment requirements.[30] The report found that the design standards in force when the plant was built were similar to those that currently apply to present-day public buildings, the plant had been designed to accommodate movement, but that it was not possible to determine whether or not the safety margins used would be adequate if a more realistic seismic evaluation were to be used.[30]

On March 11, 2011 the local Information and Oversight Commission announced that is was commissioning two independent second opinions, to be delivered as soon as possible, one on 'the safety of the plant in the event of an earthquake of magnitude 7.2, corresponding to the new seismic reference point proposed by the Swiss experts', the other on the 'redundancy of the cooling systems' in case of flooding.[31]GSIEN has been commissioned to produce one of the reports.[32]

Although situated around 8 m (26 ft)[33] below the level of the adjacent Grand Canal d'Alsace, it is not clear whether, taking into account the calculation methods in the 1960s, the design took adequate account the consequences of a breach in the canal. In its initial report following the 1999 Blayais Nuclear Power Plant flood, the Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety (now part of the Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute) called for the risk of flooding at Fessenheim to be re-examined due to the presence of the canal.[34]

On March 11, 2011 the local Information and Oversight Commission announced that it has commissioned an urgent report on the 'redundancy of the cooling systems' in case of flooding[35] and that another report 'to determine the areas to strengthen to guarantee the safety of the plant in the event of a breach in the canal', which had already started, is expected in June 2011.[36]

[edit] Opposition

Opposition to the Fessenheim plant dates back to the 1970s when its construction was proposed, and in June 1977 the pirate radio station Radio Verte Fessenheim (Radio Green Fessenheim) began broadcasting against the plant.[37]

Although the plant was built with a 40 year operational life, on the plant's 30th anniversary, the anti nuclear group sortir du nucléaire called for the plant's immediate closure. The Tri-national Nuclear Protection Action Group ATPN (Action Tri nationale de Protection Nucléaire), with members from France, Germany and Switzerland is also campaigning for the plant to be closed and in 2008 it unsuccessfully applied to the Strasbourg Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Administratif de Strasbourg) to order its closure.[38] On March 9, 2011, a further application to close the plant because of the seismic, flooding and other risks was rejected by the tribunal.[39][40]

A local association called Stop Fessenheim was formed in October 2005 and registered in the Canton of Munster, after having operated informally since 2004.[41]

Despite regional concern over the plant in the aftermath of Fukushima, nuclear power remains popular in the commune of Fessenheim itself, where the plant has brought prosperity and employs many locals.[42]

[edit] Popular culture

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

[edit] References

1. ^ Calculez la distance a vol d'oiseau entre toutes les villes de France - Distance between Ruelisheim-Fessenheim
2. ^ a b Aire Urbaine | La centrale de Fessenheim est-elle à l’abri d’un accident majeur ? Le Pays, 2011-03-15, accessed 2011-04-13
3. ^ Spotlight on France’s oldest nuclear plant euronews, published 2011-03-25
4. ^ a b Séisme, inondation : la pression monte à Fessenheim Le Moniteur published 2011-03-24, accessed 2011-03-30
5. ^ Trois cantons suisses demandent l'arrêt de la centrale nucléaire de Fessenheim Associated Press on Yahoo!, published 2011-03-30, accessed 2011-03-30
6. ^ Atomkraft: Fessenheim bereitet dem Land Sorgen Stuttgarter Nachrichten, published 2011-03-23, accessed 2011-04-06
7. ^ Les conseillers généraux de Franche-Comté votent une motion pour la fermeture de la centrale nucléaire de Fessenheim dans le Haut-Rhin La Tribune, published 2011-03-29, accessed 2011-03-30
8. ^ Le Grand Conseil de Bâle-Ville exige l’arrêt de la centrale de Fessenheim LeMatin, published 2011-04-06, accessed 2011-04-06
9. ^ Le conseil municipal de Strasbourg pour la fermeture de la centrale de Fessenheim Le Monde, published 2011-04-12, accessed 2011-04-13
10. ^ Jacques Bigot veut faire de Fessenheim une référence mondiale sur la fin de vie du nucléaire published 2011-04-12, accessed 2011-04-13
11. ^ Nucléaire: les Verts européens veulent faire de Fessenheim un "site pilote" Le Parisien, published 2011-04-06, accessed 2011-04-06
12. ^ Des milliers de manifestants demandent l'arrêt de la centrale de Fessenheim Le Monde, published 2011-04-11, accessed 2011-04-12
13. ^ Arrêter Fessenheim ! Stop Fessenheim, accessed 2011-04-13
14. ^ Alsace | Un jeûne de 366 jours pour obtenir l’arrêt de la centrale de Fessenheim L'Alsace, published 2011-04-19, accessed 2011-04-19
15. ^ Présidentielle : Hollande confirme sa volonté de fermer Fessenheim France Soir, published 2012-05-02, accessed 2012-05-08
16. ^ La centrale de Fessenheim Autorité de sûreté nucléaire, accessed 2009-05-17
17. ^ Eléments de diagnostic de la partie française Agence de l'Eau Rhin Meuse, published April 2005, accessed 2011-03-30
18. ^ Nucléaire: une année de grands travaux en 2011 à Fessenheim (Haut-Rhin) Décideurs en Région, published 2011, accessed 2011-04-13
19. ^ Faut-il fermer Fessenheim - Alsapresse.com, published 2006-03-31.
20. ^ French Nuclear Watchdog Plans Fessenheim Decision in ‘Weeks’ Bloomberg, accessed 2011-04-13
21. ^ Fessenheim: début lundi de la visite décennale du réacteur N°2 (syndicats) le Parisien, published 2011-04-13, accessed 2011-04-13
22. ^ GSIEN - Groupement des scientifiques pour l'information sur l'énergie nucléaire Réseau national de mesures de la radioactivité de l'environnement, accessed 2011-04-11
23. ^ Centrale de Fessenheim: une manœuvre cause un incident nucléaire de niveau 1 Tribune de Genève, published 2011-04-08, accessed 2011-04-12
24. ^ Communiqué n°2 à 17h15 - Incident en voie de résolution à la centrale nucléaire de Fessenheim, published 2009-12-27, accessed 2011-03-30
25. ^ a b Incident à la centrale de Fessenheim IRSN, published 2004-02-10 accessed 2011-03-30
26. ^ TRANCHE 1 DE LA CENTRALE NUCLEAIRE DE FESSENHEIM INCIDENTS DE JANVIER 2004 Stop Transports, accessed 2011-03-30
27. ^ Les cahiers de GLOBAL CHANCE - N° 25 - septembre 2008 Global Chance, published September 2008, accessed 2011-03-30
28. ^ Quatre centrales sur une zone sismique Les quatre éléments published 2011-03-15, accessed 2011-04-13
29. ^ Le risque sismique
30. ^ a b c d e f Centrale Nucléaire de Fessenheim : appréciation du risque sismique RÉSONANCE Ingénieurs-Conseils SA, published 2007-09-05, accessed 2011-03-30
31. ^ Centrale de Fessenheim : la CLIS demande deux nouvelles contre-expertises Le Parisien, published 2011-04-11, accessed 2011-04-11
32. ^ Alsace | Fessenheim : contre- expertises et nouvelles études L'Alsace, published 2011-04-11, accessed 2011-04-11
33. ^ Le risque d'inondation de la centrale à Fessenheim sera réévalué Nouvelobs, published 2011-04-11, accessed 2011-04-13
34. ^ Rapport sur l'inondation du site du Blayais survenue le 27 décembre 1999 Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety, published 2000-01-17, accessed 2011-03-21
35. ^ Centrale de Fessenheim : la CLIS demande deux nouvelles contre-expertises Le Parisien, published 2011-04-11, accessed 2011-04-11
36. ^ Fessenheim : contre-expertises demandées France 3, published 2011-04-11, accessed 2011-04-11
37. ^ Teil 11: Internationale Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Chronik Internationale Rundfunk und Fernseh-Chronik, accessed 2011-04-14
38. ^ Rejet du recours demandant la fermeture de la centrale nucléaire de Fessenheim Actu-environnement, 29/10/2008.
39. ^ N°0805582 TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DE STRASBOURG N°0805582 accessed 2011-03-30
40. ^ Fessenheim sur une faille sismique published 2011-03-13, accessed 2011-03-30
41. ^ Qui sommes nous / Adhésion Stop Fessenheim, accessed 2011-04-13
42. ^ A Fessenheim, la doyenne du nucléaire français ne fait visiblement pas peur aux riverains La Tribune published 2011-03-18, accessed 2011-03-18
43. ^ The Enforcer Script - Dialogue Transcript (archive page), accessed 2011-04-15

Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant is a nuclear power plant in Forsmark, Sweden, and also the site of the Swedish Final repository for radioactive operational waste. It is operated by a subsidiary of Vattenfall.

[edit] Reactors

Forsmark NPP has three Boiling water reactors:

• F1 with an ABB Atom BWR 69 at 2928 MW thermal and 1010 MWe net was first connected to the grid on 5 June 1980, and commenced commercial operation on 10 December 1980. It has two turbo-alternators.
• F2 with an ABB Atom BWR 69 at 2928 MW thermal and 1010 MWe net was first grid connected on 15 December 1980 and commenced commercial operation on 7 July 1981. It is a twin of Unit 1.
• F3 with an ABB Atom BWR 75 at 3300 MW thermal and 1190 MWe net and was first grid connected on 3 March 1985 and commenced commercial operation on 21 August 1985. It is a later design with one turbo-alternator.

[edit] Other facilities

West of Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant, there is the static inverter of HVDC Fenno-Skan.

[edit] Waste disposal

Forsmark is the proposed site for the long-term burial of all spent fuel from Swedish nuclear power reactors, using the KBS-3 process. The new site will be located next to the already existing final repository for radioactive operational waste, but the two will not be connected with each other.

[edit] April 1986

On April 28, 1986, unusually high levels of radiation were detected in workers' clothing at this plant, prompting concerns of a radiation leak.[1] No leak was found, however, and the radiation was subsequently determined to have originated from Chernobyl, where a reactor had exploded the previous day.[2]Chernobyl is approximately 1,100 km from this power plant.

Detection of rise of environmental radioactivity at Forsmark was crucial in leading Soviet authorities, originally attempting to cover up the disaster, to admit that a nuclear incident had taken place in Pripyat.[citation needed]

[edit] July 2006 incident

On 25 July 2006, one reactor was shut down after an electrical fault.[3][4] According to the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspection authority SKI, the incident was rated 2 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. Initially it was rated 1 since two generators remained online. But once it was discovered that all four generators could have failed due to the same fault, the event was upgraded to 2.

At the request of the Swedish Government, IAEA launched an OSART mission to Forsmark.

Lars-Olov Höglund, a former construction chief at Vattenfall, claimed it was the most serious nuclear incident in the world since the Chernobyl disaster and it was pure luck that prevented a meltdown.[5] Both the SKI and the safety chief of Forsmark power plant disagree with that opinion and state that the incident was serious but the description provided by Höglund was incorrect and there was no real risk of a meltdown.[6] Höglund has personally been involved in a legal dispute with Forsmark Nuclear powerplant for several years in connection with his private business.[7]

However, Kjell Olsson, a researcher at SKI, later stated in an informal discussion with school children that a meltdown technically could have developed from the incident.[8] The agency later stated that the failing safety system proved to be linked together in a delicate, extremely serious way.[9]

On March 14, 2011, Höglund commented that the Fukushima-disaster parallels the Forsmark incident, i.e. failing UPS system backup, and repeated his statement from 2007 that "only luck" prevented a meltdown at the Swedish plant.[10]

[edit] February 2007 shutdown

On February 3, two units at Forsmark were shut down to inspect a rubber seal in one of the safety systems. On Forsmark 1 this seal needed to be replaced, a job that would take approximately one month. Unit 2 was cleared by the regulator SKI and was free to restart.

In January an internal report made by a few employees at Forsmark who were concerned over a "degrading safety culture" was leaked to media who ran an extensive story on it. In the storm following the report the Forsmark CEO chose to resign. Forsmark was already under way to implement a 60-point program designed to improve safety culture, designed shortly after the event in July 2006.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

[edit] External links