[Part 1 of "The Secession Tradition in America," a paper presented at the 1995 Mises Institute conference, "Secession, State, and Economy."]

The United Nations Charter asserts the self-determination of peoples as a fundamental human right. From this, there has developed a lively debate among international jurists about whether the right of self-determination includes a right of legitimate secession. [1] But while the concept of legitimate secession is being explored in the world at large, it forms no part of contemporary American political discourse. There was a time, however, when talk about secession was a part of American politics. Indeed, the very concept of secession and self-determination of peoples, in the form being discussed today, is largely an American invention. It is no exaggeration to say that the unique contribution of the eighteenth-century American Enlightenment to political thought is not federalism but the principle that a people, under certain conditions, have a moral right to secede from an established political authority and to govern themselves. In what follows I would like to sketch out this all-but-forgotten American political tradition.

The English verb “to secede” comes from the Latin “secedere,” meaning any act of withdrawal. The exclusively political connotations that govern the term today are peculiarly American, and do not appear in English until the early nineteenth century. [2] Prior to then, one could speak of the soul seceding from the body; or of seceding from one room of a building to another; or of seceding from any sort of human fellowship. The latter is how “secession” was defined in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary in the mid-eighteenth century. But Johnson did not capture the Scottish use of the term.

The Church of Scotland split in 1733. Those who left called themselves “seceders” and the resulting Church the “Secession Church.” The Church went by this name for more than a century, during which time it split again, but was reunited in 1829 under the disarming name of the “United Secession Church.” The seceding self-governing religious community paved the way for the seceding self-governing political community and the term as we understand it today. One of the first to use the term in this new and exclusively political way was Thomas Jefferson, who, in 1825, retrospectively described the colonies as having seceded from the British Union.[3]

The word “secession,” for us, not only has exclusively political connotations, it is a term that marks out a peculiarly modern political act. But this is not obvious, for it might be thought that as long as there have been large-scale political regimes, peoples have sought to withdraw from them. It could be said that the Israelites seceded from Egypt, or that Melos unsuccessfully sought to secede from the Athenian League. We can, of course, speak in this way, but the concept of secession, as understood in contemporary political discourse, is more specific in its meaning. Secession, for us, presupposes the background of the modern state, and this sort of state is only about two centuries old. So secession is not just any kind of political action; it is the withdrawal of a people from a modern state under the moral principle of the right of self-government, and such that the separation requires the territorial dismemberment of that state. The Israelites and Melots were not separating from a modern state, and their withdrawal would not have resulted in the territorial dismemberment of such a state.

The modern state has been theorized in such a way as to entail a strong presumption against secession. It has been said that the sovereignty of a modern state cannot be divided, and that sovereignty is co-extensive with territory. There has been no difficulty in allowing that a modern state can expand its territory and sovereignty, but it cannot allow itself to be dismembered by a supposed right of a people to self-government. Anyone who takes secession seriously as a possibility is necessarily throwing into question the legitimacy of the modern state.

At the time of William the Conqueror, Europe was composed of thousands of independent political units; today there are only a few dozen. This massive centralization and consolidation was accomplished mainly by conquest. The result was that dukedoms, margraviates, small republics, principalities, free cities, and baronies, (not to mention peoples speaking different languages, having different cultures and religions, and pursuing different visions of the human good) were crushed together into the modern state. This state was inherently unstable. A solution was theorized by Hobbes, who postulated a sovereign office whose task was to establish a rule of law which allowed individuals to pursue their own power and glory in that domain in which the law is silent. In time, a modern state came to be seen as an association to protect the rights of individuals, and this added a stronger presumption against secession, because any right of a people to secede could only be the aggregate right of a set of individuals. But if one set could secede, any other set or subset—down to one individual—could secede. An acknowledged right of secession would mean the unravelling of the modern state.

But to affirm a right of secession is not to say that secession is morally justified under any conditions, but only that there can be conditions under which it is justified, and even then there might be reasons for not exercising the right. But those philosophers who first theorized the modern state (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel) do not so much as raise the question of whether such conditions are possible. Their main task is to understand and legitimate the modern state; the problem of secession simply never occurs to them. And political philosophers since have followed in their steps. John Rawls, for instance, dismisses the possibility of secession without argument.[4] Secessionist discontent, though a pressing fact of contemporary political life, is the most under-theorized concept in political philosophy. Political scientists and international jurisprudence have taken up the question, but philosophers have not. There is only one book length study by a philosopher on the question of whether secession is ever morally legitimate.[5]

One indication of this under-theorized character of secession is its being confused with revolution. Three conceptions of revolution have dominated in modern political speech. The first derives from the Glorious Revolution of 1688. This is revolution as restoration, and its image is the revolution of a wheel. According to eighteenth-century English Whiggism, the Glorious Revolution was a bloodless restoration of a liberty-loving Protestant regime from the attempted usurpations of the Catholic James II. The second form is Lockean revolution. Here a sovereign people recall the powers they have delegated to a government that has violated its trust in protecting life, liberty, and property. The government is overthrown and a new government instituted. The third form is Jacobin revolution. This is not Lockean revolution for the sake of preserving property but an attempt to subvert and to totally transform an entire social and political order in accord with an egalitarian philosophical theory. A Lockean revolution leaves the social order intact, whereas Jacobin revolution aims at a root-and-branch transformation. Marxian revolution is Jacobin, as are many other forms of contemporary political criticism. Gloria Steinem once said that to talk about reforms for women is one thing, to talk about the total transformation of society is feminism. So conceived, feminism is a species of Jacobin revolution.

Secession is quite distinct from these dominant conceptions of revolution. All presuppose the theory of sovereignty internal to the modern state and the prohibition against dismembering its territory. Secession is not revolution in the sense of eighteenth-century Whiggism because it is not the restoration of anything. It is the dismemberment of a modern state in the name of self-government. Nor is it Lockean revolution. A seceding people does not necessarily claim that a government has violated its trust. And even if the claim is made, there is no attempt to overthrow the government and replace it with a better one. Indeed, a seceding people may even think that the government is not especially unjust. What they seek, however, is to be left alone to govern themselves as they see fit. Finally, secession is not Jacobin revolution because it does not seek to totally transform the social and political order. Indeed, it seeks to preserve its social order through secession and self-government.

We may, of course, continue to call secession “revolution” if we like, but the danger is that there will be a tendency to confuse it with the dominant meanings of revolution. A seceding people may indeed be said to be in a state of revolt in so far as they resist being coerced back into an established modern state, but this sort of revolt is quite different from revolution. And the moral considerations that would legitimate such resistance are categorically different from that which would legitimate revolution in the above senses, all of which seek, for different reasons, to overthrow an established regime. A seceding people is happy leaving the existing regime exactly as it is. It seeks only to limit its territorial jurisdiction. This, of course, is a serious matter, but it is not revolution in any of the traditional senses. Its name is secession.

Nowhere is the under-theorized character of secession and the confusion that results from failure to distinguish it from revolution more evident than in the habit of describing the conflict with Britain and the North American colonies as the “American Revolution.” It is true that there were whiggish themes from the ideology of 1688 about restoring the rights of Englishmen, and there were Lockean themes about self-government. But the act of the British colonists in America was an act of secession. It was neither whiggish, nor Lockean, nor Jacobin revolution. The colonists did not seek to overthrow the British government. Commons, Lords, and Crown were to remain exactly as before. Indeed, many of the colonial leaders, such as Adams and Hamilton, admired the British constitution and government, and sought to imitate its best features. They wished simply to limit its jurisdiction over the territory they occupied. They wished to be let alone.

Much has been made of the influence the Lockean idiom of self-government had on the Founders. But it is important to realize that, though Locke allows the overthrow of a corrupt regime, he does not allow secession in the form of dismembering the territory of a modern state. And for citizens of a regime who have given their express consent, he does not even allow the right to exit, much less the right to carry territory with them. [6] There is every reason to believe that Locke, like the “friends of America” (Burke, Pitt, Shelburne, Barré), would have supported reforms on behalf of the Americans, but would have stopped short of secession.

The case is quite otherwise with David Hume, who supported complete independence for the colonies as early as 1768, before the idea had occurred to most Americans. In this he stood virtually alone among major British thinkers. The Edinburgh literati were overwhelming in their support for strong measures against the Americans. Hume, however, staunchly defended secession of the colonies from 1768 until his death on 25 August 1776, five days after the Declaration of Independence was published in Edinburgh’s Caledonian Mercury. To the disappointment of his “oldest and dearest friend,” Baron Mure, who had asked him to write a letter on behalf of the county of Renfrewshire advocating military measures against the Americans, Hume wrote: “I am an American in my Principles, and wish we would let them alone to govern or misgovern themselves as they think proper.” [7]

In this statement, Hume put into words, for the first time, an ideology of “Americanism,” the thought that there are political principles specifically American. What were those principles? They were free trade and the corporate liberty of a people to govern themselves. Hume argued that if the ports of America were open to free trade, it would result in only a trifling temporary loss of revenue, and would, in the long run, benefit British commerce.

Let us, therefore, lay aside all Anger; shake hands, and part Friends. Or if we retain any anger, let it only be against ourselves for our past Folly; and against that wicked Madman Pitt; who has reduced us to our present Condition. [8]

[Listen to "David Hume on Colonial Secession," a lecture presented by Donald W. Livingston at the 1995 Mises Institute conference, "Secession, State, and Economy."]

Donald Livingston is a professor of philosophy at Emory University with an "expertise in the writings of David Hume." Livingston received his doctorate at Washington University in 1965. He has been a National Endowment for the Humanities fellow and is on the editorial board of Hume Studies and Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture. Livingston is a constitutional scholar and an expositor of the compact nature of the Union, with its concomitant doctrines of corporate resistance, nullification, and secession. The doctrine coincides with federalism, states' rights, the principle of subsidiarity. His political philosophy embodies the decentralizing themes echoed by Europeans such as Althusius, David Hume, and Lord Acton and Americans such as Thomas Jefferson, Spencer Roane, Abel Parker Upshur, Robert Hayne and John Calhoun, which holds the community and family as the elemental units of political society. As Livingston affirms, the compact nature of the Union is opposed to the innovative nationalist theory of Joseph Story, Daniel Webster, and Abraham Lincoln which contends for an indivisible sovereignty, an inviolable aggregate people, and that the American Union created the States following the American War for Independence. This theory as articulated by Lincoln has been characterized by Livingston as "Lincoln's Spectacular Lie." See Donald W. Livingston's article archives.

You can subscribe to future articles by Donald W. Livingston via this RSS feed.

Notes

[1]Lee Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978). This book is an excellent discussion of the debate over whether a right of secession can be recognized in international law.

[2]The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), the articles on “secede” and “secession.”

[3]Ibid.

[4]Allen Buchanan discusses Rawls on secession in Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce: From Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 5–6.

[5]Ibid.

[6]John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 349.

[7]David Hume, The Letters of David Hume, John Y.T. Greig, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 302–3.

[8]Ibid., pp. 300–1. Pitt had sought to establish a mercantile empire of managed trade which Hume thought required constant war for its maintenance and an increase in the public debt. For an in-depth study of Hume on secession and America, see my Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

The stateless market society—a peaceful social arrangement based on voluntary relations among individuals in which the state is not present—is not a popular idea. Many people believe that this society would lack the capacity to define and enforce property rights, and that this would result in chaos, tyranny of the rich or in a reversal to a state. This belief has led to a widespread dismissal of the stateless society paradigm.

Murray Rothbard is by many considered the champion of the stateless society doctrine. However, even Rothbard conceded that “there can be no absolute guarantee that a purely market society would not fall prey to organized criminality.” [1]

While it is true that absolute guarantees for any social outcome are generally inappropriate, I argue that there are good reasons to believe that outcomes like chaos, tyranny of the rich, or even “organized criminality” in the absence of a state are unlikely.

To show this, I will assess the core economic forces that govern the development of any society and ultimately hold it together. This will show how the internal economic features of a stateless society provide incentives for nonviolence and cooperation and disincentives for violence, theft, and extortion. This analytical journey will also lead us to the realization that the glue that keeps state societies together in their current form may be nothing other than fear of an imagined enemy. As far as humans can overcome this fear, they can open the path to a stateless society.

Neither Chaos nor Tyranny

The typical story one hears when the necessity of the state is questioned is that, in the absence of the state, we would allegedly all turn against each other and start taking each other’s resources, and, since there would be no state to “regulate” this taking, chaos would ensue. Everyone would, allegedly, become a taker. This outcome, however, is unlikely for at least two reasons.

First, like any other economic activity, taking from others requires the use of scarce resources. Resources can be obtained by discovery, production, exchange, gift, or by taking from others by force. Those who want to take from others first need to acquire resources that they would use in the subsequent process of taking. This means that the initial resources for taking from others would have to be obtained by some method other than taking: discovery, production, exchange, or gift.

Thus, a situation in which everyone only acquires resources by taking from others cannot be the initial stage of any society. Someone needs first to find or produce goods before those goods can be taken away from him or her. Any society based exclusively on taking from others is illogical. Instead, a society in which some people take while other people produce would be something we would expect to see in reality. It is also not excluded that the same individuals may produce at some times and take at other times.[2]

The second reason why we would not all turn into takers is that unspecialized individuals are less productive than those that specialize in several activities or only in one activity. The law of comparative advantage, or the law of association, compels people to specialize in activities while obtaining most products and services from other specialized individuals. This way everyone gets to enjoy more goods and services than they would if they were self-sufficient. This is why, in a stateless society, like in any other society, different people would specialize in different activities. Only some would specialize in taking from others.

However, the taking activity would not be as attractive as it may seem at first glance. First, in a capital-poor stateless society it would be quite hard to become an effective taker because of the initial resource requirement needed to start a successful taking operation. If one starts taking from others at a stage when he only acquired a low level of initial wealth (say, a cave and a stick), this taker will not be able to effectively defend himself from those whose resources he took. Thus, the process of taking must be preceded by a process of capital accumulation.

How about then the absence of the state in a capital-rich society such as the one in which we live? Some argue that if the state were to be abolished, the rich would use their ample resources to force the poor into submission. This would allegedly turn the present system into a system of forced labor with minimal compensation. The business owners would presumably provide the workers only with enough resources to secure food, shelter, and clothing.

However, it is not at all clear why business owners would want to enslave their employees and customers. As humans came to learn over the course of history, freedom benefits all, in the long run, because voluntary cooperation is more productive than forced labor. Force stifles motivation and creativity, which are necessary for the discovery of new and more productive activities. This is why freer societies tend to outperform in the long run those with less freedom, economically as well as militarily. It is the increase in the productivity of labor gained through capital accumulation and voluntary cooperation that compelled people to abolish slavery.

Let us posit a total breakdown of states in a society. One possible outcome of such an event, as many have argued before, is the rise of new states, perhaps worse than the ones before. Another possible outcome is what I will call a stateless equilibrium.[3] As the following two sections will show, while there are strong incentives for voluntary cooperation in such equilibrium, these incentives can be clouded by the oldest of emotions—fear.

A Stateless Equilibrium

Let us suppose that after the state breakdown, there is a wild spree of mutual "taking." The wilder the fighting, the sooner will some or most of those fighting run out of resources for fighting and for sustaining their own life.

At this point, some of them need to resort to production in order to sustain their own livelihood. Others, who haven't run out of resources, may try to take resources from those who have turned to production. In this case, the producers would have to make a two-fold effort—produce and fight to protect what they have produced. More successful producers will survive and less successful ones won't. Similarly, only the most successful takers would survive. These takers may organize into gangs to become more effective in taking. The producers may also organize to better defend their goods.

Some of those that specialized in violence and taking would eventually realize that they can obtain more resources by protecting the producers from other takers, in exchange for money or goods and services. This is what the law of comparative advantage or the law of association implies. Specialized fighters are more effective in fighting than people who are both producers and fighters. Specialized producers are more effective in producing than the producers who have to devote some of their time to fighting. Thus, a fighter can obtain more resources through voluntary exchange with a specialized producer than by taking from a producer who is also a fighter. Likewise, specialized producers, even after paying for the protection services, are able to consume more compared to when they have to devote a portion of their time and resources to fighting the takers.

The objection that is often raised against this is that these protectors would turn against the producers and use force to extort goods and services. True, those less far-sighted might resort to extortion. But, the wiser ones would realize that violence, or a threat of violence, would weaken the productive capacity of the producers and consequently their own ability to provide resources necessary for the defense against the takers, while strengthening the producers' incentives to seek the services of other potential protectors. Thus, those protectors that engage in voluntary transactions with the producers are in a better position to fend off aggression.

In the end, some people specialize in taking, while others specialize in either producing or protecting the producers against the takers. Since takers rely only on taking for acquiring resources, they do not directly enjoy the benefits of entrepreneurial discovery. Entrepreneurial discovery is a feature of the producers and those who engage in voluntary exchanges with them. The takers are always the secondary users of the producers' creative work. They are always the second movers.

The fact that the takers do not engage in productive activity or in voluntary cooperation with producers renders the size and scope of the takers' organizations quite narrow. The fact that the protectors and producers are in a voluntary relationship enables the protectors to gain better access to an abundant supply of goods and services.

This implies that the takers, despite the productivity benefits of a voluntary exchange relationship with producers, still prefer a violent relationship. Takers are thus individuals with a preference for violence.

What about conflict resolution among producers? It would be naïve to believe that all of the producers would always agree on who owns what and what the limits of that ownership are. Thus, we should expect that some producers would at times come into conflict over the appropriate use of resources (including the use of resources for paying the protectors). How would this conflict be resolved without the state?

First, we know that, as anything else, being in a conflict with someone, even a nonviolent conflict, is not costless. As conflict diverts time and effort, it reduces the productive powers of the producers involved in it, so each of them would prefer some sort of conflict resolution. It is unlikely that either of the producers would resort to violence (which may include hiring a protector to initiate violence) because the short-run gains from such a resolution would have to be weighed against the long-run implications of being labeled as unreliable and violent among fellow producers. And, the hired protector must evaluate the benefits against the costs of being labeled as a thug among the producers. This does not mean that some unwise individuals would not resort to violence. It simply means that, for producers and protectors, violence against other producers is generally less advantageous than cooperation.

This suggests that, despite being in a disagreement over the use of a resource at one time or another, the parties involved in a conflict would still be in agreement that nonviolent conflict resolution is better than a violent one or an indefinitely prolonged conflict. The actual conflict resolution technique that these parties might choose depends on their preferences. They may negotiate directly or they may agree on a mediator who would, based on the arguments presented by each side, judge how the conflict should be resolved. Ultimately, the conflict resolution technique depends on the preferences of the parties involved. And, the proposed conflict-resolving course of action is generally binding not because it is backed by a threat of state violence (i.e., imprisonment), but because not complying implies a prospect of a prolonged conflict (and all the costs involved with it).

This, again, does not mean that every proposed solution to a conflict will be accepted by all involved parties. It simply means that, after some time of being in a conflict, all parties would reach a point when a resolution is better than prolonging the conflict. And, since being in a conflict requires the use of resources without a clear future benefit, producers will generally seek to avoid prolonged conflicts. Those that continually partake in conflicts will be shunned and avoided, and may even be perceived as takers, in which case they would not be able to cooperate with those that perceive them in that way.

The State: An Equilibrium of Fear

It is only when a large number of producers start believing that they could use the force of their protectors to take resources from other producers that a large scale, organized, violent conflict may arise. But, why would producers want to do such a thing when they can, in the long run, benefit more by engaging in voluntary exchanges with other producers and protectors?

Let us, at this point, introduce an old instinct—fear.[4] Producers may fear potential aggression by other groups of producers. This fear may propel the producers to support the aggression of their protectors on others while believing this aggression is the only means of preventing a future aggression by others. This fear would also motivate the producers to abandon the idea of seeking services of other groups of protectors. After all, who wants services of those who seem eager to aggress on you?

In this situation, the protectors could simply take as much from the producers as they think is "optimal" or "fair." The producers would not object to this for fear that the protectors would not otherwise be able or willing to protect them from potential "aggressors." The producers may also fear that the protectors would use force to extort goods and services from them if they refuse to pay their "fair" share. Thus, there are strong incentives for the protectors to create and maintain a situation in which the producers are fearful of other producers and, potentially, of their own protectors.

But, if only some protectors manage to make their partner producers fearful of others, this would still not lead to the elimination of voluntary relationships among all producers and all protectors. Those producers that are free of fear are, in the long run, more productive and thus better able to protect themselves. Those in fear are more likely to realize that their fear is baseless and counterproductive if they see there are other, more prosperous and better protected nonaggressing groups of producers.

Thus, the scenario in which there is a universal relationship between protectors and producers based on the producers' fear of other producers can only exist if the origin of this fear is not fully grasped by most of the producers, if the fear exists in a latent, unarticulated, and unidentified form.

If we now replace the word protectors with the word states, the word producers with taxpayers, and the word taking with taxing, we get something that looks much like the world in which we live. The protectors that maintain the latent fear of foreign or internal aggression are nation-states with their military and police forces that acquire resources by taxing the taxpayers, while the taxpayers[5] are all those within these nation-states earning their resources through productive activities and voluntary exchanges with others.

If you ask anyone from either side of a war, you will generally hear the same story. People on each side deeply believe that they are waging a defensive war. Even when initiating a war, this initiation is justified by claiming this was the only way to prevent a future aggression by the other side. When it comes to aggression within countries, most people would assert that a state police is the only practically feasible deterrent against individual and gang aggression.

The element that holds this equilibrium in place is the producers' latent fear that some other producers (with the help of their protectors' state armies and police forces) or groups of specialized gangs of takers would take away their resources by force.

In the first case, potential aggression is fueled by the producers' fear and not by the desire for others' resources. This is true because a producer can always benefit more in the long run through voluntary exchange with others. In the second case, gangs of takers can effectively be deterred by contracting with protectors, i.e., private security services. If this is true, one has to conclude that the fear that sends us running into the clutches of the state is, in reality, entirely baseless.

Conclusion

Despite the common belief that a stateless society is utopian, there are good reasons to believe that this society is not only economically feasible, but also provides continuous incentives for nonviolence. The perceived inevitability of the state, as well as the perceived unviability of a stateless society, are founded on faulty economic reasoning and irrational fear.

The following interview with Hans-Hermann Hoppe first appeared in the German weekly Junge Freiheit on November 2, 2012, and was conducted by Moritz Schwarz. It has been translated here into English by Robert Groezinger.

Are taxes nothing but protection money? The state a kind of mafia? Democracy a fraud? Philosopher Hans-Hermann Hoppe is not only considered one of the most prominent pioneering intellectuals of the libertarian movement, but also perhaps the sharpest critic of the Western political system.

Professor Hoppe, in your essay collection "Der Wettbewerb der Gauner" ("The Competition of Crooks") you write that "99 percent of citizens, asked if the state was necessary, would answer yes." Me too! Why am I wrong?

Hoppe : All of us, from childhood, have been moulded by state or state-licensed institutions—preschools, schools, universities. So the result you quoted is not surprising. However, if I asked you whether you said yes to an institution having the last word in each conflict, even in those it is itself involved in, you would certainly say no—unless you hoped to be in charge of this institution yourself.

Er ... correct .

Hoppe : Of course, because you know that such an institution cannot only mediate in conflicts but also cause them, you can recognize that it can then resolve them to its own advantage. In the face of this I, for one, would live in fear of my life and property. However, it is precisely this, the ultimate power of judicial decision-making, that is the specific characteristic of the institution known as the state.

Correct, but on the other hand the state is based on a social contract, which provides the individual with protection and space for personal fulfilment, which without the state he would not have—in a struggle of all against all.

Hoppe : No, the state is anything but the result of a contract! No one with even just an ounce of common sense would agree to such a contract. I have a lot of contracts in my files, but nowhere is there one like this. The state is the result of aggressive force and subjugation. It has evolved without contractual foundation, just like a gang of protection racketeers. And concerning the struggle of all against all: that is a myth. Of course the racketeer protects his victims on “his” territory from other racketeers, but only so he can conduct his own racket more successfully. Moreover, it is states that are responsible for the deaths of hundreds of millions of people and immeasurable destruction in the 20th century alone. Compared to that, the victims of private crimes are almost negligible. And do you seriously believe that conflicts between the inhabitants of the tri-border region [of France, Germany and Switzerland] near Basle, who are living together in a condition of anarchy, are more numerous than conflicts between the inhabitants of Dortmund and Düsseldorf, who are citizens of one and the same state [Germany]? Not that I know of.

Why in your view is democracy just a “competition of crooks”?

Hoppe : All highly-developed forms of religion forbid the coveting of someone else’s property. This prohibition is the foundation of peaceful cooperation. In a democracy, on the other hand, anyone can covet anybody else’s property and act according to his desire—the only precondition being that he can gain access to the corridors of power. Thus, under democratic conditions, everybody becomes a potential threat. And during mass elections what tends to happen is that the members of society who attempt to access the corridors of power and rise to the highest positions are those who have no moral inhibitions about misappropriating other people’s property: habitual amoralists who are particularly talented in forging majorities out of a multitude of unbridled and mutually exclusive demands.

"Politicians: lazy and spongers!" Aren’t you afraid you might be reproached for complaining on the level of the "Bild" tabloid newspaper?

Hoppe: So what? Up until the 20th century there was hardly an important political thinker who didn’t speak disparagingly about democracy. The key word was: "mob rule." The populist criticism of democracy, as can be found in Bild or at the water cooler, is all very well. But it is not fundamental enough, nor does it go far enough—to date Bild hasn’t asked me for an interview either. Of course politicians are spongers; they live off money extorted from other people with the threat of violence—which is called "taxation." But unfortunately, politicians are not lazy. It would be nice if all they did was squander their booty. Instead they are obsessive megalomaniacal do-gooders, who in addition make life difficult for their victims with thousands of laws and regulations.

Democracy is only one possible variety of statehood. Would a different form of state be more acceptable to you?

Hoppe: In a monarchist state everyone knows who the ruler is and who the ruled are, and accordingly there is resistance against any attempt to increase state power. In a democratic state this distinction becomes blurred, and it becomes all the easier to expand state power.

Just a moment: that’s what courts, laws and the constitution are for, to limit and control the state—government as well as parliament.

Hoppe : The mafia also has “executive”, “legislative” and “judicial” branches. Just go and watch the movie “The Godfather” again!

Another objection: What about the new internet-based detractors of the state, such as "Occupy" or the "Pirates," who demand transparency and participation, without immediately condemning the state and democracy in their entirety?

Hoppe : The "Occupy" movement consists of economic ignoramuses who fail to understand that the banks’ dirty tricks, which they rightly deplore, are possible only because there is a state-licensed central bank that acts as a “lender of last resort,” and that the current financial crisis therefore is not a crisis of capitalism but a crisis of statism. The "Pirates," with their demand for an unconditional basic income, are well on the way to becoming another "free beer for all" party. They have a single issue: criticism of "intellectual property rights" (IP rights), which could make them very popular—and earn them the enmity in particular of the music, film and pharmaceutical industries. But even there they are clueless wimps. They just need to google Stephan Kinsella. Then they’d see that IP has nothing to do with property, but rather with state privileges. IP allows the inventor (I) or ‘first maker’ of a product—a text, picture, song or whatever—to forbid all other people to replicate this product, or to charge them license fees, even if the replicator (R) thereby uses his own property only (and does not take away any of I’s property). This way, I is elevated to the status of co-owner of R’s property. This shows: IP rights are not property but, on the contrary, are an attack on property and therefore completely illegitimate.

In "The Competition of Crooks" you outline as an alternative the model of a "private law society." How does it work?

Hoppe: The basic concept is simple. The idea of a monopolistic property protector and law keeper is self-contradictory. This monopolist, whether king or president, will always be an expropriating property protector and a law-breaking law keeper—who will characterize his actions as being in "the public interest." In order to guarantee the protection of property and safeguard the law there has to be free competition in the area of law as well. Other institutions apart from the state must be allowed to provide property and law protection services. The state then becomes a normal subject of private law, on an equal footing with all other people. It can’t raise taxes any more or unilaterally enact laws. Its employees will have to finance themselves just the same as everybody else does: by producing and offering something that freely engaging customers consider value for money.

Wouldn’t that quickly lead to a war between these "providers?"

Hoppe: War and aggression are costly. States go to war because they can, via taxes, pass on the cost to third parties who are not directly involved. By contrast, for voluntarily-financed companies, war is economic suicide. As a private law subject the state too will, like all other security providers, have to offer its customers contracts that can only be changed by mutual agreement, and which in particular regulate what is to be done in the case of a conflict between itself and its customers, or between itself and the customers of other, competing security providers. And for that there is only one solution acceptable to everyone: that in these sorts of conflicts not the state, but an independent third party decides—arbitrators and judges who in turn compete with each other, whose most important asset is their reputation as keepers of the law, and whose actions and judgments can be challenged and, if need be, revised, just as anyone else’s can be.

Who should be such a "third party?" And with what instruments of power should it assert the interests of an individual citizen against his contractual partner—the private state, which of course is much more powerful?

Hoppe: In local conflicts, in a village or a small town, these will very often be universally respected "natural aristocrats." Or else, arbitrating organisations and courts of appeal, which insurers and insured have contractually agreed on from the start. Whoever then does not abide by the judgments will not only be defaulting, he will become a pariah in the world of business. Nobody will want to have anything to do with him, and he will immediately lose all his customers. This is no utopian idea. This is already the usual practice in international—anarchical—business transactions today. And another question for you: How should the individual citizen assert his interests in the face of a monopolistic tax-state? It is much more powerful—and always has the last word!

Do you understand the continuing scepticism with regard to your proposition?

Hoppe : Of course, as most people have never heard of this idea, let alone thought about it seriously. I am only unsympathetic towards those who yell out at the top of their voices when they hear this idea and demand the condemnation of its representatives, without having the least knowledge of economics and political philosophy.

It is hardly likely that a majority of citizens will ever support such an unfamiliar model. But what parts of it at least could be adopted, in order to achieve at least partial improvements of our current system, without a complete abandonment of state and democracy?

Hoppe : There is an interim solution. It’s called secession and political decentralization. Small states must be libertarian, otherwise the productive people will desert them. Desirable therefore is a world made up of thousands of Liechtensteins, Singapores and Hong Kongs. In contrast, a European central government—and even more so a world government—with a "harmonized" tax and regulation policy, is the gravest threat to freedom.

For that too you will probably not find a majority. Therefore how will state and democracy develop in future? Where will we finally end up?

Hoppe : The Western "welfare state model," "socialism light," will collapse just like "classical" socialism—of course, I can’t say whether in five, ten or 15 years. The key words are: state bankruptcy, hyperinflation, currency reform and violent distribution battles. Then it will either come to a call for a "strong man" or—hopefully—a massive secession movement.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, an Austrian School economist and anarchocapitalist philosopher, is professor emeritus of economics at UNLV, a distinguished fellow with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, and founder and president of The Property and Freedom Society. Send him mail. See Hans-Hermann Hoppe's article archives.

You can subscribe to future articles by Hans-Hermann Hoppe via this RSS feed.

Copyright © 2012 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given.

[Excerpted from Ron Paul's historic farewell speech to Congress, which is available in our new publication, Pursue the Cause of Liberty: A Farewell to Congress, in both pocketbook and ebook editions, with an introduction by Lew Rockwell.]

Limiting Government Excesses vs. A Virtuous Moral People

Our Constitution, which was intended to limit government power and abuse, has failed. The Founders warned that a free society depends on a virtuous and moral people. The current crisis reflects that their concerns were justified.

Most politicians and pundits are aware of the problems we face but spend all their time in trying to reform government. The sad part is that the suggested reforms almost always lead to less freedom and the importance of a virtuous and moral people is either ignored, or not understood. The new reforms serve only to further undermine liberty. The compounding effect has given us this steady erosion of liberty and the massive expansion of debt. The real question is: if it is liberty we seek, should most of the emphasis be placed on government reform or trying to understand what "a virtuous and moral people" means and how to promote it. The Constitution has not prevented the people from demanding handouts for both rich and poor in their efforts to reform the government, while ignoring the principles of a free society. All branches of our government today are controlled by individuals who use their power to undermine liberty and enhance the welfare/warfare state—and frequently their own wealth and power.

If the people are unhappy with the government performance it must be recognized that government is merely a reflection of an immoral society that rejected a moral government of constitutional limitations of power and love of freedom.

If this is the problem all the tinkering with thousands of pages of new laws and regulations will do nothing to solve the problem.

It is self-evident that our freedoms have been severely limited and the apparent prosperity we still have, is nothing more than leftover wealth from a previous time. This fictitious wealth based on debt and benefits from a false trust in our currency and credit, will play havoc with our society when the bills come due. This means that the full consequence of our lost liberties is yet to be felt.

But that illusion is now ending. Reversing a downward spiral depends on accepting a new approach.

Expect the rapidly expanding homeschooling movement to play a significant role in the revolutionary reforms needed to build a free society with Constitutional protections. We cannot expect a Federal government controlled school system to provide the intellectual ammunition to combat the dangerous growth of government that threatens our liberties.

The internet will provide the alternative to the government/media complex that controls the news and most political propaganda. This is why it's essential that the internet remains free of government regulation.

Many of our religious institutions and secular organizations support greater dependency on the state by supporting war, welfare, and corporatism and ignore the need for a virtuous people.

I never believed that the world or our country could be made more free by politicians, if the people had no desire for freedom.

Under the current circumstances the most we can hope to achieve in the political process is to use it as a podium to reach the people to alert them of the nature of the crisis and the importance of their need to assume responsibility for themselves, if it is liberty that they truly seek. Without this, a constitutionally protected free society is impossible.

If this is true, our individual goal in life ought to be for us to seek virtue and excellence and recognize that self-esteem and happiness only comes from using one's natural ability, in the most productive manner possible, according to one's own talents.

Productivity and creativity are the true source of personal satisfaction. Freedom, and not dependency, provides the environment needed to achieve these goals. Government cannot do this for us; it only gets in the way. When the government gets involved, the goal becomes a bailout or a subsidy and these cannot provide a sense of personal achievement.

Achieving legislative power and political influence should not be our goal. Most of the change, if it is to come, will not come from the politicians, but rather from individuals, family, friends, intellectual leaders and our religious institutions. The solution can only come from rejecting the use of coercion, compulsion, government commands, and aggressive force, to mold social and economic behavior. Without accepting these restraints, inevitably the consensus will be to allow the government to mandate economic equality and obedience to the politicians who gain power and promote an environment that smothers the freedoms of everyone. It is then that the responsible individuals who seek excellence and self-esteem by being self-reliant and productive, become the true victims.

Conclusion

What are the greatest dangers that the American people face today and impede the goal of a free society? There are five.

1.The continuous attack on our civil liberties which threatens the rule of law and our ability to resist the onrush of tyranny.

2.Violent anti-Americanism that has engulfed the world. Because the phenomenon of "blow-back" is not understood or denied, our foreign policy is destined to keep us involved in many wars that we have no business being in. National bankruptcy and a greater threat to our national security will result.

3.The ease in which we go to war, without a declaration by Congress, but accepting international authority from the UN or NATO even for preemptive wars, otherwise known as aggression.

4.A financial political crisis as a consequence of excessive debt, unfunded liabilities, spending, bailouts, and gross discrepancy in wealth distribution going from the middle class to the rich. The danger of central economic planning, by the Federal Reserve must be understood.

5.World government taking over local and U.S. sovereignty by getting involved in the issues of war, welfare, trade, banking, a world currency, taxes, property ownership, and private ownership of guns. Happily, there is an answer for these very dangerous trends.

What a wonderful world it would be if everyone accepted the simple moral premise of rejecting all acts of aggression. The retort to such a suggestion is always: it's too simplistic, too idealistic, impractical, naïve, utopian, dangerous, and unrealistic to strive for such an ideal.

The answer to that is that for thousands of years the acceptance of government force, to rule over the people, at the sacrifice of liberty, was considered moral and the only available option for achieving peace and prosperity.

What could be more utopian than that myth—considering the results especially looking at the state sponsored killing, by nearly every government during the twentieth century, estimated to be in the hundreds of millions. It's time to reconsider this grant of authority to the state.

No good has ever come from granting monopoly power to the state to use aggression against the people to arbitrarily mold human behavior. Such power, when left unchecked, becomes the seed of an ugly tyranny. This method of governance has been adequately tested, and the results are in: reality dictates we try liberty.

The idealism of non-aggression and rejecting all offensive use of force should be tried. The idealism of government sanctioned violence has been abused throughout history and is the primary source of poverty and war. The theory of a society being based on individual freedom has been around for a long time. It's time to take a bold step and actually permit it by advancing this cause, rather than taking a step backward as some would like us to do.

Today the principle of habeas corpus, established when King John signed the Magna Carta in 1215, is under attack. There's every reason to believe that a renewed effort with the use of the internet that we can instead advance the cause of liberty by spreading an uncensored message that will serve to rein in government authority and challenge the obsession with war and welfare.

What I'm talking about is a system of government guided by the moral principles of peace and tolerance.

The Founders were convinced that a free society could not exist without a moral people. Just writing rules won't work if the people choose to ignore them. Today the rule of law written in the Constitution has little meaning for most Americans, especially those who work in Washington, D.C.

Benjamin Franklin claimed "only a virtuous people are capable of freedom." John Adams concurred: "Our Constitution was made for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other."

A moral people must reject all violence in an effort to mold people's beliefs or habits.

A society that boos or ridicules the Golden Rule is not a moral society. All great religions endorse the Golden Rule. The same moral standards that individuals are required to follow should apply to all government officials. They cannot be exempt.

The ultimate solution is not in the hands of the government.

The solution falls on each and every individual, with guidance from family, friends, and community.

The #1 responsibility for each of us is to change ourselves with hope that others will follow. This is of greater importance than working on changing the government; that is secondary to promoting a virtuous society. If we can achieve this, then the government will change.

It doesn't mean that political action or holding office has no value. At times it does nudge policy in the right direction. But what is true is that when seeking office is done for personal aggrandizement, money or power, it becomes useless if not harmful. When political action is taken for the right reasons it's easy to understand why compromise should be avoided. It also becomes clear why progress is best achieved by working with coalitions, which bring people together, without anyone sacrificing his principles.

Political action, to be truly beneficial, must be directed toward changing the hearts and minds of the people, recognizing that it's the virtue and morality of the people that allow liberty to flourish.

The Constitution or more laws per se, have no value if the people's attitudes aren't changed.

To achieve liberty and peace, two powerful human emotions have to be overcome. Number one is "envy" which leads to hate and class warfare. Number two is "intolerance" which leads to bigoted and judgmental policies. These emotions must be replaced with a much better understanding of love, compassion, tolerance, and free market economics. Freedom, when understood, brings people together. When tried, freedom is popular.

The problem we have faced over the years has been that economic interventionists are swayed by envy, whereas social interventionists are swayed by intolerance of habits and lifestyles. The misunderstanding that tolerance is an endorsement of certain activities, motivates many to legislate moral standards which should only be set by individuals making their own choices. Both sides use force to deal with these misplaced emotions. Both are authoritarians. Neither endorses voluntarism. Both views ought to be rejected.

I have come to one firm conviction after these many years of trying to figure out "the plain truth of things." The best chance for achieving peace and prosperity, for the maximum number of people world-wide, is to pursue the cause of LIBERTY.

If you find this to be a worthwhile message, spread it throughout the land.

Dr. Ron Paul is a Republican member of Congress from Texas and a 2012 US presidential candidate. See Ron Paul's article archives.

You can subscribe to future articles by Ron Paul via this RSS feed.

It is the same with a people as it is with a man. If it wishes to give itself some gratification, it naturally considers whether it is worth what it costs. To a nation, security is the greatest of advantages. If, in order to obtain it, it is necessary to have an army of a hundred thousand men, I have nothing to say against it. It is an enjoyment bought by a sacrifice. Let me not be misunderstood upon the extent of my position. A member of the assembly proposes to disband a hundred thousand men, for the sake of relieving the tax-payers of a hundred million.

If we confine ourselves to this answer, "The hundred thousand men, and these hundred million of money, are indispensable to the national security: it is a sacrifice; but without this sacrifice, France would be torn by factions or invaded by some foreign power" — I have nothing to object to this argument, which may be true or false in fact, but which theoretically contains nothing which militates against economics. The error begins when the sacrifice itself is said to be an advantage because it profits somebody.

Now I am very much mistaken if, the moment the author of the proposal has taken his seat, some orator will not rise and say, "Disband a hundred thousand men! Do you know what you are saying? What will become of them? Where will they get a living? Don't you know that work is scarce everywhere? That every field is overstocked? Would you turn them out of doors to increase competition and to weigh upon the rate of wages? Just now, when it is a hard matter to live at all, it would be a pretty thing if the State must find bread for a hundred thousand individuals! Consider, besides, that the army consumes wine, arms, clothing — that it promotes the activity of manufactures in garrison towns — that it is, in short, the godsend of innumerable purveyors. Why, anyone must tremble at the bare idea of doing away with this immense industrial stimulus."

This discourse, it is evident, concludes by voting the maintenance of a hundred thousand soldiers, for reasons drawn from the necessity of the service, and from economical considerations. It is these economical considerations only that I have to refute.

A hundred thousand men, costing the taxpayers a hundred million of money, live and bring to the purveyors as much as a hundred million can supply. This is that which is seen.

But, a hundred million taken from the pockets of the tax-payers, ceases to maintain these taxpayers and their purveyors, as far as a hundred million reaches. This is that which is not seen. Now make your calculations. Add it all up, and tell me what profit there is for the masses?

I will tell you where the loss lies; and to simplify it, instead of speaking of a hundred thousand men and a hundred million of money, it shall be of one man and a thousand francs.

We will suppose that we are in the village of A. The recruiting sergeants go their round, and take off a man. The tax-gatherers go their round, and take off a thousand francs. The man and the sum of money are taken to Metz, and the latter is destined to support the former for a year without doing anything. If you consider Metz only, you are quite right; the measure is a very advantageous one: but if you look toward the village of A, you will judge very differently; for, unless you are very blind indeed, you will see that that village has lost a worker, and the thousand francs which would remunerate his labor, as well as the activity which, by the expenditure of those thousand francs, it would spread around it.

At first sight, there would seem to be some compensation. What took place at the village, now takes place at Metz, that is all. But the loss is to be estimated in this way: At the village, a man dug and worked; he was a worker. At Metz, he turns to the right about and to the left about; he is a soldier. The money and the circulation are the same in both cases; but in the one there were three hundred days of productive labor, in the other there are three hundred days of unproductive labor, supposing, of course, that a part of the army is not indispensable to the public safety.

Now, suppose the disbanding to take place. You tell me there will be a surplus of a hundred thousand workers, that competition will be stimulated, and it will reduce the rate of wages. This is what you see.

But what you do not see is this. You do not see that to dismiss a hundred thousand soldiers is not to do away with a hundred million of money, but to return it to the tax-payers. You do not see that to throw a hundred thousand workers on the market, is to throw into it, at the same moment, the hundred million of money needed to pay for their labor: that, consequently, the same act that increases the supply of hands, increases also the demand; from which it follows, that your fear of a reduction of wages is unfounded. You do not see that, before the disbanding as well as after it, there are in the country a hundred million of money corresponding with the hundred thousand men. That the whole difference consists in this: before the disbanding, the country gave the hundred million to the hundred thousand men for doing nothing; and that after it, it pays them the same sum for working. You do not see, in short, that when a taxpayer gives his money either to a soldier in exchange for nothing, or to a worker in exchange for something, all the ultimate consequences of the circulation of this money are the same in the two cases; only, in the second case the taxpayer receives something, in the former he receives nothing. The result is — a dead loss to the nation.

The sophism which I am here combating will not stand the test of progression, which is the touchstone of principles. If, when every compensation is made, and all interests satisfied, there is a national profit in increasing the army, why not enroll under its banners the entire male population of the country?

Frédéric Bastiat was the great French proto-Austrolibertarian whose polemics and analytics run circles around every statist cliché. His primary desire as a writer was to reach people in the most practical way with the message of the moral and material urgency of freedom. See Frederic Bastiat's article archives.

You can subscribe to future articles by Frederic Bastiat via this RSS feed.

Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given.