Navy Shifts Focus To Lower-end Threats
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead has signed off on the Navy’s “Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges.” The Navy will buy ships and aircraft that provide “broadened” and “balanced” capabilities to deal with a range of irregular opponents, including pirates, terrorists, criminal organizations, insurgents and other state and non-state actors, the document says.
By “balancing shifts in our investments” the service will better address and incorporate “urgent and emerging requirements” to confront the “hybrid nature” of future challenges. It emphasizes buying “multi-mission ships and aircraft,” oriented to “lower end operations,” such as Littoral Combat Ship mission modules, Riverine squadrons and “persistent manned and unmanned surveillance platforms.” Navy undersecretary Bob Work has been a big proponent of building flexibility and multi-mission capabilities, his “big boxes” concept, into ship design.
The document calls for using conventional weapons in low end missions, “to include P-3 for surveillance against terrorists and insurgents, tactical aircraft for armed reconnaissance, and submarines and surface combatants in counter-drug operations.” Navy ships and personnel currently provide anti-terrorist forces in the Philippines, pirate hunters off East Africa, protection of oil platforms in the Arabian Gulf and foreign nation security force training and assistance with multi-mission amphibious ships and helicopters.
The irregular warfare vision advocates closer ties with the Coast Guard and the Marines, as well as other government agencies and non-government organizations. Expanding coordination with interagency and international partners features prominently in the new vision document as part of the “indirect” approach to supporting counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense. “Partners can appreciate the Navy’s dependable but impermanent presence, which requires neither a footprint ashore nor infringement on their sovereignty.”
The open seas and littoral areas provide “operating space” for irregular actors to destabilize weak governments, traffic in contraband or intimidate populations. As part of the Navy’s Cooperative Strategy, the vision “recognizes the value presence, of being there,” to maintain security and gather intelligence as well as to act as a deterrent to non-state actors.
Interagency cooperation, resources called deterrent to terrorism threatsApril 10, 2012 | Rachel Levy Sarfin - CorrespondentcloseAuthor: Rachel Levy Sarfin - Correspondent Name: Rachel Levy SarfinSite: About: See Authors Posts (7)
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CSIS Assistant Director Raymond Boisvert speaks at the “Canada and the New Middle East” conference as panelists RCMP Superintendent Doug Best (left) and Mackenzie Institute expert John Thompson (right) look on.
TORONTO – When Doug Best joined the RCMP in the late 1970s, terrorist threats posed a challenge to the law enforcement agency.
However, Best declared, the events of Sept. 11, 2001 “changed the world.”
These changes included the amount of resources Canadian security and law enforcement agencies received to fight terror. More than a decade after the horrific attacks, terrorism still poses a threat to the original target – the US – and to Canada as well. However, greater resource allocations to organizations such as CSIS and the RCMP, as well as unprecedented levels of interagency cooperation, translate to greater success in preventing attacks.
Best, now superintendent of the RCMP, joined CSIS Assistant Director Raymond Boisvert and international security expert John Thompson of the Mackenzie Institute on a panel devoted to counterterrorism at the Canada and the New Middle East conference held recently in downtown Toronto. The three men discussed increased threats to Canada in the wake of the political instability the Arab Spring has wreaked across the Middle East.
Boisvert echoed Best’s statement about enhanced collaboration as an effective tool to fight terrorism. Still, risks abound for Canadians both inside and outside of Canada, Boisvert warned.
Both Best and Boisvert spoke of the terrorist threat that comes from inside immigrant communities. Radical elements can infiltrate these groups and recruit followers, who may then carry out terrorist attacks. The RCMP is trying to prevent this problem from taking place by reaching out to immigrant communities and urging them to root out harmful influences.
Thompson pointed out that Canada has never had to face such an internal threat before. He blames countries such as Saudi Arabia for encouraging extremists to leave the country and sow the seeds of fundamentalism across the world.
Thompson also raised the question of Canada’s humanitarian interests. While Canada is letting in Coptic Christians fleeing Egypt now, what will happen in another year? As Egypt hovers on the brink of famine, what will Canada do?
In an exclusive interview with the Jewish Tribune, Thompson shed light on Canada’s possible humanitarian role in the Middle East. He pointed out that Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s pragmatic leanings mean that Canada’s interests lie in forestalling war, and Canada’s current peacekeeping role in the Middle East probably won’t change. Thompson also predicts Canada’s alliance with Israel will continue, as Israel remains a trustworthy partner.
Tags: Canada CSIS current interagency cooperation Middle East RCMP security terrorism threats
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Originating from the Defence Planning Committee in 1992, the AGS programme was defined as a capability acquisition effort in 1995, when the NATO Defence Ministers agreed that “the Alliance should pursue work on a minimum essential NATO-owned and operated AGS core capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets”.
The AGS programme was to provide NATO with a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability that would offer the Alliance and its nations unrestricted and unfiltered access to ground surveillance data in near-real-time and in an interoperable manner. It was to include an air segment comprising airborne radar sensors and a ground segment comprising fixed, transportable and mobile ground stations for data exploitation and dissemination, all seamlessly interconnected linked through high-performance data links.
From the outset, the AGS capability was expected to be based on one or more types of ground surveillance assets either already existing or in development in NATO nations, an approach that later also came to include proposed developmental systems based on US or European radars. However, all those approaches failed to obtain sufficient support by the NATO nations to allow their realisation. In 2001, the Reinforced North Atlantic Council (NAC(R)) decided to revitalise AGS through a developmental programme available to all NATO nations and a corresponding cooperative radar development effort called the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR).
In 2004, NATO decided to move ahead with what was labelled as a mixed-fleet approach. The air segment was to include Airbus A321 manned aircraft and Global Hawk Block 40 UAVs, both carrying versions of the TCAR radar, while the ground segment was to comprise an extensive set of fixed and deployable ground stations.
Due to declining European defence budgets, NATO decided in 2007 to discontinue the mixed fleet approach and instead to move forward with a simplified AGS system where the air segment was based on the on the off-the-shelf Global Hawk Block 40 UAV and its associated multi-platform radar technology insertion program (MP-RTIP) sensor. The ground segment, which would largely be developed and built by European and Canadian industry, remained virtually unchanged as its functional and operational characteristics were largely independent of the actual aircraft and sensor used.In February 2009, the NATO nations participating in the AGS programme started the process to sign the Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). This was a significant step forward on the road towards realising an urgently required, operationally essential capability for NATO. NAGSMA was established in September 2009, after all participating nations had agreed on the PMOU. The PMOU serves as the basis for the procurement of this new NATO capability.
Another important milestone for the AGS programme was the 2010 Lisbon Summit, where the strong operational need for a NATO owned and operated AGS capability was re-confirmed with NATO’s new Strategic Concept. AGS also featured in the Lisbon Package as one of the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs.
On 3 February 2012, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided on a way ahead to collectively cover the costs for operating AGS for the benefit of the Alliance. The decision to engage NATO common funding for infrastructure, satellite communications and operations and support paves the way for awarding the AGS acquisition contract by 13 Allies. In addition, an agreement was reached to make the United Kingdom Sentinel system and the future French Heron TP system available as national contributions-in-kind, partly replacing financial contributions from those two Allies.
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As the late Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi's forces prepared to crush the Libyan uprising last summer in Benghazi, Britain, France, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and other allies moved quickly to reinforce the beleaguered rebel forces.
With military supplies, training, advice -- and of course the backing of NATO war planes -- this coalition of governments provided critical support to change the course of the conflict, ultimately leading to Qaddafi's downfall.
The U.N. Security Council's arms embargo was primarily intended to constrain Qaddafi's capacity to use its massive oil wealth to import new stocks of weapons and foreign mercenaries to help put down the rebellion. But it also placed restraints on the supply of weapons to the rebels, prompting the Security Council to later introduce an exemption -- providing significant cover for governments seeking to arm the rebels.
A new report by a U.N. panel of experts responsible for monitoring the arms embargo in Libya sought to itemize a list of military supplies -- everything from sandbags to shouldered propelled rockets -- that flowed into Libya after the U.N. Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Libya in February 2011. The list, however, is incomplete because NATO and some of the insurgents' chief military backers, including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have refused to provide a full account of their contributions.
The report identified numerous attempts by the Qaddafi regime "to secure arms deals and use mercenaries from neighboring countries," citing reports in the Globe and Mail about a July 2011 visit to Beijing by Libyan officials seeking to purchase military supplies from three Chinese arms manufacturers. (China denied that the talks led to any deals.) The panel also cited reports that much of Libya's military capacity had been reconstituted after 2004, following years of Western and U.N. sanctions, with the aid of Western European countries and ex-Soviet states (The panel also noted that is conducting an ongoing investigation into Qaddafi's use of mercenaries, adding that so far it had found "no conclusive evidence.")
But the 78-page report provides insights into how the international community combined diplomatic pressure, military airpower, and clandestine arms deliveries, to topple a regime. It would not be surprising if some of those countries considering backing the Syrian campaign to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad in Syria are drawing from the same playbook.
The United States
Though U.S. airpower proved decisive in crippling Qaddafi's defenses, the United States maintains that it provided only non-lethal military support to the rebels. The report notes that on February 6, the United States provided the panel with a list of its contributions, including 8,000 uniforms, 8,000 boots, 5,825 load-bearing vests, 2,850 bullet proof vests, 1,975 military helmets, and "items for defensive positions (sandbags, Hescos...)."
Italy
The Italian government notified the panel on February 14 that it supplied 10 military trainers, 10,000 uniforms, 5,400 helmets and 2,800 leather boots.
United Kingdom.
On February 9, the United Kingdom informed the panel that it supplies the rebels with 6,000 sets of body armor and no more than 20 military personnel. The British action, according to the report, was intended to "provide a military assistance team to the Libyan authorities for the purpose of providing operational assistance, training and mentoring on security issues, including reform of the armed services, counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency."
France
In April 2011, the French government notified the United Nations that it had sent a small team of military advisors to Libya to provide the National Transitional Council with "support and advice on ways to organize its internal structure, manage its resources and improve its communications." In June, it went further, notifying the UN that it had "airdropped self-defence weapons for the civilian populations that had been victims of attacks by Libyan armed forces." The panel's report contains no detailed list of these contributions as the French asked it to keep the details confidential.
Albania
The panel said that it has obtained information that several flights operating from Tirana, Albania, transported military materiel to Benghazi over a three day period in September, 2011. The case remains under investigation.
Sudan
One of the more tantalizing revelations in the panel report is the suggestion that Darfuri rebel groups, including members of the Zaghawa tribe and fighters from the Justice and Equality Movement, may have backed Qaddafi's counterinsurgency campaign. The panel said that while it was not able to "definitely corroborate" numerous reports of the military role in the conflict, ‘the accumulative strength of intelligence gives substantial credibility to these findings." No to be outdone, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, extended overflight rights over Sudanese territory to NATO, according to senior U.N. diplomats, and allegedly supplied arms to the insurgents, according to the panel. The panel cited claims by the Benghazi rebel defense ministry that Sudan provided "small arms and light weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades," and transported other supplies to Bengazhi on two Ilyushin-76 aircraft. "According to media reports, on 26 October, the President of the Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, gave a speech in Kasala in which he acknowledged weapons deliveries from the Sudan to Libya and that the weapons had reached revolutionaries in Misratah, Al-Jabal Al-Gharabi and Zawiya." The Sudanese government did not reply to the panel's request for information.
Qatar
In March 2011, Qatar notified the United Nations that it would participate in NATO enforcement of the U.N.-authorized no-fly zone over Libya, contributing "a number of military aircraft, military transport aircraft and helicopters." Qatar categorically denied media reports that "it had supplied the revolutionaries with arms and ammunition," saying only that it had "sent a limited number of military personnel to provide military consultations to the revolutionaries, defend Libyan civilians and protect aid convoys." The only weapons and ammunition it had furnished was for the use of Qatari military advisors in self-defense.
But the Qatari contention had one big hole in it. In July, 2011, a Swiss television station discovered spent Swiss ammunition used by the Libyan revolutionaries. The Swiss ammo had been exported to the Qatar armed forces in 2009 by a Swiss arms company, FGS Frex, and made its way to Libya. Confronted by Swiss authorities, who noted that Qatar was prohibited from re-exporting the ammunition, the Qatari ambassador appeared to have confirmed its role in the supply of ammunition. "The ambassador of Qatar explained to the Swiss representatives that the ‘transfer of the aforementioned ammunition to the Libyan opposition was a misadventure in the course of his country's support of the NATO operation in Libya.' He reassured the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs that ‘Qatar took the appropriate measures to prevent similar errors in the future.'"
The United Arab Emirates
The panel provided few details about alleged arms transfers by the United Arab Emirates, partly because it is conducting an ongoing investigation into the matter, and partly because the Gulf state refused to provide the panel with a list of its contributions. On March 25, "the United Arab Emirates notified the [UN] Secretary General that it would participate, within the framework of the international coalition, by providing military aircraft. No notification was given regarding transfers of weapons or ammunition or provision of military personnel." The panel visited the UAE to inquire about its role in arming and advising the Libyan insurgents. The government insisted that it had acted in conformity with UN resolutions and under the umbrella of the NATO operation" to protect civilians. "They did not provide more precise information and said that NATO would be in a better position to answer those questions."
NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's role in Libya was decisive in crippling Qaddafi's military defenses and providing support for insurgent offensive operations. While its air campaign is not the subject of the panel's inquiry, the report notes that it wrote to NATO "asking it to provide a detailed list of military materiel, including weapons and ammunition, sent by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates or any other country that participated in the NATO operation and information regarding the number and roles of military personnel sent by those countries to Libya since the imposition of the embargo. While NATO acknowledged the receipt of the panel's request for information on 25 January 2012, no answer has been provided to date."
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Can we see genocides and other mass atrocities coming? If so, how, and how far in advance? And would public dissemination of those forecasts help policy-makers, advocates, and affected societies prevent those atrocities from occurring?
In October 2011, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) convened a group of advocates and academics for a one-day seminar to ruminate on these questions. These are big and difficult problems, and the event really had a more practical goal at its heart: to help the Museum and other civil-society groups assess the potential for, and value of, a new public early-warning system focused on genocide and other mass atrocities.
Based on that conversation and the recommendations of USHMM Fellow and Dartmouth professor Ben Valentino, the Museum decided that the need and opportunity were sufficient to start considering what such a system might look like and how to build it. In March 2012, the Museum hired me for an eight-month consulting project, to finish in October, that’s meant to push this process forward.
My project has two main parts. First and most important, I’ve been asked to write a prospectus detailing the elements and funding this program would require. Second, I’ve been asked to build a statistical tool that could produce one set of forecasts for this program, if it gets built. Under Ben’s proposal, a second set of forecasts would come from some form of expert survey, and the two could be compared and combined to useful effect.
As I get deeper into the project, I expect to blog occasionally about what I’m working on and where I could use some help. I’ve already had very helpful exchanges with numerous people engaged in related projects, including former Political Instability Task Force colleagues Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff, who produces her own global genocide risk list each year, and Sentinel Project founder Christopher Tuckwood. I’m also slated to present results from a preliminary version of my statistical analysis at NYU’s Northeast Methods Program (NEMP) in early May, and my work will surely benefit from the constructive criticism that esteemed audience can provide.
In the meantime, I wanted to spread the word about the Museum’s interest in this endeavor and invite your reactions and suggestions. If you know of any relevant research or advocacy projects or might be interested in supporting this work in some fashion, please post a comment or drop me a line at ulfelder <at> gmail <dot> com.
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What is the Political Instability Task Force?
The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) is a panel of scholars and methodologists that was originally formed in 1994 at the request of senior policymakers in the United States Government. The composition of the core group of scholars numbers from ten to fifteen and represents several of the country's leading research institutions; current Task Force members come from Arizona State, Columbia, George Mason, Harvard, Maryland, Minnesota, Stanford, and Texas universities. Its original, assigned task was to assess and explain the vulnerability of states around the world to political instability and state failure. Over the eleven-year course of its work, the Task Force has broadened its attention from the kind of extreme state failure that befell Somalia and the former Zaire in the early 1990s to include onsets of general political instability defined by outbreaks of revolutionary or ethnic war, adverse regime change, and genocide. More recently, the Task Force has explored matters of governance raised by our earlier research through projects that measure state capacity and model democratic transitions. In the wake of September 11, we also turned our attention to relationships between states and international terrorist groups. Even as the scope of the panel's research program has grown, however, the central objective has remained the same: using open-source data, the Task Force seeks to develop statistical models that can accurately assess countries' prospects for major political change and can identify key risk factors of interest to US policymakers.The PITF is funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The PITF website is hosted by the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University and is provided as a public service. The views expressed herein are those of the Task Force and its individual members, and do not represent the views of the University or the US Government.
IntroductionState failure is a label that encompasses a range of severe political conflicts and regime crises exemplified by macro-societal events such as those that occurred in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) in the 1990s. This web site lists comparative information on cases of total and partial state failure (i.e., periods of political instability) that began between 1955 and 2006 in independent countries with populations greater than 500,000. The four types of events included are revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides. The accompanying codebook provides definitions of each type of event and describes the scales used to estimate magnitudes of each type (click on the "Code Book" button above). The list of state failure events (i.e., the PITF/State Failure "problem set") has been compiled from multiple sources and is updated annually by researchers at the Center for Global Policy, George Mason University; it is regularly reviewed and revised with input from area and subject-matter specialists. The "problem set" information is presented in two forms: (1) a description of consolidated cases in tabular form and (2) a series of four separate datasets, based on type of event, with estimates of annual magnitudes for each of the events that were used in compiling the table. The list of consolidated cases is provided in Word document format and the four, event-type data sets are provided in Excel spreadsheet format. These resource files can be downloaded and viewed or imported/integrated into statistical software. In addition to the list(s) of state failure events, this Web site houses other important Political Instability Task Force (PITF) resources, including electronic copies of the several Task Force Research Reports, the PITF Public Data Dictionary (identifying all open source data collected and compiled by the Task Force in its Global Database), and selected PITF Replication Datasets comprising variables used in the several models described in Task Force reports.
Who and WhyA list of state failures was originally prepared in 1994 by a research team directed by Ted Robert Gurr of the University of Maryland and (for genocides and politicides) Barbara Harff of the U.S. Naval Academy. The information was compiled as part of an unclassified study that was commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence in response to a request from senior US policy makers to design and carry out a data-driven study on the correlates of state failure since the mid-1950s. The study was carried out by a Task Force consisting of academic experts, data collection and management specialists from the Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), and analytic methods professionals from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). It must be noted that, although the work of the Task Force was funded by the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, none of the information contained in this Web site, associated data resources, or Task Force reports is based on intelligence reporting or classified material. Neither does the information presented represent the official view of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or the Central Intelligence Agency, but, rather, the views of the individual authors and researchers themselves.
The original global data-driven studies conducted by the originally-named State Failure Task Force used the "consolidated," or "complex," case as the unit of analysis (i.e., the dependent variable). Subsequent analyses have examined various subsets of the global dataset (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa countries and Muslim countries) and specific types of political instability or state failure events (e.g., democratic transitions, genocides and politicides, ethnic wars, internal wars).
In late 2000 and early 2001, the State Failure Problem Set and the underlying methodology for identifying state failure cases was re-examined by the Task Force, following the lead of Monty G. Marshall, who took over management of the Problem Set in 1998. The re-examination and consequent revision of the Problem Set was conducted in order to improve the quality of the data, particularly the beginning and ending dates of the State Failure events, and thus enable finer-grained and more focused analyses of the data. The resulting revised Problem Set is substantially "stronger" and "tighter" than the version reported in the earlier phases of the research (Reports I and II, see below).
In mid-2002, an agreement was finalized that allowed the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Program in the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland to provide public access to State Failure Task Force research materials. In 2003, the name of the Task was changed to the Political Instability Task Force to reflect the ever-expanding scope of the Task Force's work and to distance it from the more narrow, and more extreme, notion of complex, systemic failure and state collapse. In 2005 hosting of the Task Force public access Web site moved to the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University. The Task Force materials hosted on this Web site have been provided directly by the managers of the Task Force and have not been altered in any way by the INSCR or CGP hosts.
ReferencesThe several research phases of the State Failure project and their results are described in the citations below. Electronic copies of the first three biennial Task Force reports are available free of charge and are downloadable from this Web site; the Phase IV report is also available here by special request.
Overview: Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Pamela T. Surko, Alan N. Unger, and Robert Chen. "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning," chap. 3 in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Boulder, CO and Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
Phase I Report: Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger. Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 30 November 1995.
Phase II Report: Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger. State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 31 July 1998. Also published as: State Failure Task Force. "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings." In Environmental Change and Security Project Report (Summer 1999). Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center.
Phase III Report: Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc A. Levy, Monty G. Marshall, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Colin H. Kahl, Pamela T. Surko, John C. Ulfelder, and Alan N. Unger. In consultation with Matthew Christenson, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Daniel C. Esty, and Thomas M. Parris. State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 30 September 2000.
Phase IV Report:
Robert H.Bates, David L. Epstein, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Colin H. Kahl, Kristen Knight, Marc A. Levy, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Thomas M. Parris, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark R. Woodward. 2003. Political Instability Task Force Report: Phase IV Findings. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation.Phase V Reports:
A Global Forecasting Model of Political InstabilityJack A. Goldstone, Robert Bates, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark WoodwardForecasting Instability: Are Ethnic War and Muslim Country Models Different? Ted Robert Gurr, Mark Woodward, and Monty G. MarshallModeling Transitions to and from Democracy Jay Ulfelder and Michael LustikAmerican Journal of Political Science 50.1; 190-208 A Global Model for Forecasting Political InstabilityJack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik,
Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark WoodwardWe welcome your comments and inquiries concerning the State Failure Project or the list of internal wars and failures of governance. Please direct all correspondence to
Dr. Monty G. Marshall Director of Research, Center for Global Policy School of Public Policy George Mason University 3401 North Fairfax Drive, MS 3B1 Arlington, VA 22201 Phone: (703) 993-8177 Fax: (703) 993-8215 Email: mmarsha5@gmu.edu
For more information on the Center for Global Policy in the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, or to return to the CGP website, click here or on the "CGP" button in the button bars.
This website was last updated on January 19 , 2010.
See this Go Daddy InstantPage®! http://r2pindex.com. Get yours free with a domain name at GoDaddy.com. A 4 level Index on crises in the world. An index for the International Community to intervene and act on the Responsibility To Protect. Crises management team on call.
London, United Kingdom - Claiming that a great deal of uncertainty hangs over the contemporary security/strategic environment in the Middle East is neither a novel statement nor an exaggeration. Although it is commonly acknowledged that the regional politics will have a stronger Islamic flavour in the years ahead, it is not at all clear how various Islamic parties will conduct themselves once in government, and how their political activism will affect extremist groups in the region and beyond. Similarly, while there is a general consensus that US power in the region is waning, the trajectory of this expected demise is yet to be determined; will it be a sudden fall or will it be a gradual one?
At the same time, certain projections can be made confidently - two of which make the whole picture more complicated. The Middle East is home to 65 per cent of proven global oil reserves and 45 per cent of its natural gas. Concentration of so much of the world's hydrocarbons in this geographical location implies that global dependency on the region is only going to grow, leading to intense geopolitical competition over access to the region's vast resources.
Meanwhile, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that China and India - ("Chindia") - will witness the highest rate of growth in their energy consumption between now and 2030. Hence, one can predict with confidence that Chindia will go head to head with the US and its European allies, and perhaps with one another, within the context of the evolving geopolitical contest over Middle Eastern oil and gas.
After decades of diplomatic passiveness between Chindia and the Middle East, Chindia's ties with the region entered a new phase in the 1980s. As the direct consequence of a generational change in their leaderships and their market liberalisation efforts, both China and India embarked upon a path toward astonishing economic development, forcing the two Asian giants to develop near identical interests in the subregion of the Gulf.
Today, India is interested in the Gulf as a source of oil and an oil services market; so is China. Indian elites and businesses are keen on pursuing opportunities in investment, sale of consumer goods and tourism; so are their Chinese counterparts. New Delhi is eager to enhance its ties with Saudi Arabia so to improve its standing amongst its Muslim population and the Muslim world; so is Beijing. Finally, India has sought to utilise Iran and the GCC states support in order to boost its power base on the international stage; so has China.
Similar policy
In addition, both Beijing and New Delhi seem to have adopted a similar policy towards the subregion, based on the principles of neutrality and non-intervention. As such, they both have used soft power/trade diplomacy to expand ties with all the states - regardless of their domestic politics and/or their historical/sectarian rivalries with one another.
Their disinterest in the domestic affairs of regional states, the complementarity of Chindia and regional actors' interests in each other's markets, Chindia's economic and industrial achievements, their increasing global power at the time of the US decline, and Washington's unconditional support for Israel, in turn, have substantially boosted Chindia's standing in the region - to the extent that many regional actors are now receptive to their increasing presence and involvement in regional affairs.
"Washington's ... efforts to bring India into its geopolitical orbit seem to be partly responsible for an emerging alternation in Chindia's Middle East diplomacy."
Yet, Washington's recent foreign policy initiatives and its efforts to bring India into its geopolitical orbit seem to be partly responsible for an emerging alternation in Chindia's Middle East diplomacy, as the two have begun to undertake more partial stances in their regional endeavours, and that a new set of regional blockings might be in the making - with Iran, China and probably Russia on one side, and the US, India and the GCC, on the other.
Currently, Indo-American ties are at their best in history. Washington is now co-operating with New Delhi in the fields of nuclear energy and cyber security, economic ties are growing fast and Indian firms are finding it much easier to obtain US technology, while military relations, including arm sales and joint military exercises, have reached new heights with the US keen to turn India into a buffer zone against China.
As a consequence, India is now closely aligned with US policy in the Gulf subregion - evident in its termination of military contacts and energy deals with Tehran, while seeking closer military and economic ties with the GCC states. The recent decision by the Indian government to extend its military co-operation agreement with Oman, alongside the Indian prime minister's reassurance to the Gulf States of India's "steadfast support" for the GCC leaders during the Manama uprising, are cases in point.
Ties with the Middle East
To be sure, India has its own reasons for forging closer ties with the Gulf monarchies vis-à-vis Iran. The bulk of India's trade is with the GCC states, especially with Saudi Arabia. A major portion of India's energy supplies have traditionally come from the Arab countries. Around six million Indians are employed in the GCC, whose presence not only eases the unemployment problem in India, but also results in substantial remittances.
Finally, India, as an IT superpower, sees a profitable market for itself in the GCC - where internet security is a pressing issue for both governments and businesses. Nonetheless, India's recent decision to distance itself from Tehran is a direct consequence of US pressure and New Delhi's desire to expand and strengthen its emerging friendship with the US.
Perceiving US led sanctions on Iran as a purported attempt at regime change and installation of a US friendly government in Iran as well as a threat to Beijing's economic interests, and angered by the recent Indo-American rapprochement and the US Pacific Century strategy, China too seems to be abandoning its neutrality and getting closer to Tehran.
To this end, Green Experts of Iran reports that Tehran and Beijing have signed an agreement whereby China, "in exchange for relinquishing parcels of Iran’s land and natural resources, promises to provide military protection for those areas". The geographical zones include a "380 kilometre stretch of the Persian Gulf peninsula as well as eight kilometres into the sea", "[a] large parcel of land from Ilam province through Marivan, which engulfs a newly-discovered reservoir of natural gas" and "a vast north-western area adjacent to the Caspian Sea".
Cautious approach
As with India however, China's decision to cuddle Iran has more to do with Beijing's own geopolitical calculations than a simple concern with Washington's new foreign policy initiatives; the conduct of the US has only accelerated the whole process.
Given the anti-Americanism of the Iranian government, Tehran's isolation on the world stage, and its desperate need for economic and political allies, not only can China use its influence over Tehran as a valuable bargaining chip in its dealings with the West and the GCC states, but it can also secure favourable deals for its businesses, particularly the state-owned energy companies, repel US hegemonistic efforts in the subregion, and gradually increase its control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Whether Beijing or New Delhi is pursuing a smarter strategy in the Middle East is too early to tell, but India appears to be taking a more cautious approach. Given the GCC states' small geographical and population size, their lack of strategic depth, their weak armed forces and near-total dependence on outside forces for their security, Gulf states are more of a strategic liability than asset.
Its alliance with the US, however, means that New Delhi needs not to concern itself with the GCC states' defence, since the US is likely to remain committed to their security in the foreseeable future. Nor does an embrace of the Gulf monarchies have any adverse effect on Indo-Israeli ties.
"... embracing Tehran could distort China's image as a responsible actor on the world stage."
Chinese strategy, on the other hand, suffers from two main shortcomings. First of all, China appears to be committing itself to the defence of Iran, and such commitment could have unintended consequences for Sino-GCC, Sino-American, and Sino-Israeli relations. The latter one is of paramount importance given that Beijing's interest in Israeli, and by proxy, in US, weapons, is at a record high.
Secondly, given the unpopularity of the Iranian regime, China seems to be investing much political capital on shaky ground, with the fate of its strategy entirely dependent on the Iranian administration's ability to maintain its hold on power. Anti-Chinese sentiments are already high in Iran.
Backing Iran
The Iranian public today have an aversion to China and Russia as perceived backers of their leaders, while many Iranian merchants and workers complain that imports of cheap Chinese goods are costing them their jobs and businesses. Should there be regime change in Iran, therefore, China's whole Gulf strategy would collapse. This is not to mention that embracing Tehran could distort China's image as a responsible actor on the world stage.
However, if, and this is a big if, the Iranian regime manages to remain in power, it could be argued that Beijing is acting more cunningly by taking into account the overall schemes of Chindia's geostrategic interests. China, India, and the US are all pursuing a grand policy commonly referred to as the "New Silk Road" strategy, seeking to establish their dominance over the vast natural resources of the Middle East and Central Asia.
Given Iran's geography, Tehran should naturally be the cornerstone of this strategy if it is to be realised. Yet, Washington, and by extension India, appear determined to bypass and replace Iran with a stable Afghanistan - in their imagining of a 21st Century version of the Silk Road.
The trouble here is that for Afghanistan to be stable, Iran and Pakistan's co-operation is a must. Pakistan's influence over Afghanistan is well documented. As for Iran's influence, suffice to say that a large number of Afghans speak Farsi and there are strong cultural and communal ties between the two states.
Aware of this, and in line with China's strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience and long-term thinking, Chinese officials seem to have decided to lend their backing to the Iranian government so to be able to utilise Iran's geography, influence over, and cultural proximity with its neighbours to advance China's own Silk Road strategy.
Furthermore, India's top national security concerns are likely to remain threats emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan over the medium term, and thus India will inevitably seek closer co-operation with any state that can address those concerns more constructively. As such, if Beijing - with the help of Tehran and Islamabad - proves more capable of stabilising Afghanistan, it will then be in a strong position to render US efforts in embracing India ineffective, especially that it has the institutional means for doing so - though BRICS organisations and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.
Nima Khorrami Assl is a security analyst at the Transnational Crisis Project in London.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
As the dust settled in the wake of 9/11, the only thing clear was that the United States was facing a new type of combat, and that our nation’s enemies were hiding out in the remote mountains of Afghanistan. Into this new climate, Brandon Webb and his fellow Navy SEALs embarked on one of the most critical missions in the War on Terror. By January 2002, Webb and company had penetrated deep into enemy territory, where they found a terror camp unlike any seen before. Inside the hunt for Al Qaeda.
From The Red Circle: My Life in the Navy SEAL Sniper Corps and How I Trained America’s Deadliest Marksmen, by Brandon Webb | Licensed to Alpha Media Group 2012Shortly after New Year’s Day 2002, my fellow SEALs and I learned we would be going on a mission to the province of Khost in Afghanistan, a few hundred miles northeast of Kandahar and nestled in the mountains right up against the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This was the home of the infamous Zhawar Kili cave complex, the location where Osama bin Laden is said to have officially declared war on America in 1998. My platoon had shipped out soon after 9/11, first to Kuwait, then Oman, before finally arriving in Afghanistan in mid-December.
Zhawar Kili was an elaborate complex of caves and tunnels built into the mountainside and one of the prime regions where Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership was believed to have fled after we bombed their hideouts at Tora Bora, some 50 miles to the north. It was also a major corridor to Pakistan.
Hard information on Zhawar Kili was sketchy at best. We knew there was a base camp consisting of three large tunnels, with an unknown number of rooms, caverns, and sub-tunnels. We also knew there was an extensive system of caves and tunnels built into the mountain ridge above the base camp. The place was a frigging warren, encompassing arms depots, communications, hotel-like residences, a mosque, a kitchen, a medical facility…an entire terrorist town drilled into the face of a mountain, with room for some 500 people.
It was also a fortress, and damn near invincible. It had been hit by U.S. air strikes shortly after hostilities commenced on October 7, 2001, but to little effect. In order to really nail this place, we needed people on the ground exploring the caves on foot and coming back with the specific coordinates that would allow precision strikes.
This was not originally our mission. The Zhawar Kili site was too large and complicated for our platoon of 16. We were going to need some reinforcements, so our numbers were appropriately goosed with the addition of a ground unit of about 20 Marines. We had our two-man Air Force Combat Control Team, Brad and Eric; and our two Explosive Ordnance Disposal guys, Brad (a different Brad) and Steve. We were also assigned two guys from the FBI to provide forensic expertise and DNA sample collection from enemy grave sites, one guy from the Counterterrorist Intelligence Center (CTIC), and a chemical-weapons expert from the Army’s Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment (CRD), for his expertise in combing through whatever we would find out there.
It was a three-hour insert by helicopter from Bagram Air Base to the Zhawar Kili complex. We were let off in the mountains predawn, about 4 a.m. Then we set off, patrolling our way in the direction of the caves.
A few kilometers in, I looked over at our breacher, Shawn, who was carrying a hooligan (a big metal breaching tool) on his back, along with a ton of explosives. Brad and Steve, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) techs, had their explosive equipment too. Choate, our assistant officer in charge, carried photographic and video equipment to document whatever we would find. These guys had to be miserable. We still had miles to go, and we were gaining altitude.
About an hour in, we took a water break. I sat down on the ground next to Shawn. “How you doin’, brother?” I felt bad for him. “Dude,” he said, “right about now I would welcome stepping on a land mine.”
Soon we were back on our feet, but by the time we got within proximity of the site, everyone was completely worn out, even Cassidy, our team leader. I saw Cassidy and Smith huddling up for a couple of minutes.
Then Cassidy came over to us. “All right, everybody,” he said, “we’re going to ditch our armor and stash it. We’ll cache it right here and pick it up again on our way out.”
Everyone started shucking their plates. Cassidy looked over at me. “Hey, Webb. Aren’t you going to stash your plates?” I shook my head. “Nope. I didn’t wear any.” Cassidy looked at me for a moment, then grinned. “You son of a bitch.”
From The Red Circle: My Life in the Navy SEAL Sniper Corps and How I Trained America’s Deadliest Marksmen, by Brandon Webb | Licensed to Alpha Media Group 2012I wasn’t trying to be a smart-ass: This was critical strategic thinking. You look at the kind of enemy we were up against: Here was a dude running around with nothing but a wool blanket, a wool hat, an AK-47, and maybe a little water and bullets. Not only did this guy know the terrain like the back of his hand, but he was also fast on his feet, running through the hills like a mountain goat. We needed to modify our equipment load if we wanted any hope of matching pace with the guys we were hunting.
By the time we reached the complex the sun was coming up. We started in at the base camp, taking a cave at a time. Our planes had pounded the hell out of the place. There had been quite a few people here the night before, but there was nothing now but bits and pieces of bodies, hardly anything even identifiable. It was a scene of pure carnage.
Inside the caves up on the ridge it was a whole other story. As we started penetrating into the mountainside, it became clear that our bombing raid hadn’t done shit. This place was in mint condition. These caves were so deeply burrowed that many of them were still completely intact. Hell, some went back a good half mile. Several of the tunnels were reinforced by steel beams and lined with brickwork, with plenty of evidence of Soviet craftsmanship left over from the ’80s.
Those first few hours going deep into the caves and tunnels were intense. We had no idea what we’d find in there. Fortunately we did not encounter a single person—but we were stunned at how much we found in the way of matériel. There were massive amounts of ordnance, ammo, and fuel. And they had stocked up on some big hardware, too, including tanks and other Soviet-era combat vehicles. These guys had prepared for quite the campaign.
We found classrooms with posters on the walls sporting anti-American slogans. On one the artist had cobbled together a photo of bin Laden in the foreground with two planes crashing into the Twin Towers in the background. I stared at this freakish piece of propaganda nearly open-mouthed. This thing was created as an Al Qaeda recruiting poster for the mission it illustrated. In other words, it had been put together before the event it was depicting had taken place. Standing there deep in the bowels of this godforsaken mountain on the other side of the world, staring at a picture of the attack on New York City that was composited and hung here before the attack itself actually occurred...It was one of the eeriest experiences I’ve ever had. I still have that poster.
It was hot, tedious, nerve-racking work. Within about four hours we had the whole place cleared. Fortunately, we hadn’t run into any resistance.
Now that we knew we were alone and had a general sense of the lay of the land, we went back through the whole place a second time, gathering up intel, collecting the smaller items we could bring back with us, and planting demolition in areas we would later blow up. After taking everything we could, we got the complex ready for the explosion. The blast created a huge fireball that nearly took out half the mountain. The secondaries cooked off for probably four to six hours. It was January 6, but it sure looked like the Fourth of July.
The next day four of us—Cassidy, Osman, Brad, and me—went out before dawn to patrol a site where a C-130 gunship had engaged some forces the night before, to see if we could find any bodies. Before we could do any serious searching, we heard voices coming from some nearby caves. The four of us instantly hit the ground and waited. As we watched, a group of enemy fighters—20 of them, at least, and all armed—started pouring out of a cave above us.
If this were happening in the movies, we would all just jump up to our feet and blow these guys away. But in real life it doesn’t work that way. We were outnumbered at least five to one, and we were not armed with machine guns. This was not the O.K. Corral, and if we leaped to our feet we would all be mowed down in short order. There was no hiding until they were gone, either: These guys were headed our way. We would have to call in an air strike, and do it fast.
From The Red Circle: My Life in the Navy SEAL Sniper Corps and How I Trained America’s Deadliest Marksmen, by Brandon Webb | Licensed to Alpha Media Group 2012There was a B-52 nearby. Brad got it on the radio. It was my job to give him the coordinates, but there was a snag: The only way to ensure that the team in the B-52 dropped their fireworks on the other guys and not on us was to give them the exact location. Typically we’d do this using a high-powered laser rangefinder hooked into a GPS, so that when it ranged the target it would give us not only the distance but also the target’s GPS coordinates. And these bombers are extremely accurate with their ordnance, like vertical snipers in the sky.
But we’d only planned for a simple 12-hour mission and didn’t have all our usual equipment. Typically, for a full-on recon mission, I’d have at least a good sniper rifle. We didn’t even have a decent rangefinder.
Training, training. As a SEAL sniper I’d been taught to estimate distances on the fly even without all the regular tools, using only my five senses and my gut. But usually I’d be shooting a 10-gram bullet from the muzzle of a rifle. In this case, we were shooting a 1,000-pound “bullet” out of a 125-ton aircraft, flying 20,000 feet above us at near the speed of sound, at a target less than 500 yards away from where we sat. And I had to get it right.
Those 20-plus Al Qaeda, or Taliban, or who the hell knew who, were trickling down the slope heading straight for our position. They hadn’t seen us yet, but it would be only seconds before they did. If we were going to do this thing, it had to be now.
“Brandon!” Cassidy hissed. “You need to Kentucky-windage this drop!” Kentucky windage is a term that means basically this: Wing it. Give it your best shot. I gave Cassidy a bearing I estimated as 100 meters past the group. If I was going to be off at all, better to guess long than short, and if I was balls-on accurate, a drop 100 meters behind them should at least buy us a few seconds to adjust and drop a second time.
Now the enemy cluster was so close we couldn’t wait any longer. We quickly moved to cover—and that’s when they spotted us. There were a few alarmed shouts and then the sounds of small-arms fire.
There is nothing quite so galvanizing as the distinct crack! snap! of semiautomatic weaponry being fired over your head, the crack! being the sound of the initial shot and the snap! being the bullet breaking the sound barrier as it zings past you.
We returned fire. I sighted one guy wearing a black headdress, dropped him. Quickly resighted and dropped a second, this one wearing the traditional Afghan wool roll-up hat. I sighted a third—then glanced up and saw vapor trails in the sky. The B-52 was flying so high it was invisible to us, but I knew exactly what was happening up there: They were dropping the first bomb.
When you are this close to a big explosion, it rocks your chest cavity. You want to make sure your mouth is open so the contained impact doesn’t burst your lungs. Brad got the call: We were seconds from impact. We opened our mouths, dropped, and rolled.
The Joint Direct Attack Munition is a big bomb and extremely accurate. When the first set hit, it shook the mountain under our feet, throwing rubble everywhere.
I whipped around and glanced back to assess the strike. Perfect—about 100 yards behind the target. I rolled again, adjusting numbers in my head, and shouted the new coordinates to Cassidy. Then an unexpected sound sliced through the strange silence: the wail of a baby crying.
My stomach twisted. I had a five-week-old baby boy at home whom I’d not yet held in my arms; hopefully I would survive this war to meet him face-to-face. Someone up on that hillside had a baby they would never see or hold again. I knew these people had made the decision to bring their families out here to this godforsaken fortress, knowingly putting them in harm’s way. It was their choice, I told myself, not ours. But I’ll never forget the sound of that baby’s cry.
We opened our mouths, ducked, and rolled. The second drop took them all.
Several days later we went out on another village op. There were genuine bad guys hiding out there, and there were people who were just up in the mountains, living the simple life. We could usually tell the difference pretty clearly… but not always.
There was a place we’d been watching for a few days now. These people appeared to be farmers, but we were not 100 percent positive. We decided it was time to go out there and see up close. I was set up as sniper overwatch to guard the platoon as they went in to meet the people and talk.
It was morning. I watched as Cassidy and his team made their way to where a small group of these guys had congregated in a few buildings. It wasn’t like we were storming the place; this was more of a diplomatic mission.
Having dug into my sniper overwatch position, in the kind of well-concealed hide we’d been trained to construct in the stalking phase of sniper school, I used the scope on my .300 Win Mag sniper rifle to get a closer look at these people. The villagers clearly saw Cassidy and the guys approaching. Something was going on there, but I couldn’t tell what.
I relayed my observations to Cassidy on the radio and told him to be on his toes.
As I continued moving my rifle in a small oscillating arc, shifting my view back and forth between Cassidy and his team and the little knot of Afghan farmers, I noticed one guy standing off to the side. He had a gun.
Shit.
The man had his rifle slung casually over his shoulder, and there was nothing threatening about the posture. I couldn’t tell if he was a bad actor or an innocent farmer. I was leaning toward farmer...But why was he carrying a gun? Alarm bells were going off in my head.
Cassidy and the team were now close to the house. Man, oh, man, I was thinking.
Do I take the shot? Will it put Cassidy in a tough spot?
The guy was about 600 yards away. I knew I could take him out in a heartbeat. I felt my finger against the trigger. Breathe out…focus…squeeze…pop.
It would be that easy. But if I did, it would certainly complicate the situation. If I shot the guy and it turned out he was innocent, we’d have quite a scene on our hands.Shit!
What do I do? I had all the information I was going to have. There was no more intel to weigh, no path of logic to make the wiser choice. It came down to pure instinct. Do I take the shot or not?
I breathed out…focused…squeezed...
I decided not to take the shot.
A moment later Cassidy and the guys were there talking to these Afghan farmers—and suddenly I caught a glimpse of movement way off to my left. Some character in Arab dress, clearly not Afghan, was hightailing it out of there, tearing along a little goat trail up the mountain toward Pakistan.
Motherfucker!
This guy could have been out there on his own, but I didn’t think so. The farmer I’d been targeting had been standing sentry. They were covering for this Al Qaeda dude or whoever he was, and the moment they had Cassidy and his team engaged in conversation, one of them had told him to take off.
I switched to my binoculars and caught him scurrying up the hill, closing in on a kilometer away. I couldn’t get an accurate shot off in time, and I couldn’t chase him, because I’d have to leave my hiding spot and would no longer be supporting Cassidy and the team.
I got back to Cassidy on the radio and told him what happened. I could see him now, going back and forth with the farmers, who were hotly denying everything. But I’d seen enough to know they were lying.
Thinking back over the whole sequence, I didn’t see what I would have done differently. With the information I had, giving this farmer the benefit of the doubt still seemed to me the right decision. Yes, these Afghan villagers would sometimes harbor other Afghans who were Taliban or Arabs we would call Al Qaeda. But for the most part, they were not bad people; they were just trying to get along and survive, to go on living there in the mountains the way they had been for generations without getting caught in the crosshairs of battle.
When we first arrived, in Kuwait and Oman and finally Afghanistan, we were hyped up and angry and ready to deliver payback. We were coming right off the shock of 9/11 and had all sorts of people e-mailing us from the States, voicing their support and cheering us on. Along with the caricature of the white devil and 3 echo on our platoon patch, I’d had a legend stitched underneath that read embrace the hate.
That’s the mode we operated in, and our rules of engagement certainly supported that: When in doubt, take them out. But as we got more immersed in the culture and began to see things from the point of view of the people who lived there, things began to shift a bit. I’d been in Afghanistan long enough now to understand that not everyone had to die.
From The Red Circle: My Life in the Navy SEAL Sniper Corps and How I Trained America’s Deadliest Marksmen, by Brandon Webb. Copyright © 2012, reprinted by permission of St. Martin’s Press, LLC.
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- GAO/NSIAD-96-225 Foreign Missile Threats: Analytical Soundness of Certain NIEs
- GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combatting Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks
- GAO/NSIAD-97-53 Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of National Intelligence Estimate 95-19
- GAO/NSIAD-98-245 EOP Procedures for...Intelligence Information
- The Environment and National Security Speech (1996)
- Rand Hot Topics: Intelligence Gathering
- SSCI Report on Committee Activities, Jan. 4, 1995-Oct. 3, 1996 (also in pdf)
- SSCI Rules
- DCI Directive 1/7: Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information
- Intelligence Oversight Board's Guatemala Review (1996) via CIP
- Department of State's Guatemala Documents
- Executive Order 12863 on the PFIAB (also in pdf format)
- Executive Order 12958: Classified National Security Information (pdf format)
- Executive Order 12968: Access to Classified Information (pdf format)
- Executive Order 12972: Amendment to Executive Order 12958 (pdf format)
- Executive Order 12977: Interagency Security Committee (pdf format)
- Executive Order 13142: Amendment to Executive Order 12958 (also in pdf format)
- Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2000 (pdf format, ca 2 mb)2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
- Technology Collection Trends in the U.S. Defense Industry (2002)
- Checklist for the Future of Intelligence
Legislative Bills, Laws, and Reports
- Public Law 95-511 [summary] Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
- Intelligence Related Laws through March 25, 2003 (via HPSCI or local) (2.6 mb pdf)
- S.2089 A Bill to Amend FISA, introduced in the Senate Feb. 24, 2000 (pdf)
- Executive Summary and Report: Investigation of Espionage Allegations Against Dr. Wen Ho Lee (Released by Sen. Arlen Specter)
- Public Law 104-93 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1996 (pdf)
- Public Law 104-293 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1997 (pdf)
- Public Law 105-107 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1998 (pdf)
- Senate Report 105-24 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1998 (pdf)
- House Report 105-135 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1998 (pdf)
- Conference Report 105-350 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1998 (pdf)
- Public Law 105-272 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1999 (pdf)
- HR3694(enrolled) Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1999 (pdf)
- Senate Report 105-185 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1999 (pdf)
- House Report 105-508 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1999 (pdf)
- Conference Report 105-780 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1999 (pdf)
- Senate Report 106-3 on Activities of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- Senate Report 106-048 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2000 (txt)
- House Report 106-130 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2000 (pdf)
- Conference Report 106-457 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2000 (txt) and (pdf)
- HR1555 (enrolled bill) Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2000 (pdf)
- Public Law 106-120 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2000 (pdf)
- House Report 106-620 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001 (pdf)
- Senate Report 106-279 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001 (pdf)
- Conference Report 106-969 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001 (pdf)
- Veto Message on Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001 (November 4, 2000) (pdf)
- Public Law 106-567 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001 (pdf)
- House Report 107-219 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2002 (pdf)
- Senate Report 107-63 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2002 (pdf)
- Conference Report 107-328 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2002 (pdf)
- Public Law 107-108 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2002 (pdf)
- Senate Report 107-149 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 (pdf)
- Public Law 107-306 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 (pdf)
- House Report 108-163 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 (pdf)
- Senate Report 108-44 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 (pdf)
- House Report 108-558 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005 (pdf)
- Senate Report 108-258 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005 (pdf)
- House Report 109-101 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2006 (pdf)
- Senate Report 109-142 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2006 (pdf)
- House Report 109-411 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2007 (pdf)
- Senate Report 109-259 on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2007 (pdf)
- Public Law 107-56 (USA Patriot Act of 2001)
- Senate Report 109-85 on USA Patriot Act Renewal (2005)
- HPSCI Committee Activity Report for the 105th Congress (173 kb pdf)
- HPSCI Committee Activity Report for the 106th Congress (98 kb pdf)
- SSCI Committee Activity Report for the 107th Congress (pdf)
- Senate Report 107-51 on Committee Activities, Jan. 6, 1999-Dec. 15, 2000. (174 kb pdf)
- Cox Report via House Server or locally on technology transfer and theft of Nuclear Secrets by the PRC
- Report of the Redmond Panel on Improving Counterintelligence at DOE/National Laboratories (pdf)
- SSCI China Report: Report on Impacts to U.S. National Security of Advanced Satellite Technology Exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Report on the PRC’s Efforts to Influence U.S. Policy
- SSCI Report on the US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq
- Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report (1.6 mb pdf)
- Handling of FBI Intelligence Information Related to the Justice Department’s Campaign Finance Investigation (USDOJ/OIG Special Report: July, 1999)
- FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters is Limited (GAO Report 01-780, July, 2001)
- House Reports 109-384 and 109-385 regarding domestic CT surveillance.
- USCODE (U.S. House of Representatives Internet Law Library U.S. Code)
Hearings, Statements, and Testimony
- William Webster (Fmr. DCI) Testimony before House Committee on National Security February 13, 1997
- Anthony Lake Testimony before the SSCI March 11, 1997
- Thomas R. Wilson, DDIA, before the SSCI 2 February 2000
- George Tenet (DCI), before the SSCI 2 February 2000 [as prepared for delivery]
- John Deutch (Fmr. DCI) Testimony before House Committee on National Security February 12, 1998
- James Woolsey (Fmr. DCI)Testimony before House Committee on National Security, February 12, 1998
- Terrorism and Intelligence Operations, before Joint Economic Committee, May 20, 1998
- CIA: Observations of GAO Access to information on CIA Programs and Activities, GAO Testimony July 18, 2001 (pdf format)
- Disclosure of Classified Information to Congress, before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 4 and 11, 1998 (S. Hrg. 105-729)
- Hearing: Infectious Disease: Threat to America's Health and Security, June 29,2000. H.Serial 106-146 (3.5 MB pdf)
- Hearing: State Department Domestic Security Lapses, May 17, 2000. H.Serial 106-162 (2.4 MB pdf)
- Hearing: Russian Intelligence Activities Directed at the Department of State.Feb.10,2000. S.Hrg.106-565 (225 kb pdf)
- Hearing: NIE on Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Feb. 9, 2000. S.Hrg. 106-671 (4.3 MB pdf)
- Hearing: Defense Security Service Oversight, Feb. 16, 2000. H.Serial 106-152 (3.5 MB pdf)
- Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks GAO testimony Feb. 16, 2000
- DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program are Being Addressed GAO testimony April 6, 2000
- More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance Reinvestigations is Needed GAO testimony September 20, 2000
- Defense Security Service: Mission Degradation? Hearing before Subcom.on Nat.Sec.,Vet.Aff.,and IR of the House Committee of Government Reform, March 2, 2001
- For testimony on U.S. weapons labs and foreign espionage, see technology transfer
Reorganization, Reform, and Management
- IRTPA and IC Reform
- Assessing the 9/11 Panel's Recommendations for Reshaping American Intelligence (2004, via TCF)
- John Millis (HPSCI Staff Director) Address at the CIRA Luncheon, October 5, 1998, via JYA.
- IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century via GPO or local
- Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy Report via GPO or local
- Commision on the Roles and Capabilities of the US IC via FAS
- Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence
- Rethinking Intelligence, via GovExec
- DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risk (GAO/NSIAD)
- DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations (GAO/NSIAD)
- NRO at the Crossroads (Report of the National Commission for the Review of the NRO, 2000)(6 mb pdf)
- NSA 1999 External Team Review (large pdf file, ca. 2.7 mb)
- NSA 1999 NETeam (Internal) Review (very large pdf file, ca. 6.5 mb)
- Security Clearance Investigation FAQ
- NPR (National Performance Review)Intelligence Agency Activities
- NPR Intelligence Agency Activities Update 1
- NPR Intelligence Agency Activities Update 2
- NPR New Recommendations for Intelligence Agencies
- Gore announces NPR New Recommendations for Intelligence
- Counter Intelligence Effectiveness (White House Statement: May 4, 1994)
- U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies since 1947 via CSI
Terrorism / Counterterrorism
- Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Annual Report to Congress, 1999 (pdf, 919 kb)
- Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (St. Andrews University)
- Combatting Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO Report, April 1998)
- Combatting Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks (GAO/NSIAD-99-163)
- FEMA Virtual Library on Terrorism
- Foreign Terrorist Organizations, via U.S. Department of State
- Heritage Foundation Library on Intelligence/Counter-Terrorism
- HEROES (State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security: Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program)
- Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan
- Khobar Towers Bombing Incident (Staff Report, House National Security Committee, August 1996)
- National Commission on Terrorism Report, 2000 (pdf, 3.2 mb)
- National Domestic Preparedness Office
- Office for DomesticPreparedness (Justice Department)
- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996 via State Department
- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997 via State Department
- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998 via State Department
- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999 via State Department (or local 3.4 mb pdf)
- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000, via State Department
- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001, via State Department
- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, via State Department
- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, via State Department
- Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004
- Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005 and map
- Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006
- Country Reports on Terrorism, 2007
- Country Reports on Terrorism, 2008
- Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Site (Centers for Disease Control)
- Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 - by the HPSCI and SSCI (5.5mb pdf, via GPO or local)
- Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Prior to the September 11 Attacks
or in pdf- Terrorism and Intelligence Operations, before Joint Economic Committee, May 20, 1998
- Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues (CRS)(pdf)
- Terrorism Incident Annex to Federal Response Plan (pdf)
- Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 2nd Annual Report to Congress, Dec. 2000
- Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001 (CRS)(pdf)
- UK Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005
- Government Response to the ISC's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005
- Report of the Official Account of the Bombing in London on 7 July 2005
Journals, Articles, and Papers Related to Strategic Intelligence
- Journal of Intelligence and National Security (Table of contents and contact information.)
- Journal of Intelligence History
- Can't Anybody Here Play This Game? (Atlantic Monthly, February 1998)
- Intelligence and National Security (15 Year Index)
- International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (on-line index is available)
- National Security and the Future (International Journal published by the St. George Association)
- Russia's Security Services: A Checklist for Reform (from Perspectives)
- The Pitfalls of U.S. Covert Operations via Cato
- Profile: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
- Making Intelligence Smarter
- Intelligence Lost
- The Warning-Response Problem (via Carnegie Commission)
- The Cryptolog
- Strategic Assessments 1995-1999 via NDU
- The Rapid Expansion of Intelink
- Kent Center Occasional Papers via CIA
- Unclassified articles from CIA's Studies in Intelligence: On-line index and access via CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence
- Council on Foreign Relations Report on Intel (2/96), via FAS
- The Satellite Encyclopedia
Of Historical Interest
Cuban Missile Crisis
- CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis (large pdf)
- Foreign Relations of the US: Cuban Missile Crisis via State Department
- Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges (local)
- RealAudio recordings from Oval Office during Cuban Missile Crisis
- Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, via NSArchives
- NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis
- Naval Historical Center Document on the Naval Quarantine
- Presenting the Photographic Evidence Abroad via CSI
- Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis via CSI
Declassification
- CIA's Electronic Document Release Center
- CIA Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness (1991)
- DCI Gates Response to Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness (1992)
- Conference Remarks on (De-)Classification by John Podesta (Nov. 1998)
- Declassified Military Resources
- Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group via NARA
- State Department Electronic Reading Room
- DIA Electronic Reading Room
- FBI Electronic Reading Room
- GWU Declassification Productivity Research Center
- Activities of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel 5/1997-4/1998
- National Archives: Rules on Declassification of National Security Information
National Archives Guide to OSS Records- National Archives Guide to CIA Records
- National Archives Guide to DIA Records
- National Archives Guide to FBI Records
- National Archives Guide to FBIS Records
- National Archives Guide to NSA/CSS Records
- Yale Library Declassified Documents Site
- Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Summary and full text
Historical Espionage (see also Ames and Hanssen)
- Espionage case summaries from DSS
CNN's Intelligence Interactive: Cold War Espionage- NSA Venona Program
- FBI's FOIA documents on Venona (local) (~3 megs) or via FBI server
- FBI Press Release re: Earl Edwin Pitts
- FBI Affidavit re: Harold James Nicholson
- FBI Summary of the Nathan Silvermaster Group via FBI server
- FBI Summary of the Rosenberg Case (local) Part 1 and Part 2 (~3 megs)or via FBI server
- FBI Summary of the Burgess, MacLean, and Philby Cases (local) or via FBI server
- FBI Summary of Tokyo Rose (local) Parts 1, 2, and 3 or via FBI server
- Historical Images of female spies in the Civil War (via UVA)
- Alger Hiss Story Conference Transcripts, via NYU
- DOJ Final Report on the Leung espionage case
- Ponger - Verber Espionage Case
- Executive Sessions of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations (McCarthy Hearings, 1953-54), via GPO or local (volumes I, II, III, IV, V) [large pdf files, ca. 2.5 mb per volume]
- Spy Letters of the American Revolution (Via University of Michgan)
Historical SIGINT Topics
- NSA Historical Publications
- Cryptologic Histories
- Bletchley Park Trust
- On Enigma and a Method for its Decryption
- Funkaufklaerung im 2. Weltkrieg
- The Turing Bombe
- National Cryptologic Museum
- NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis
- NSA releases on the 1958 shootdown of a USAF C-130
- Korea: AFSA Role (1.9 mb pdf)
- Korea: Chinese Intervention (1.9 mb pdf)
- Pearl Harbor Revisited: US Navy Communications Intelligence
- Truman Memorandum (Oct. 24, 1952) Establishing NSA (.tif format)
- USS Liberty Memorial Page
- NSA releases of USS Liberty incident audio intercepts, transcripts, and reports
- USS Liberty Messages
- NSA Venona Program
- FBI's FOIA documents on Venona (local) (~3 megs)
- The Zimmermann Telegraph available in coded or decoded versions
Research Related Organizations
- Guatemala Document Collection via National Security Archives
- Harvard Project on Cold War Studies
- Cold War International History Project
- International Intelligence History Study Group
Satellites
- Imaging Space Reconnaissance Operations during the Cold War [William Burrows]
- Corona: America's First Satellite Program (local 18 mb pdf) or via CIA's CSI
- Index, Declassified Collection of CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD Records, 26 Nov 97
- The Life and Death of Cosmos 954 from Studies in Intelligence, Spring 1978 (pdf file, 587 kb)
- NRO Launches from 1959-1965 (F97-0007)
- Declassified imagery via USGS Earth Explorer
- Declassified Satellite Images: Corona
- Declassified Satellite Images: Ocean Topography
- NRO Declassification Initiatives
- NRO: Strategy for Addressing the Commercialization fo Satellite Imagery
Other Historical Documents and Subjects
- The Family Jewels
- At Cold War's End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991 via CSI
- Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution via CSI (pdf)
- Church Committee publications via AARC (html and pdf)
CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1992- CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974
- CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 22 megs to PC rather than trying to open over the web)
- My Years with the CIA by Historian George C. Herring
- CIA Creation Collection access via State Department Electronic Reading Room
- British Security and Intelligence History: Documents Overview
- Citizens Guide to Using the FOIA/Privacy Act (House of Representatives pdf)
- The Easter Offensive of 1972 (via FAS)
- Rockefeller Commission Report via AARC (html and pdf)
- Target Central Europe: American Intelligence Efforts Regarding Nazi and Early Postwar Austria
- The Farewell Dossier: Duping the Soviets (pdf format-large) (Gus Weiss, Studies in Intelligence, v.39 no.5, 1996) or html via CSI
- William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan from FBI FOIA Documents
- KGB History (pdf in Russian, via Harvard University)
- List of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (1948-1977)
- CIA Reports on Oswald in Mexico
The Ames Affair
- Ames Complaint and Warrants
- White House Press Conference on Ames (February 22, 1994)
- White House Statement on Ames (February 22, 1994)
- A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of Aldrich Hazen Ames (DOJ Inspector General, April, 1997)
- 1994 CIA Inspector General Report on the Ames Affair
- 1995 CIA Inspector General SSCI Statement on the Ames Affair
- Security Awareness Bulletin on the Ames Affair
- DCI Deutch Oct. 95 Public Statement on Ames Damage Assessment
- DCI Deutch Dec. 95 SSCI Statement on Ames Damage Assessment
- The Ames Scandal: A Moscow Perspective
The Hanssen Affair
- Robert Hanssen Complaint and Warrants
- Hanssen case photographs
- FBI Press Release on the Arrest of Robert Philip Hanssen, 20 February 2001
- President Bush's Comments on the Arrest of Robert Philip Hanssen, 20 February 2001
- A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen via DOJ/OIG (also DOJ pdf or local pdf)
- Review of the FBI Security Program and its Transformation (Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, July 2001)
- Hanssen plea agreement (via findlaw)
- Hanssen sentencing memorandum (via findlaw)
Debates and Wild Controversy
- Iraq's WMD Programs (Oct. 2002)
- Iraqi Bio Warfare (May 2003)
- DCI Special Advisor Report on Iraq's WMD (Sept. 2004) Key Findings, Vol. 1, Vol. 2, Vol. 3, Duelfer Addenda (March 2005)
- Prospects for Iraq's Stability NIE (Feb. 2007)
- GAO/NSIAD-95-187: Results of a Search for Records Concerning the 1947 Crash Near Roswell, NM FISA and the Fourth Amendment Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks (Atlantic Monthly, Aug. 1979) High Resolution, Unresolved (Atlantic Monthly, July 1996) Justice for Jonathan Pollard (n.b.Website authorized by the Pollards) Listening In: Eavesdropping and the National Security Agency (via TCF) The Politicized C.I.A. [sic.] via Center for Security Policy The RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) Debate Page via Commonwealth Institute/Project on Defense Alternatives The CIA as Economic Spy: The Misuse of Intelligence via CATO Institute National Intelligence Council, Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years. Testimony 28 February 1996. DIA, Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and its Interests Abroad, 5 February 1997 Budget of the IC Chinese Espionage stories from the Washington Post Wen Ho Lee Supporter's Page Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation, May 2000 ("The Bellows Report")(local; also available directly from Department of Justice)
Echelon
- Technologies of Political Control (scanned, via Cryptome)
- Interception Capabilities 2000 (EP Report on ECHELON and COMINT, via NRC Handelsblad)
- Working Papers From the European Parliament/STOA:
- Volume 1: Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (pdf via FAS)
Volume 2: The state of the art in Communications Intelligence (COMINT)(pdf via FAS)
Volume 3: Encryption and cryptosystems in electronic surveillance (pdf via FAS)
Volume 4: The legality of the interception of electronic communications (pdf via FAS)
Volume 5: The perception of economic risks arising from the potential vulnerability of electronic commercial media to interception (pdf via FAS)
Conference Postings:
International Studies Association February 10-12, 2010, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA (See also the call for papers)
To contact us by E-mail with link suggestions or to report broken links: Political Science Department at Loyola College in Maryland. With apologies, we are unable to respond to questions.
Strategic Intelligence Homepage, Copyright Kevin Hula
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